James M. Wortzman

A residential condominium developer sought a declaration that communications from the Chief Building Official regarding parking requirements constituted appealable orders or decisions under the Building Code Act.

The developer argued that emails threatening permit revocation if occupancy permits were requested without adequate parking prevented it from applying for occupancy.

The court found that the emails were pre-emptive communications indicating the CBO's future intentions, not final decisions on actual occupancy permit applications.

As no formal decision refusing occupancy had been made, the court lacked jurisdiction to intervene.

However, the court maintained a temporary parking ratio of 1.1 spaces per unit pending the Ontario Land Tribunal's decision on the developer's parking variance appeal.

The court granted the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance of an alleged agreement to purchase a supermarket business, finding that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts showing acceptance of the agreement, lacked standing, and that the alleged agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.

Leave to amend was granted only to clarify standing for a claim for return of deposit.

The appellants abandoned their appeal of an order appointing a liquidator to wind up their business.

The respondents sought $32,764.35 in costs for work done prior to the abandonment, despite not having filed a response to the appeal.

The court applied Rule 61.14(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that an abandoned appeal shall be without costs if no response was filed.

Noting that the respondents had already received costs for a related stay motion and failed to provide detailed time records distinguishing the work, the court declined to deviate from the general rule and awarded no costs.

This endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario addresses a request for directions regarding its prior decision.

The respondent sought clarification, arguing the previous decision might have inadvertently set aside parts of the application judge's order that were not appealed or were abandoned.

The court clarified that its decision to set aside the application judge's order was due to identified errors affecting lien rights and PPSA registration.

It affirmed that the appellants (respondents in this endorsement) did not abandon any relief sought in their notice of appeal and factum, including payment for storage/rental costs intertwined with repairs.

The court confirmed the appellants' possessory lien over the aircraft, encompassing both repair and storage/rental costs, and remitted these intertwined issues to the Superior Court for determination.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal.

The Court of Appeal had previously allowed the appeal, set aside the application judge’s order, and remitted certain issues for trial, declaring that the appellants had a possessory lien.

The appellants, having prevailed on the appeal and related motions, were awarded all-inclusive costs for the appeal, a panel motion, three pre-appeal motions, and the original application, totaling $143,977.79.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 32.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order to permit their consultant to conduct a Phase Two Environmental Site Assessment of a property.

The plaintiffs argued the assessment was necessary to determine if the property was contaminated, which was relevant to their claims of misrepresentation by the defendants regarding the property's environmental status and to the remedies sought (specific performance with abatement or return of deposit).

The defendants opposed, arguing the plaintiffs had waived an environmental condition in the agreement of purchase and sale and that the motion was delayed and an abuse of process.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding the inspection necessary and probative for the trier of fact, noting no prejudice to the defendants, and deeming the delay not unreasonable.

The court also provided directions for the parties to agree on a timetable for the inspection, mediation, and trial, and on the terms of the inspection.

The appellants appealed an order vacating their possessory lien on an aircraft under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The application judge had erred by vacating the lien without fully determining whether the repair work was authorized and if any amounts were owing, despite acknowledging that litigation on these issues was possible.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge failed to make necessary findings and improperly applied the RSLA.

The appeal was allowed, the original order set aside, and the appellants' possessory lien was declared to exist until further court order, with the issues of authorization and amounts owing remitted to trial.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the order of Gibson J. dated September 26, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondents fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against their property, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure on the ex parte motion to obtain the CPL, that there was no triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim to an interest in the property, and that equitable factors favored discharge.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing delay and disputing the defendants' grounds.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the defendants' extensive delay in bringing the motion was sufficient grounds for dismissal.

The court further found that the plaintiffs had made full and fair disclosure and that there was a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim for specific performance, with equitable factors favoring the plaintiffs.

This decision addresses two cross-motions in complex, joined real estate development actions: the plaintiffs' motion for a further affidavit of documents and the defendants' motion to bifurcate the action and postpone document production.

The court dismissed the defendants' bifurcation motion, holding that bifurcation under Rule 6.1.01 requires party consent, which was absent.

The request for delayed production was also denied, as the defendants failed to demonstrate serious prejudice or that the documents were solely related to damages.

The plaintiffs' production motion was granted, with the court finding the requested documents relevant to both liability and defence, and the request proportionate given the $65 million in dispute.

The court emphasized that the deemed undertaking rule mitigates concerns about commercially sensitive information.

