Benjamin Lee

This case involves a three-way insurance company priority dispute concerning accident benefits for a minor, Alyssia Lafontaine-Greenwood, who was 17 at the time of her single-vehicle accident.

The dispute, initially decided by an Arbitrator, centered on whether Gore Mutual (father's insurer), Dominion (mother's insurer), or Certas (driver's insurer) had primary responsibility.

The Arbitrator found Alyssia equally dependent on both parents, making Gore and Dominion jointly responsible.

Gore and Dominion appealed this decision.

The court upheld the Arbitrator's finding, applying the "palpable and overriding error" standard of review for mixed fact and law, and affirmed that non-obligatory contributions from a third party (grandmother) should not be factored into the dependency equation.

The defendant brought a motion to find the self-represented plaintiff in contempt.

The motion was adjourned because the defendant's counsel filed a 1300-page motion record without a compendium or hyperlinked authorities, violating the court's Notice to the Profession.

The Regional Senior Justice used the endorsement to provide a 12-point guide on effective written advocacy and proper filing practices for virtual hearings, emphasizing the 'less is more' principle.

The plaintiff sought damages for injuries from a motor vehicle accident.

Following a jury verdict that awarded modest general damages, the defendants brought a threshold motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was barred under the Insurance Act.

The court considered the plaintiff's significant pre-existing arthritic condition and the medical evidence on causation.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the motor vehicle accident caused a permanent serious impairment meeting the statutory threshold, largely due to the pre-existing condition and the jury's modest award.

The defence motion was granted.

The defendants brought a motion to exclude the plaintiff's second orthopedic expert, Dr. Daniel Ogilvie-Harris, arguing that his testimony duplicated that of the plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Robert Luba, and citing prior judicial comments regarding Dr. Ogilvie-Harris's alleged bias.

The plaintiff sought to admit both experts, asserting distinct contributions and the need for a Rule 53 expert to challenge the defence's expert.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, allowing both Dr. Luba to testify as a participant expert and Dr. Ogilvie-Harris as a Rule 53 expert.

The court found that Dr. Ogilvie-Harris's opinion offered significant differences, including addressing the Insurance Act threshold and challenging the defence expert, and ruled that allegations of bias should be addressed in a voir dire.

The defendants sought leave to introduce surveillance evidence for substantive purposes in a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing late disclosure and prejudice.

The court found the defendants breached disclosure obligations under Rules 30.09 and 33.06, particularly regarding waiver of privilege when the evidence was provided to a medical expert.

Applying Rule 53.08, the court determined that significant prejudice to the plaintiff, including impacts on settlement considerations and trial strategy, could not be cured by an adjournment.

Leave to use the surveillance evidence for substantive purposes was denied, though its use for impeachment was not challenged.

In a motor vehicle accident action, the plaintiff objected to the defence's expert medical evidence from Dr. Finkelstein, arguing the expert relied on inadmissible surveillance video.

A voir dire was held to determine admissibility.

The court ruled that Dr. Finkelstein could testify, but with conditions: no comment on surveillance in examination-in-chief, and the plaintiff could cross-examine on activities disclosed in evidence or directly on the surveillance (with defence re-examination rights).

The court balanced the probative value of the expert evidence against the potential prejudice from the inadmissible surveillance, noting the expert's opinions were largely independent of the video and foundational facts were already in evidence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim against herself for statutory vicarious liability as the owner of a vehicle involved in an accident.

The appellant was a passenger in her own vehicle driven by her daughter when the accident occurred in a private parking lot.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on the ground that the accident did not occur on a "highway" as defined in the Highway Traffic Act and therefore section 192(2) of the Act did not apply.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal suggesting the accident occurred at a GO Station parking lot used by the general public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence and upheld the summary judgment dismissal.

The Third Parties moved for summary judgment to dismiss claims against them arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Defendant, Samra, brought a cross-motion to amend her Third Party Claim to allege the Plaintiff, Juneja, was the driver.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the Third Parties' liability, concluding Samra was solely responsible for a precipitous left turn.

The summary judgment motion was granted, dismissing the Third Party Claim, and Samra's cross-motion was dismissed as moot.