Kristin Muszynski

The applicant, a blind law student, sought shared housing but was refused a room by a homeowner who stated the accommodation was unsuitable due to his disability.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of section 21(1) of the Human Rights Code, which exempts shared owner-occupied housing from discrimination protections.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed the application, finding no evidence of disproportionate impact under section 15(1) of the Charter due to a lack of disaggregated statistical data.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the HRTO erred by requiring statistical evidence where none existed and failing to draw appropriate inferences from qualitative expert evidence.

The court remitted the matter to the HRTO to complete the Charter analysis.

The plaintiff, an insured person, brought an action against a medical assessment firm and its assessors, alleging they fraudulently or negligently altered medical reports to minimize her statutory accident benefits.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim, arguing the Licence Appeal Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction, the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and the action was an abuse of process.

The court held it had jurisdiction over tort claims against non-insurer third parties.

The court struck the direct claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation due to lack of proximity, but allowed the claims for the tort of unlawful means, inducing breach of contract, and negligence to proceed, finding that the application of expert witness immunity should be determined at trial.

The plaintiff Hollywood brought a motion for directions regarding the trial scheduling of two related actions arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The court considered the recent amendments to Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding bifurcation.

To avoid inconsistent results, the court ordered that the issue of liability be heard in a joint trial.

However, considering the lack of common witnesses for damages, the potential savings in costs, and the practical challenges of scheduling a lengthy joint jury trial, the court directed that the issues of damages proceed in separate trials.

The Applicant brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a multi-unit dwelling.

The court found the search warrant invalid because police failed to disclose obvious indicia that the residence contained multiple units, rendering the warrant overbroad.

The subsequent search, detention, and arrest were therefore illegal, violating ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Furthermore, police violated the Applicant's s. 10(b) rights by delaying access to counsel for two hours without justification and eliciting inculpatory actions (opening a safe) before he could consult a lawyer.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded the serious and cumulative Charter breaches warranted the exclusion of the seized drugs and the Applicant's statements under s. 24(2).

The offender, an Indigenous man with a lengthy criminal record, was convicted of possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and weapons offences.

The court considered two Gladue reports detailing his history of trauma and abuse, but emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the seriousness of trafficking fentanyl and his recent prior convictions for similar offences.

A global sentence of 7.5 years was imposed, reduced by pre-sentence custody credit.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to limit damages to $200,000 and continue the action under the simplified procedure (Rule 76).

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the amendment would result in non-compensable prejudice due to the loss of their substantive right to a jury trial.

The court granted the motion, finding that the striking of a jury notice alone, without specific evidence of non-compensable prejudice, is insufficient to deny an amendment.

The plaintiffs were granted leave to amend, and the defendant's jury notice was struck.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that found she had not sustained a catastrophic impairment following a motor vehicle collision.

The applicant argued the Tribunal unreasonably rejected expert evidence that her accident-related sleep impairments resulted in a 9% whole person impairment rating.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably concluded there was a lack of causal evidence linking the sleep impairment to the accident and that the Tribunal's reasons were justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The applicant insurer appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal reconsideration decision finding that the respondent, a 19-year-old student athlete who was rendered tetraplegic in a motor vehicle accident, was principally dependent on his sister for care and therefore an insured person under her automobile insurance policy.

The Divisional Court found that the adjudicator identified the correct legal principles regarding dependency and reasonably applied them to the evidence, which showed the respondent relied on his sister for physical and emotional support despite living away for school.

The appeal and judicial review were dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and fixed costs at $5,000 all inclusive.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Associate Justice Eckler dated September 26, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered no costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her discrimination application against her employer, union, and others.

The HRTO had dismissed the application against the employer due to delay, finding no good faith reason to extend the one-year time limit under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, and dismissed the claims against the other respondents for lack of factual basis or jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court found no procedural unfairness in the HRTO proceedings and held that the HRTO's decisions were reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order validating a draft will pursuant to s. 21.1(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act on behalf of a deceased who died of a sudden heart attack twelve days after the draft was prepared, before it was signed or witnessed.

The court found that while the deceased had capacity and clear general intentions to benefit the applicant and others over his estranged siblings, the applicant failed to establish that the draft will reflected a deliberate or fixed and final expression of testamentary intention.

