Laughlin J. Campbell

In an oppression application under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, the applicant sought declarations of 50% ownership and broad accounting relief concerning multiple closely-held ventures.

The court found, on objective intention and course-of-conduct evidence, that the parties had agreed to equal ownership and profit-sharing in two ongoing ventures, and that non-disclosure and non-accounting conduct was oppressive and unfairly prejudicial.

Relief against one corporation tied to a restaurant sold in 2018 was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court declared 50% share ownership in the remaining corporations, ordered issuance of shares, full financial disclosure and accounting, and payment over of any amounts found owing.

Costs of $30,000 were awarded to the applicant.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision of Gibson J. dated December 19, 2024.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and fixed costs of the motion at $5,000, payable in the discretion of the panel hearing the appeal.

The applicant, Linda Bridgewater, sought an order interpreting the residuary clause of Ronald Douglas Penrose's will, which bequeathed the balance of his estate to a non-existent entity, 'Guide Dogs of Canada.' The court applied the 'armchair rule' to determine the testator's subjective intention, considering extrinsic evidence such as the testator's prior donations to and a brochure from the Canadian National Institute for the Blind (CNIB).

The court found that the testator intended the bequest to go to the CNIB, dismissing alternative interpretations proposed by other guide dog charities.

The applicant sought to remove his sister as co-estate trustee of their late father's estate and to order her to vacate the estate's residential property.

The respondent had an option under the will to purchase the property at fair market value but refused to accept the appraised value or vacate the property, living there rent-free.

The court found the respondent's option to purchase had expired and that she was in a conflict of interest that prevented the proper administration of the estate.

The court removed the respondent as estate trustee, vested the estate assets in the applicant as sole trustee, and ordered the respondent to provide vacant possession of the property.

The court awarded the respondent, Ana Tone, full indemnity costs totaling $165,696.48, plus $8,705.48 in outstanding costs, against the applicant, Raymond Tone, following a bitter family law trial.

The applicant was found largely at fault for rejecting multiple reasonable settlement offers and for unreasonable and bad faith conduct throughout the litigation, including prolonging the trial with irrelevant testimony and changing counsel repeatedly.

The issues were numerous and complex, and the respondent achieved highly successful results on nearly all matters, far exceeding her offers to settle.

The court also noted the applicant's conduct wasted significant public resources.

The trial addressed parenting, child support, spousal support, and property division following a short, high-conflict marriage.

The court granted the respondent sole decision-making authority for the children and primary residence, with the applicant having alternate weekend access.

The applicant's income was imputed to $60,000 (or $78,102 for 2018) for child support purposes due to intentional under-employment.

No spousal support was awarded.

The date of separation was determined as February 1, 2015, and the matrimonial home was held in joint tenancy, rejecting the applicant's resulting trust claim.

This decision concerns the costs award following a successful summary judgment motion where the defendants, Schembri et al., had a $30,500,000 claim against them struck in its entirety.

Schembri sought $499,933.06 in costs.

The plaintiffs, Way et al., opposed the quantum, arguing for a reduction.

The court found Schembri's costs reasonable, noting the complexity of the intertwined actions and the plaintiffs' extensive, unfocused responding material.

The court also drew an adverse inference from the plaintiffs' failure to provide their own cost outline.

The full amount of costs requested by Schembri was awarded.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for breach of a non-competition clause in a shareholders agreement and breach of fiduciary duty.

The parties, former joint venturers in real estate development, had a falling out.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached the agreement by pursuing other developments without presenting them first.

The court found the non-competition clause was ambiguous, constituted an unenforceable agreement to agree, and lacked a reasonable time limit.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs' unpleaded argument regarding breach of statutory fiduciary duties under the Business Corporations Act.

The plaintiffs' action was dismissed in its entirety.

The defendant, Stacey Newman, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation) to dismiss a defamation and malicious prosecution action brought by the plaintiffs, Azim Rizvee and Rabiya Azim.

The court found that Newman's public statements regarding Rizvee's political candidacy and campaign conduct related to a matter of public interest, satisfying the initial burden for the anti-SLAPP motion on the defamation claim.

However, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Newman had no valid defence (specifically, fair comment and limitations period) and provided insufficient evidence of serious harm to their reputation.

Consequently, the defamation claim was dismissed.

Conversely, the malicious prosecution claim, arising from Newman's private peace bond application against Rizvee, was deemed not to relate to a matter of public interest, and thus the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss it was denied.

The respondent father brought a motion to change an interim support order, claiming he had overpaid support and was owed money.

The applicant mother brought a cross-motion for payment of child and spousal support arrears based on Minutes of Settlement.

The court calculated the respondent's obligations under the Minutes of Settlement, including child support, extra-curricular expenses, and post-secondary education costs, totaling $281,720.97.

After deducting the $234,783.89 the respondent had already paid, the court ordered the respondent to pay the remaining $46,937.08 in arrears.

The appellant mother appealed a finding of contempt for failing to comply with a temporary access order.

The motion judge had ordered her to pay a $5,000 fine and $10,000 in costs, to be set off against the respondent father's child support arrears and ongoing obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application of the three-part test for contempt, the direct payment of the fine, the unusual but justified set-off against child support, or the decision not to bifurcate the proceedings to allow purging of the contempt.

A custody and access dispute involving a four-year-old child, Sophia Franco dos Santos Rego, born March 16, 2010.

The applicant, Victor Rego, sought sole custody, child support from the respondent, and various financial recompense.

The respondent, Claudia Santos, sought sole custody with supervised access for the applicant.

The court found that the respondent engaged in a sustained pattern of parental alienation, deliberately frustrating access orders and making derogatory statements about the applicant in the child's presence.

The respondent was found to suffer from a delusional disorder, maintaining irrational beliefs about the applicant's role in the child's life despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

The court awarded sole custody to the applicant, finding that continued custody with the respondent posed real and present risks to the child's emotional and psychological well-being.

Access by the respondent was placed in the applicant's discretion pending professional assessment of appropriate access arrangements.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment granting the respondents partial relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the forfeiture clause was penal and that retaining the full amount of the instalments would be unconscionable given the disparity with the value of the work performed.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $10,000.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their motion to certify a class proceeding against the provincial government.

The action alleged negligence, breach of statutory duty, and misfeasance in public office arising from the government's decision to discontinue entering into Special Needs Agreements for profoundly disabled children.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding it was plain and obvious the negligence claim could not succeed.

The court held that the statement of claim disclosed arguable causes of action and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.