Kirk Frederick Stevens

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought an action for defamation against other councillors based on statements made during a council meeting.

The defendants moved to strike the allegations, arguing their statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The motion judge held that absolute privilege does not apply to municipal councillors, who instead enjoy qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that Canadian law applies qualified privilege to municipal council speech and declining to extend absolute privilege without a full evidentiary record demonstrating its necessity.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action against the defendant doctor regarding care during pregnancy and delivery.

The defendant successfully moved to strike the statement of claim on the basis that it lacked sufficient particulars of the alleged negligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that a plaintiff in a medical negligence action is not required to obtain an expert opinion before pleading, and that the material facts pleaded were sufficient to enable the defendant to deliver a statement of defence.

The deceased promised to bequeath his farm and cottage to his common-law wife's grandsons in exchange for their unpaid labour.

He later married the appellant, who claimed dependant's relief against the estate.

The trial judge ordered the properties conveyed to the grandsons and awarded the widow support based on an inflated estate value, refusing to consolidate the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that the promise was to bequeath, not convey, meaning the properties remained in the estate and were subject to the widow's dependant's relief claim under s. 71 of the Succession Law Reform Act to the extent their value exceeded the grandsons' consideration.

The matter was remitted for a new trial on the dependant's relief claim.

Municipal councillors brought a Rule 21 motion to strike a defamation action arising from statements made during a municipal council meeting and alleged media interviews.

They argued the statements were protected by absolute privilege and that certain allegations were deficient or statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The court held that Canadian law recognizes only qualified privilege for statements made by municipal councillors during council proceedings and declined to extend absolute privilege.

The court also found the allegations regarding republication in the media and the statutory notice were sufficiently pleaded at this stage.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

The appellant radiologist failed to detect a cancerous lesion on the respondent's liver following colon cancer surgery.

The respondent later died of metastatic colon cancer.

A jury found the appellant negligent and awarded substantial damages, concluding that the delayed diagnosis deprived the respondent of a greater than 50 percent chance of being cured.

The appellant appealed, arguing the jury's finding on causation was unreasonable, the trial judge erred in her charge regarding survival versus cure rates, and the jury failed to properly discount future income loss for adverse contingencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was supported by expert evidence, the jury charge was adequate, and the damages award was reasonable.

The defendant physician appealed an order of a master compelling him to attend an examination under Rule 39.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in advance of a motion to strike the statement of claim in a medical negligence action.

The defendant argued that the motion to strike raised only legal issues concerning pleading sufficiency and therefore evidence was irrelevant.

The court held that once the defendant asserted in his factum that he was unable to respond to the allegations, his ability to respond became a relevant issue on the Rule 25.11 motion.

The plaintiffs therefore had a prima facie right to examine him on that issue under Rule 39.03(1).

The court found no error in the master’s reasoning and upheld both the examination order and the costs award.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle collision with a propane truck on a snow-covered road.

At trial, the central issue was the municipality's liability for failing to provide proper winter maintenance.

The plaintiff's expert testified that he could not reconcile the municipality's snowplough records with photographs of the accident scene.

The trial judge erroneously characterized this testimony as an unpleaded allegation of fraud and repeatedly refused to accept plaintiff counsel's assertions to the contrary.

Furthermore, the trial judge made an adverse credibility finding against the plaintiff mid-trial based on an allegedly falsified curriculum vitae, and suggested the parties consider this finding in their settlement discussions.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's interventions and premature credibility findings gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

In six Ontario libel actions tied to statements posted by a U.S. company and later republished in Ontario newspapers, the appellants argued Ontario lacked jurisdiction or should defer to Illinois.

The Court held that defamation was presumptively connected to Ontario because publication occurred there through reading, downloading, and republication.

It concluded the appellants did not rebut jurisdiction and did not prove Illinois was clearly the more appropriate forum under forum non conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for delay.

He had sued the respondent insurer in 2002 for breach of contract relating to disability benefits.

After the exchange of pleadings in 2003, essentially no progress was made for over seven years, during which the appellant declared personal bankruptcy and failed to produce medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and gave rise to a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved divided success, the Court of Appeal determined the appropriate costs awards for both the appeal and the trial.

The appellants were awarded reduced partial indemnity costs for the appeal to reflect their divided success.

For the trial costs, the respondents were awarded their agreed costs against the unsuccessful appellant, and a Sanderson order was made allowing the respondents to recover the trial costs they owed to the successful co-appellants from the unsuccessful appellant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for unlawful conduct conspiracy and Purina liable for breach of contract, resulting in a $2 million damages award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, dismissing the conspiracy claim because only Purina's conduct was unlawful.

The Court also reduced the breach of contract damages, holding that damages should be calculated based on the contract's 60-day termination clause, which was the least burdensome mode of performance.

The prejudgment interest rate was reduced to the statutory rate of 5.1 percent.

However, the $30,000 punitive damages award against Purina was affirmed due to its deceitful and reprehensible conduct in surreptitiously supplying a competitor in the respondents' exclusive territory.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, stating they agreed with the reasons of the motion judge.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal.

Costs of the appeal and a related appeal were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for non-compliance with the governing limitation period.

She argued that the action should proceed because the motion judge did not find actual prejudice to the defendants, despite the statement of claim being served more than two years late.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered the relevant factors, including prejudice and the complete lack of explanation for the delay by the appellant's solicitor.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from the death of the patient due to a pulmonary embolism following arthroscopic knee surgery.

The appellants argued the respondent orthopaedic surgeon was negligent in failing to warn the patient about the symptoms of a pulmonary embolism upon discharge.

The trial judge found the respondent met the standard of care, as the patient was not at a heightened risk of a pulmonary embolism at the time of discharge.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and application of the standard of care.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's findings on two factual issues in a bifurcated medical malpractice trial: whether the appellant doctor recommended a drug to the respondent, and whether a medical note accurately recorded a meeting.

The trial judge found against the appellants on both issues, relying on expert forensic evidence suggesting the note was added to the file later.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's treatment of the expert evidence or her decision not to address equivocal evidence from other doctors.

The costs award for the bifurcated proceeding was also upheld.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident action sought to bifurcate the trial of liability and damages issues, to be heard by different juries.

The plaintiffs, who had also served a jury notice, opposed the motion.

The Master dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction.

The Superior Court set aside the Master's order, but the Divisional Court restored it.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to bifurcate a trial where a valid jury notice has been served, absent the consent of the parties, as it would infringe the statutory right to have issues of fact tried by a single jury.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent, a real estate sales agent who sold homes exclusively for the appellant for 18 years, was an employee entitled to 18 months' notice of termination.

The appellant argued the respondent was a dependent contractor.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the existence of an intermediate 'dependent contractor' category but upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondent was an employee based on the Sagaz/Belton factors.

The court also upheld the finding that the respondent was not required to mitigate her damages by accepting a temporary employment offer from the appellant, as the employment relationship had been irreparably damaged.

The appellant anaesthetist appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for medical negligence after a patient suffered hypoxia, a heart attack, and permanent brain damage following premature extubation after gastric bypass surgery.

The appellant argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and made palpable and overriding errors in his factual findings, particularly regarding expert evidence and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias and concluding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence and free of palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict regarding a motor vehicle accident where the respondent suffered a severe brain injury.

The jury found the appellant's driver 61% liable and the respondent 39% liable, awarding nearly $14 million for future care costs.

The appellant argued the liability apportionment and damages were perverse and resulted from deficient jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability and damages, finding the jury's conclusions were not plainly unreasonable and the trial judge's instructions were adequate.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs in part, reducing the substantial indemnity costs award to prevent it from amounting to full indemnity.