There was no evidence the deceased had reviewed the draft, the deadline for suggested corrections had not expired at the time of death, and discrepancies existed between the draft and the deceased's earlier handwritten notes.

The application was dismissed; costs submissions were invited but the court noted the estate may appropriately bear the successful respondent's costs given the reasonable grounds for bringing the application.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's estate application, the successful respondent sought full indemnity costs of $79,439.23.

The applicant argued no costs should be payable or they should be paid by the Estate.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity scale due to the applicant's unfounded allegations of fraud, formal offers to settle, and an improper late motion to admit expert evidence.

Costs were fixed at $60,000 payable by the applicant personally to the Estate.

The applicant, a transgender female federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging her involuntary transfer from a women's institution to a men's maximum-security institution.

The applicant argued the transfer was an unlawful deprivation of her residual liberty.

The court declined to decide whether the transfer constituted a deprivation of residual liberty, finding that even if it did, the transfer was reasonable and lawful due to the applicant's disruptive and threatening behavior at the women's institution.

The application was dismissed, along with underdeveloped Charter claims.

The applicant brought a motion for interim relief and to add a party to an application regarding her incapable father's property.

The respondent, the father's lawyer and attorney for property, allegedly misappropriated funds by taking an undisclosed personal loan from the father's trust funds.

The parties reached a consent interim order restricting the respondent's access to the funds and transferring trust funds to the applicant's counsel.

The court reluctantly signed the consent order, expressing serious concerns about the respondent's actions and questioning why he was not removed entirely as attorney for property.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend the statement of claim to limit damages to $200,000 (the statutory minimum insurance limit) and continue the action under simplified procedure.

The defendant insurer opposed the motion, arguing it was premature and that the loss of the right to a jury trial constituted non-compensable prejudice.

The court granted the amendment, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate non-compensable prejudice and that the defendant's own pleading acknowledged the $200,000 limit and simplified procedure applicability.

The jury notice was struck as a necessary consequence of proceeding under simplified procedure.

Brandon Sero and Marie Miller were charged with drug trafficking offences following a search warrant executed on February 8, 2024.

Sero brought a Charter application under section 24(2) to exclude evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant was invalid due to breaches of section 8 rights.

The applicant challenged the validity of the warrant, claiming the Information to Obtain failed to disclose reasonable and probable grounds and that confidential source information was insufficiently credible, compelling, and corroborated.

The court found the warrant was valid despite material omissions from the ITO regarding the background and credentials of confidential sources.

The court applied the Garofoli process to manage disclosure while protecting informer privilege and ultimately dismissed the Charter application, finding the evidence admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Following conviction on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving/over 80 causing death arising from a motor vehicle collision that killed two young women, the court imposed a global sentence of six years custody on the impaired driving counts and five years custody on the dangerous driving counts, all running concurrently.

The court rejected both the Crown's submission for 7-8 years and the defence submission for 4 years, balancing denunciation and deterrence against the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

The court also imposed a 12-year driving prohibition and a non-communication order.

The court rejected the defence argument that the impaired driving counts should be stayed under the Kienapple principle, finding that impaired driving and dangerous driving address different aspects of road safety.

The plaintiff commenced a 468-page statement of claim against 38 defendants, alleging that her children's autism was caused by environmental toxins and acetaminophen, and seeking billions of dollars to fund a fecal microbiota transplant program.

A motion judge dismissed the claim against most defendants under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous and vexatious, but allowed the claims against the Bayer and Johnson defendants to proceed.

The Bayer and Johnson defendants appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the plaintiff's lack of standing, the court's inability to order the requested research funding, and the numerous hallmarks of querulous litigation present in the claim.

The action was dismissed against the remaining defendants.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that apportioned 35% liability to them for a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

The respondent had rear-ended the appellants' vehicle after it allegedly stopped suddenly.

The Divisional Court found the trial judge made a palpable and overriding factual error by conflating the parties' evidence, leading to an unwarranted adverse credibility finding against the appellants.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the presumption of negligence against the rear driver, as a sudden stop within a lane of traffic does not constitute an unusual circumstance sufficient to rebut the reverse onus.

The appeal was allowed, and the respondent was found 100% liable.