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The court ordered temporary care to the grandmother with conditions restricting the grandfather's access.
This is a temporary care and custody motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.
The Halton Children's Aid Society sought an order that a 13-year-old child remain in the temporary care and custody of her maternal grandmother, subject to supervision and conditions prohibiting the maternal grandfather from being left alone with the child and from sleeping in the family residence at night.
The grandfather faced criminal charges for historical sexual offenses involving multiple alleged victims.
The grandparents sought to have the child remain in their joint care without supervision or with minimal conditions.
The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of sexual abuse by the grandfather based on credible hearsay evidence of multiple allegations, the pattern of alleged abuse, and the child's age falling within the grandfather's apparent victim profile.
The court rejected a proposed bedroom lock condition as placing inappropriate responsibility on the child and granted the Society's motion, ordering the child to remain in the grandmother's temporary care and custody subject to supervision and the requested conditions.
Estoppel preserved the lien despite defective statutory sale notice.
The appellant secured creditor appealed an order permitting the respondent lien claimant to realize on proceeds from the auction sale of horses despite giving less than the two weeks' newspaper notice required by the Innkeepers Act.
The Court of Appeal held that estoppel by convention was available as a matter of law and was compatible with the statutory purpose of preserving a lien for unpaid horse-care charges.
The owner had notice and an opportunity to redeem, no public complaint arose, and the appellant knew of and was content with the sale proceeding as scheduled while intending to claim excess funds.
In those circumstances, the notice defect did not nullify the respondent's lien and the appeal was dismissed.
Applicant found to be principally dependent on deceased father and entitled to death benefit.
The applicant applied for a death benefit under section 25 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule following the death of her father in a motorcycle accident.
The insurer denied the benefit, arguing she was not principally dependent on him for financial support.
The arbitrator found that the applicant was principally dependent on her father in the year prior to the accident, as he contributed substantially to her expenses and intended to pay off her student loan.
The applicant was therefore entitled to the death benefit.
Third-party production order granted to compel brother to produce deceased father's financial records for dependency claim.
The applicant sought death benefits from the insurer following her father's death in a motor vehicle accident, claiming she was a dependant.
The insurer denied the claim.
In the course of arbitration, the applicant brought a motion for a third-party production order against her brother to obtain their late father's financial records.
The brother did not respond to the motion.
The arbitrator granted the motion, finding the documents relevant to the dependency issue and satisfying the requirements for third-party production under the Dispute Resolution Practice Code and the Insurance Act.
Appeal of Deputy Director's boundary confirmation dismissed as the decision was reasonable and supported by evidence.
The appellant appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles under the Boundaries Act confirming the location of a boundary between her property and the respondents' property.
The Deputy Director had rejected the boundary lines proposed by both parties' expert surveyors, instead relying on a 1970 survey and the historical location of a snake rail fence.
The Divisional Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found that the Deputy Director's decision was supported by the evidence.
The appeal was dismissed.
Appeal dismissed; commercial tenant held responsible under lease for security alterations required by municipal authority.
The appellant tenant appealed a decision interpreting a protective installations clause in a commercial lease.
The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the tenant was responsible for the costs of work required by a municipal authority, as the work comprised additions or alterations for the security of the tenant and its employees.
The court noted that under the lease, the tenant was required to satisfy itself that the premises were fit for occupation before entering into the lease.