Barjinder Paul Kalsi

The defendant, Walmart Canada Corp., brought a motion for leave to appeal an order by Justice Barnes that dismissed Walmart's motion for summary judgment.

Justice Barnes had found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the plaintiff's slip and fall claim and declined to use enhanced fact-finding powers.

The current court, presided over by Emery J., dismissed Walmart's motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of Justice Barnes' order.

The court also determined that the issues raised did not transcend the private interests of the parties to become a matter of public importance, thus failing to meet the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4).

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury action, arguing it was statute-barred due to the commencement of a second action outside the presumptive limitation period.

The plaintiff resisted and brought a cross-motion for leave to amend her statement of claim to plead discoverability.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the discoverability of threshold injuries under the Insurance Act was a genuine issue for trial, and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion to amend her pleading.

The court found the prior unserved action irrelevant to the limitation period analysis of the served action.

The defendant moved to transfer a personal injury action from Brampton to Toronto so it could be heard together with related actions arising from the same motor vehicle accident.

The court considered Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the interests of justice factors governing venue transfer.

Although related Toronto actions had been commenced and consolidated, the court found that transferring the proceeding would significantly delay the trial and prejudice the plaintiff, a foreign resident unable to return home while awaiting trial.

The defendant had also delayed bringing the transfer motion despite knowledge of related proceedings.

The court dismissed the motion and ordered costs to the responding parties.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s dismissal for delay in a motor vehicle accident action.

Applying the contextual approach to the Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. criteria, the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found uncertainty regarding whether the dismissal order had ever come to the attention of the plaintiffs while they were unrepresented, and accepted that the plaintiffs intended to pursue the litigation.

The court also concluded that the presumption of prejudice from delay had been rebutted and that the defendants failed to establish actual prejudice.

In the interests of justice and adjudication on the merits, the dismissal was set aside.