Daniel Strigberger

This appeal concerns the extraterritorial application of Ontario's loss transfer provisions under section 275 of the Insurance Act.

The applicant, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, appealed an arbitrator's decision that it was bound to indemnify the respondent, Echelon Insurance, for statutory accident benefits paid to an Ontario resident involved in an accident in Alberta.

Aviva argued that the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in Primmum Insurance Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, which supported the application of loss transfer in similar cross-jurisdictional scenarios, was effectively overturned by a later Court of Appeal decision in Travelers Insurance Company of Canada v. CAA Insurance Company.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that Primmum remains binding precedent on the issue of loss transfer, as Travelers addressed priority disputes under a different section of the Act and explicitly left the correctness of Primmum open for another day.

The court affirmed that an insurer licensed and doing business in Ontario is subject to the loss transfer provisions, regardless of where the specific policy was issued or the accident occurred.

The plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger on an ATV driven by Tyler Drenth and owned by Theodore Drenth.

The third-party insurer denied coverage on the basis that Tyler breached a statutory condition of the automobile policy by driving on a highway with a G1 licence after consuming alcohol.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the full third-party limits were available to Theodore.

The court found that Theodore only consented to Tyler driving on a specific lane to access trails, and did not consent to him driving on the shoulder of the road where the accident occurred.

The court held that Theodore's breach of the statutory condition by permitting Tyler to drive on the lane did not taint the entire trip.

The court also found that, in the alternative, relief from forfeiture would be granted.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted.

Michael Beaudin, severely injured in a dirt bike motocross competition, sought statutory accident benefits from Travelers Insurance.

Travelers denied coverage, arguing the dirt bike was not an "automobile" under the Insurance Act and Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) because it was exempt from the Off-Road Vehicles Act (ORVA) insurance requirement.

The core issue on appeal was whether the ORVA exemption for closed course competitions applied only if the competition was sponsored by a motorcycle association.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the ORVA exemption applies only to sponsored competitions.

Consequently, the dirt bike was not exempt and was considered an "automobile," entitling Beaudin to benefits.

The appeal was dismissed.

On a statutory appeal from a License Appeal Tribunal reconsideration decision, the insurer challenged a ruling that an injured dirt bike rider was entitled to statutory accident benefits.

The court held there was no legal error in allocating onus to the insurer on the narrow exemption issue and no reversible error in applying the Adams framework.

Interpreting s. 2(1)5 of O. Reg. 863 purposively and contextually, the court agreed that motorcycle-association sponsorship applies to both closed course competitions and rallies, so the exemption did not apply on the record.

Although the reconsideration reasons improperly referenced a document outside the hearing record, the court found no procedural unfairness because that reference did not affect the ultimate analysis.

The appeal and the insurer’s fresh-evidence motion were dismissed, with costs to the respondent.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitration award finding it responsible for paying statutory accident benefits to a pedestrian struck by a vehicle.

The appellant had initially agreed to accept priority for the claim but later sought to withdraw its acceptance, arguing it was made in error.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the arbitrator's finding that an insurer cannot unilaterally withdraw its agreement to accept priority absent exceptional circumstances.

The court confirmed that the acceptance of priority precluded the insurer from initiating a priority dispute arbitration under the regulation.

Two Ontario residents injured in separate accidents outside Ontario involving an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) and a dirt bike sought statutory accident benefits (SABs) under their Ontario automobile insurance policies.

Both insurers denied coverage, arguing that the definition of "automobile" under Ontario law should be determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the accidents occurred (lex loci delicti).

The Court of Appeal held that Ontario law applies to the interpretation of Ontario contracts and statutes, and that the definition of "automobile" in the Insurance Act and Off-Road Vehicles Act applies uniformly regardless of where the accident occurs.

Both vehicles qualified as automobiles under the extended definition because they would have required insurance if operated in Ontario under the Off-Road Vehicles Act.

The court allowed the appeal of the insured and dismissed the appeal of the insurer.

The appellant, an out-of-province insurer, appealed an arbitrator's decision finding that the priority provisions in s. 268 of the Insurance Act applied to it for a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Ontario.

The appellant argued that applying the Ontario legislation would have an extra-jurisdictional effect.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, applying the reasonableness standard of review.

The court held that because the accident occurred in Ontario and the appellant had signed a Power of Attorney and Undertaking (PAU), it was bound by the priority provisions of the Insurance Act.

Northbridge General Insurance Corporation appealed an arbitrator's decision that designated it as the priority insurer for accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

Northbridge contended that Co-Operators General Insurance Company failed to provide proper notice under section 3(1) of Ontario Regulation 283/95, thereby precluding Co-Operators from asserting Northbridge's priority.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review to the arbitrator's decision, consistent with The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company v. Unifund Assurance Company.

