Matthew Wells

The plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger on an ATV driven by Tyler Drenth and owned by Theodore Drenth.

The third-party insurer denied coverage on the basis that Tyler breached a statutory condition of the automobile policy by driving on a highway with a G1 licence after consuming alcohol.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the full third-party limits were available to Theodore.

The court found that Theodore only consented to Tyler driving on a specific lane to access trails, and did not consent to him driving on the shoulder of the road where the accident occurred.

The court held that Theodore's breach of the statutory condition by permitting Tyler to drive on the lane did not taint the entire trip.

The court also found that, in the alternative, relief from forfeiture would be granted.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granted in favour of the respondent on a motion concerning the interpretation of paragraph 20 of a Licence Agreement between Gro-Bark and Eacom.

The motion judge granted summary judgment by simply adopting the respondent's factum without engaging in the required contractual interpretative exercise or articulating the basis for his findings.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to properly analyze the evidence and explain his reasoning, and therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the decision.

The appellants appealed an order regarding the admissibility of proposed expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge, rather than a motion judge, should determine the admissibility of expert evidence to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, ensure full context, and prevent tactical preliminary steps.

The court noted that even if a motion judge has such jurisdiction, it should only be exercised in the rarest of cases.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to exclude the medical report and evidence of a defence expert, Dr. Bednar, prior to trial.

The motions judge had declined to rule on the admissibility, holding that such a determination should be reserved for the trial judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, with the majority finding that it would be extremely rare for a motions judge to be in an equal or better position than the trial judge to rule on the exclusion of expert evidence.

Matlow J. dissented, arguing the motions judge had jurisdiction under Rule 37.02(1) and should have considered the merits.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal upholding the accused's acquittal on dangerous driving counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that while there was evidence upon which a trier of fact could make a finding of dangerous driving, the failure to do so did not amount to an error of law.