This appeal concerned the suitability of specific performance as a remedy in a failed real estate transaction.

The appellants (defendants) challenged the trial judge's order for specific performance, arguing that the property was not unique and that the corporate purchaser's intent was for investment, not personal use.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence regarding the corporate principal's (Mr. Lin's) intentions, as he did not testify and was not proven unavailable.

The court concluded that the corporate structure and expert evidence supported an investment purpose, making damages an adequate remedy.

The appeal was allowed, the specific performance order was set aside, and the issue of damages was remitted for a new trial.

The respondent's cross-appeal on costs was dismissed.

The plaintiffs and defendants were equal shareholders in two closely held corporations that owned and operated gas stations and a driving range.

Following a breakdown in their relationship and a deadlock over succession planning and the division of corporate assets, both parties alleged oppressive conduct against the other.

The court found that both shareholders had engaged in conduct that unfairly disregarded the other's interests.

Given the irreparable breakdown of trust and the deadlock, the court ordered the winding up and liquidation of the companies by a court-appointed receiver.

The court dismissed the claims of the plaintiff's wife, finding she was not a shareholder or officer, but awarded the plaintiff $250,000 in compensation for his historical management of the companies.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court found that the offer lacked a genuine element of compromise, as it essentially demanded the defendants either purchase the property or pay equivalent damages.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $150,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, after deducting costs for an earlier consent motion and an unsuccessful summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff corporation entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale to buy a residential property from the defendants.

The defendants subsequently refused to close the transaction, breaching the agreement.

The plaintiff sued for specific performance, arguing the property was uniquely suited as a recreational compound for its principals' extended family.

The defendants argued the purchase was a commercial investment and damages were the appropriate remedy.

The court found the property had a peculiar and special value to the plaintiff and ordered specific performance.

The applicants, members of the Geneva Park community and Friends of Geneva Park, brought an urgent application seeking declarations of trust (implied, constructive, resulting, or charitable purpose trust) over the Geneva Park property, an order for directions or investigation under the Charities Accounting Act, production of the sale agreement, a Certificate of Pending Litigation, and an interim injunction to prevent the sale of the property by YMCA of Simcoe/Muskoka (YSM) to a private purchaser.

The applicants argued that their historical donations and contributions created a beneficial interest or trust.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence to support the creation of any trust, no misuse of charitable funds by YSM, and that granting an injunction or CPL would be unjust and inequitable, as the sale was a reasonable solution for the financially struggling charity.

The plaintiff appealed an Associate Justice's decision removing its counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defendant, a former lawyer for the plaintiff being sued for professional negligence, intended to call lawyers from the plaintiff's current firm as witnesses regarding advice they provided to the plaintiff before, during, and after the defendant's retainer.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's conclusion that the lawyers were likely to be material witnesses and that their continued representation would impair the administration of justice.

The moving parties (defendants) sought an order to approve a loan and dispense with the consent of the responding parties (plaintiffs) for the loan and future financing.

The moving parties argued that the responding parties' refusal to consent was oppressive and intended to leverage a buyout.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties had not made a claim for oppression and that the court could not use its inherent jurisdiction to rewrite a commercial agreement negotiated at arm's length by sophisticated parties.

Despite the responding parties' success, the court declined to award costs due to their inequitable conduct.

The appellant abandoned its appeal, and the respondent sought substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant challenged the court's jurisdiction to award costs for an abandoned appeal and proposed a lower partial indemnity amount.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its jurisdiction under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that Rule 61.14 did not displace this discretion.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, finding substantial indemnity was not justified.

The appellant, BSAR (Eglinton) LP, appealed a trial judgment that awarded a real estate commission to the respondent, Harvey Kalles Realty Inc. The appellant argued that a condition for the commission, related to the definition of "Tenant" in a Commission Agreement and the automatic termination of an offer to lease, was not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors or errors in law in the trial judge's interpretation of the agreements.

The court affirmed the trial judge's finding that the objective intention of the parties was for the commission to be paid if a lease was concluded with any Loblaw entity, and that the offer to lease had not terminated.

Following the defendant's unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $70,777.55, while the defendant argued for no costs or costs on the Small Claims Court scale.

The court found no basis for full or substantial indemnity costs, nor for restricting costs to the Small Claims Court scale, noting the motion involved a novel issue regarding Infectious Disease Emergency Leave.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $22,840.13.