Darcy W. Romaine

The plaintiff was struck by an uninsured driver and sought coverage under the uninsured and underinsured provisions of an automobile insurance policy issued to his child's mother.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the plaintiff did not meet the definition of 'spouse' as the couple had ceased living in a conjugal relationship.

The court applied a holistic approach to the definition of 'spouse' for parents of a child, finding that living under the same roof was not strictly required.

The court concluded that the parties had not formed a settled intention to end their relationship and were living in a conjugal relationship of some permanence at the time of the accident.

The plaintiff was found entitled to coverage under the policy.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the jury notice in a motor vehicle accident action, arguing that civil jury trials would be unavailable for the foreseeable future due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that a jury would not represent a cross-section of the community.

The court dismissed the motion, adopting a 'wait and see' approach to allow the newly implemented Central East Region protocol for civil trials to evolve.

The court found no evidence that jury composition had deteriorated and held that striking the jury based on anticipated delay was premature.

The plaintiff, Stephanie Gilbraith, suffered a severe eye injury from an egg thrown from a speeding, unidentified vehicle.

She sought coverage under her father's OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement with Intact Insurance Company and from the Superintendent of Financial Services for uninsured automobile coverage.

Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the injury did not "arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile." The court dismissed the motions, finding that the plaintiff met both the "purpose test" (transporting passengers and cargo is an ordinary use of a vehicle) and the "modified causation test" (the vehicle's speed significantly increased the egg's impact and the likelihood of severe injury, establishing an unbroken chain of causation).

The court concluded there was a genuine issue for trial.

The defendant Redi-Mix brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiff Youssef's claim after Youssef was seriously injured when his motorcycle struck a donkey that had escaped from Redi-Mix's rented property.

Youssef cross-sought summary judgment on liability.

The court found that Redi-Mix, as a residential landlord, was negligent in failing to maintain and inspect the fences, as required by the Residential Tenancies Act and its regulations, which allowed the donkeys to escape and cause a public nuisance.

The court dismissed Redi-Mix's motion and granted summary judgment on liability in favour of Youssef against Redi-Mix, reserving damages for trial.

In a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs brought a motion to exclude surveillance evidence obtained by the defendant.

The defendant had disclosed a surveillance video from October 2012 well in advance of trial but failed to disclose additional surveillance from 2013 and 2014 until shortly before trial, contrary to an undertaking given at discovery.

The court held that although the defendant breached its disclosure obligations, the October 2012 surveillance could still be admitted as substantive evidence and for impeachment because it had been disclosed long before trial and both parties’ experts had reviewed it.

The later surveillance footage could not be relied upon by the defendant but remained available for the plaintiffs’ use.

Any potential prejudice could be addressed through supplemental expert reports or an adjournment.

Applicants brought an application challenging the validity of sections 3, 4, and 5 of the 2002 Minimum Maintenance Standards for Municipal Roadways under the Municipal Act, 2001, asserting that the regulation was ultra vires.

The challenge arose in the context of a personal injury action alleging negligent winter road maintenance.

After the Court of Appeal’s decision in Giuliani limited the scope of the regulation and the municipality withdrew reliance on it as a defence, the respondents moved to strike the application as moot.

The court held that no live controversy remained between the parties and declined to exercise discretion to hear the matter, emphasizing judicial economy and the limited relevance of the impugned provisions following amendments and appellate guidance.

The plaintiff, a cyclist with significant pre-existing psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities, was struck by a police cruiser while riding through a pedestrian crosswalk at night.

The court apportioned liability 60% to the defendant police officer and 40% to the plaintiff.

Applying the thin skull rule, the court found the collision exacerbated the plaintiff's pre-existing conditions and caused a mild traumatic brain injury, rendering him completely disabled and requiring 24/7 attendant care.

Total damages were assessed at over $5.2 million, reduced to $3,131,370 after accounting for contributory negligence.

The defendant organization moved to dismiss a personal injury action on the basis that the claim against it was commenced outside the applicable two‑year limitation period.

The plaintiffs had initially sued another party following a slip and fall at a fundraising skating event and later added the moving party after learning of its potential involvement through a third‑party claim.

The court considered the discoverability principles under s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and whether reasonable due diligence would have revealed the moving party’s role earlier.

The court found there was no trigger that would reasonably have alerted the plaintiffs to the moving party’s involvement in the ice rink setup prior to receiving the third‑party claim.

As a result, the limitation period had not expired and the action could proceed.

In a personal injury action arising from a skiing accident allegedly causing traumatic brain injury, the defendants sought an order compelling the plaintiff to undergo a vocational assessment by a non‑medical practitioner.

The plaintiff argued the court lacked jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure to order such an assessment because the proposed assessor was not a "health practitioner" within the statutory definition.

The court held that, regardless of the statutory framework, the court may order a non‑medical vocational assessment where it is reasonably required and necessary to ensure fairness in the litigation.

Given the substantial claim for past and future income loss and the importance of assessing residual earning capacity, the requested assessment was found appropriate and not unfairly intrusive.

The motion was granted and the plaintiff was ordered to attend the vocational assessment.