Andrew Yolles

The plaintiffs brought eight proposed class actions against various long-term care (LTC) home owners and operators in Ontario, alleging systemic negligence and gross negligence in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered whether the claims met the certification criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, particularly in light of the statutory immunity provided by the Supporting Ontario's Recovery Act (SORA).

The court certified six of the actions against the main corporate groups, finding that the pleadings disclosed a viable cause of action in gross negligence and that a class action was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the certification motions against independently owned homes and municipalities due to the lack of a collective enterprise and missing representative plaintiffs.

The defendants moved to adjourn a lengthy personal injury trial arising from a 2014 motor vehicle accident, citing late service of expert reports and outstanding productions by the plaintiffs.

The court considered the principles for adjournment, including the objective of a just determination on merits and potential prejudice.

While some late reports for one plaintiff (Khadim) were not sufficient for adjournment, a recently served psycho-vocational report for the other plaintiff (Khan) indicating complete unemployability was deemed significant.

The court found that the defendants would be prejudiced if they could not adequately respond to this new evidence.

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on trial scheduling, the motion to adjourn was granted to ensure a fair trial on the merits, vacating the fixed trial date.

A case management conference was held for five related actions arising from a 2016 motor vehicle accident.

The court noted partial compliance with a previous timetable and ordered further deadlines for answering undertakings, arranging defence medical examinations, and serving expert reports.

The court also directed that the matters be tried together and admonished counsel for sending representatives without knowledge or authority to the case conference.

This endorsement outlines a case management order for five consolidated actions arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court, acting as case management judge, set a timetable for the remaining procedural steps, including the completion of examinations for discovery, answering undertakings, conducting defence medical examinations, and scheduling a mediation.

The order also directed counsel to circulate a draft consent order for trial of the actions together and to advise on the continuation of an action against a specific insurer.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granted in favour of the respondent on a motion concerning the interpretation of paragraph 20 of a Licence Agreement between Gro-Bark and Eacom.

The motion judge granted summary judgment by simply adopting the respondent's factum without engaging in the required contractual interpretative exercise or articulating the basis for his findings.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to properly analyze the evidence and explain his reasoning, and therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the decision.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent plaintiff claimed chronic pain, anxiety, and depression resulting from a relatively minor collision.

The appellants raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on alleged prejudicial evidence regarding the respondent's complaints about defence counsel's conduct, and (2) the trial judge erred in allowing an amendment to the statement of claim following the jury's verdict to reflect the full damages awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions.

The plaintiff was injured when she fell on a public transit bus.

At trial, the jury awarded $35,000 in general damages and $5,000 for past housekeeping.

On post-trial motions, the court held that while the defendant employer was vicariously liable for the driver's negligence, its liability was limited by the Insurance Act to the amount the driver would be liable for.

Applying the statutory deductible reduced the general damages to zero.

Furthermore, the court found the plaintiff did not meet the statutory threshold for permanent serious impairment.

The housekeeping award was also reduced to zero due to collateral benefits received from the plaintiff's own insurer.

The defendant, Walmart Canada Corp., brought a motion for leave to appeal an order by Justice Barnes that dismissed Walmart's motion for summary judgment.

Justice Barnes had found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the plaintiff's slip and fall claim and declined to use enhanced fact-finding powers.

The current court, presided over by Emery J., dismissed Walmart's motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of Justice Barnes' order.

The court also determined that the issues raised did not transcend the private interests of the parties to become a matter of public importance, thus failing to meet the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4).

Wal-Mart Canada Corp. sought a declaration that Intact Insurance Company had a duty to defend and indemnify it in a negligence action.

The underlying tort action involved a plaintiff tripping over cracked pavement in Wal-Mart's parking lot.

Intact argued that its policy, which named Wal-Mart as an additional insured under a contract with C.L. & Sons Property Maintenance, did not cover the claim as C.L. & Sons was only contracted for litter pick-up, not pavement repair.

The court found that the maintenance agreement's scope of work included reporting deficiencies affecting pedestrian safety, and the insurer's own description of C.L. & Sons' business operations included "Maintenance and inspection." Therefore, the court declared that Intact had a duty to defend Wal-Mart.

However, Wal-Mart's request to appoint its own counsel due to a potential conflict of interest was dismissed, with the court directing standard insurer procedures for separate counsel and adjusters for Wal-Mart and C.L. & Sons.

Costs were awarded to Wal-Mart.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim in a negligence action arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision.

They sought to add claims for post‑traumatic stress disorder suffered by a surviving spouse and related income loss, as well as expanded Family Law Act damages for a child.

The defendants argued the amendment introduced a new cause of action outside the limitation period and improperly pleaded evidence.

The court held the proposed amendment merely added a new head of damages arising from the same material facts already pleaded and therefore did not constitute a new cause of action.

The amendment was permitted, except for portions that improperly pleaded evidentiary details.