Alexander B. Wilkinson

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were awarded as the responding party, who was self-represented, did not file a costs outline.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing her motion to add a private snow removal contractor as a defendant in a slip and fall action against the City of Toronto.

The motion judge had found the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence by not inquiring about a contractor earlier.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that without a specific trigger or reason to be put on notice, a plaintiff has no free-standing duty to inquire whether a municipality contracted out its snow removal.

The claim against the contractor was not discoverable until the City disclosed its involvement, and therefore was not statute-barred.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision denying entitlement to income replacement benefits and medical benefits.

The applicant argued the Tribunal made errors of law or fact regarding the disclosure of productions, the date of the applicant's baby's birth, and the timelines of visits to her family doctor.

The adjudicator found that the alleged errors were either not part of the decision's analysis or were not significant enough to affect the outcome.

The request for reconsideration was dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a minor motor vehicle accident, including income replacement benefits (IRBs) and various medical benefits for physiotherapy, psychological, and chronic pain assessments.

The adjudicator dismissed the application in its entirety.

The adjudicator found that the applicant did not suffer a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her pre-accident employment, preferring the respondent's insurer's examination reports over the applicant's expert, who relied heavily on self-reporting and failed to review prior assessments.

The requested medical benefits were deemed not reasonable and necessary, as the evidence indicated the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guidelines and she demonstrated the ability to perform her pre-accident duties and activities of daily living.

The defendants in a slip and fall action moved for leave to issue a third party claim against a snow removal contractor.

The motion was brought after the expiry of the limitation period for third party claims.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants were the authors of their own misfortune for the delay.

The court held that the prejudice to the plaintiffs, including the potential for further delay, additional examinations, and the erosion of witness memories, significantly outweighed the interest in avoiding multiple proceedings.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury action, arguing it was statute-barred due to the commencement of a second action outside the presumptive limitation period.

The plaintiff resisted and brought a cross-motion for leave to amend her statement of claim to plead discoverability.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the discoverability of threshold injuries under the Insurance Act was a genuine issue for trial, and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion to amend her pleading.

The court found the prior unserved action irrelevant to the limitation period analysis of the served action.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury action, arguing it was time-barred under the Limitations Act.

The plaintiff sustained soft-tissue injuries in a motor vehicle accident and commenced the action more than two years later.

The court applied the discoverability principle for permanent injury claims under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, emphasizing that the limitation period does not begin until there is a sufficient body of evidence to reasonably persuade a judge that the injury constitutes a serious permanent impairment.

The court found that the plaintiff did not know her injuries were permanent at the time of the accident and that her lawyer only formed the opinion of permanent impairment after receiving a specific medical report.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.