The court upheld the arbitrator's finding that Co-Operators' initial failure to notify Northbridge directly under section 3(1) was not fatal, as Intact Insurance Company subsequently provided notice to Northbridge under section 10(1) of the Regulation.

The court emphasized the practical realities of priority investigations and the public policy of ensuring timely benefit payments.

The appeal was dismissed, and Northbridge was ordered to pay costs to both respondents.

The appellant, Travelers Insurance Company, appealed an arbitrator's decision that it was the priority insurer for statutory accident benefits following an accident in Nunavut.

The arbitrator found Travelers liable because it was an Ontario insurer, had filed a Power of Attorney and Undertaking (PAU) in Ontario, and was the insurer of the car involved.

Travelers argued the arbitrator erred by applying Ontario law to a Nunavut policy without first determining if the policy provided Ontario benefits coverage.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that Travelers, as an Ontario-licensed insurer and PAU signatory, was bound by Ontario's priority laws, precluding it from denying coverage based on the accident's location.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the standard of review applicable to insurance arbitral decisions resolving priority disputes under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The first appeal involved a claimant listed as an excluded driver on his parents' policy who was injured as a passenger in another vehicle.

The second involved a claimant similarly listed as an excluded driver who was injured while driving an uninsured motorcycle.

The central issue was whether excluded drivers could qualify as "insured persons" under the SABS definition and thus trigger priority coverage under their parents' policies.

The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate standard of review for such arbitral decisions is reasonableness, not correctness, and that arbitrators' interpretations of the SABS and insurance policies within their specialized expertise warrant deference.

The applicant insurer sought to appeal an arbitration decision regarding priority for paying statutory accident benefits for an extra-provincial motor vehicle accident.

The applicant argued that leave to appeal was not required because the parties had entered into an unwritten arbitration agreement permitting appeals on questions of law or mixed fact and law.

The court found that the parties' conduct and communications evidenced a binding arbitration agreement containing the appeal provision.

Consequently, the applicant was entitled to appeal the arbitrator's decision without leave.

Belair Insurance Company appealed an arbitrator's decision that found it 100% at fault for indemnifying State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for statutory accident benefits under a loss transfer dispute.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the arbitrator's interpretation of the Fault Determination Rules, specifically rules 12(5) and 13(2), under a reasonableness standard.

The arbitrator had concluded that Rule 13(2) did not apply to incidents involving vehicles travelling in opposite directions in adjacent lanes at an uncontrolled intersection, as such scenarios were covered by Rule 12(5).

The court upheld the arbitrator's interpretation, finding it reasonable and consistent with the legislative scheme's purpose of providing an expedient method for fault determination among insurers.

The appeal was dismissed.

The insurer brought an application seeking a determination that the respondent was not involved in an "accident" within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and therefore not entitled to accident benefits.

The court held that disputes concerning entitlement to benefits, including whether an accident occurred, must proceed through the statutory dispute resolution process under the Insurance Act.

Allowing an insurer to unilaterally seek a court determination would undermine the legislative scheme and expose insured persons to premature cost consequences.

The court also found that the application procedure was inappropriate where material facts were disputed and no agreed statement of facts existed.

An insurer brought an application seeking a declaration that the respondent’s injuries did not arise from an “accident” within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The respondent had tripped over a motorcycle that had been temporarily parked in a pedestrian walkway at a campsite and sustained serious spinal injuries.

Applying the two‑part purpose and causation test from Amos and subsequent Ontario Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court held that the temporary parking of the motorcycle constituted the use or operation of an automobile.

The motorcycle’s placement in the walkway was found to be the dominant feature causing the injuries and created an unbroken chain of causation.

The court declared that the incident was an “accident” under the SABs.

A heavy commercial vehicle insured by the appellant initiated a chain reaction collision by rear-ending a stopped vehicle, which in turn rear-ended a vehicle insured by the respondent.

The respondent paid statutory accident benefits to its insured and sought loss transfer indemnification from the appellant.

The arbitrator held that under Rule 9(4) of the Fault Determination Rules, the appellant was 100 per cent at fault for the incident and liable to indemnify the respondent, despite the absence of a direct collision between their respective vehicles.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the plain meaning of Rule 9(4) imposes liability for the entire incident on the moving vehicle that initiates the chain reaction.

The appeal concerned a preliminary arbitration decision arising from a statutory accident benefits priority dispute under s. 268 of the Insurance Act and O. Reg. 283/95.

The appellant argued that the insurer initiating the dispute was required to conduct a reasonable investigation and give notice to all insurers potentially higher in priority before serving the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The court held that the wording of s. 3 of the Regulation did not impose a general duty to investigate before giving notice and required notice only to insurers the initiating insurer claims are liable.

The court agreed with the arbitrator’s interpretation that the Regulation does not obligate the first insurer to notify every potentially higher-priority insurer or conduct a full investigation prior to issuing a priority dispute notice.

The arbitrator’s decision was upheld.