Elizabeth Anne Guilbault

The provincial legislature passed legislation to remove certain bicycle lanes in Toronto to reduce traffic congestion.

The respondents successfully challenged the legislation in Superior Court, arguing it violated section 7 of the Charter by depriving cyclists of security of the person in an arbitrary and grossly disproportionate manner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that the Charter does not create a positive right to bicycle lanes and that the legislature's decision to repeal or amend prior policy choices regarding road use does not violate section 7.

The Court found the legislation was neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate.

The applicant, a blind law student, sought shared housing but was refused a room by a homeowner who stated the accommodation was unsuitable due to his disability.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of section 21(1) of the Human Rights Code, which exempts shared owner-occupied housing from discrimination protections.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed the application, finding no evidence of disproportionate impact under section 15(1) of the Charter due to a lack of disaggregated statistical data.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the HRTO erred by requiring statistical evidence where none existed and failing to draw appropriate inferences from qualitative expert evidence.

The court remitted the matter to the HRTO to complete the Charter analysis.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision striking down provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020 and its Regulation.

The application judge had found that provisions invalidating consent to enter a farm obtained under false pretences violated the freedom of expression of animal rights activists seeking to conduct undercover exposés.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the activists' claim was a positive rights claim seeking access to private property on their own terms.

The Court found that the legislation did not substantially interfere with freedom of expression and that any limits were justified under section 1 of the Charter.

Four organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the certification of a class action against the Province of Ontario and 49 Children's Aid Societies regarding the use of 'Birth Alerts'.

The appeal engages the continued application of the Ragoonanan principle, which requires a representative plaintiff to have a cause of action against each defendant.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to the Class Action Clinic and Women of Class, and granted leave on limited issues to the Ontario Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, finding their perspectives would be useful to the court.

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

A case management conference was held to set the timetable for two grouped appeals arising from a decision certifying a class action against the Province of Ontario but declining to certify it against 49 Children's Aid Societies regarding the use of 'Birth Alerts'.

The appeals will be heard by a five-judge panel to consider whether the court should depart from the Ragoonanan principle.

The case management judge set the schedule for responding materials, intervention motions, and factums.

This is a case management decision in an appeal of a Superior Court judgment that declared section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act infringed section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The decision addresses the timetable for the appeal and the appellants' motion to expedite the hearing.

The Court of Appeal established a detailed timetable culminating in a hearing date of January 28, 2026, balancing the public importance of the issues with the need for proper briefing and consideration of intervention requests.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which required the removal of protected bicycle lanes on Bloor Street, University Avenue, and Yonge Street in Toronto and their replacement with lanes for motor vehicle traffic.

The applicants argued that the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by putting cyclists at increased risk of injury and death, and that the infringement was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the stated objective of reducing traffic congestion.

The court found that the provision was unconstitutional, as the evidence established that removing the protected bike lanes would not achieve the stated objective of reducing congestion and would instead increase the risk of collisions and injuries for all road users.

The court also found that the government had been advised internally that the removal would not reduce congestion, yet proceeded with the legislation anyway.

The application was not moot despite subsequent amendments to the legislation, as the government retained the power and stated intention to remove the bike lanes.

The moving parties (Ontario) sought to schedule a motion for leave to appeal and a motion to stay an earlier order on an expedited basis.

The court declined to schedule the stay motion before a single judge prior to the leave to appeal motion, noting the responding parties needed time to respond to new affidavit material and that the matter was better suited for a panel.

The court established a schedule for the exchange of materials for the leave to appeal motion to be heard in writing by a panel.

This decision certifies a class action against the Province of Ontario regarding the issuance of "Birth Alerts" by Ontario children's aid societies (CASs), but declines to certify the action against the CASs themselves.

The court finds that the claims against the CASs suffer from the "Ragoonanan problem"—the lack of a representative plaintiff with a claim against each defendant—and that the CASs acted independently, not collectively.

The action against Ontario, however, is certified on the basis of negligence and breaches of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter, as the Province had oversight authority and failed to act to stop the practice despite being able to do so.

The court sets out the certified class, common issues, and clarifies the preferable procedure for such claims.

The court dismissed a motion to certify a class action brought by Rodney Wilson against the Ontario Provincial Police for alleged privacy breaches arising from video recording detainees using the toilet in OPP cells.

The court found that the proposed common issues, including alleged Charter breaches and damages, required individualized adjudication and were not suitable for certification.

The court also addressed the evolution of OPP privacy policies and the balance between detainee privacy and institutional security.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the implementation of s. 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which requires the removal of certain protected bike lanes in Toronto.

The court found that the applicants met the test for an interlocutory injunction, including a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and a balance of inconvenience favouring the applicants.

The injunction was granted, suspending the operation of the provision until the court’s decision on the constitutional application.

The moving party sought an extension of time to review a motion judge's decision under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge had previously dismissed a motion to extend the time to seek judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision, finding no apparent merit to the application because the moving party lacked standing and the challenged program was protected under s. 14(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court panel agreed with the motion judge, finding no error in principle and a reasonable result, and dismissed the motion.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the removal of certain bike lanes in Toronto, arguing that the removal would unjustifiably infringe the section 7 Charter rights of cyclists by exposing them to a heightened risk of injury or death.

The court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm was established, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents due to the presumption that legislation serves the public interest.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses seven motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020, and its Regulation 701/20, which were found to violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to intervene to Animal Alliance, Centre for Free Expression (CFE), Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), and Labour Issues Coordinating Committee (LICC), finding they offered useful and distinct perspectives without unduly expanding the appeal's scope.

Motions by Justicia for Migrant Workers (J4MW), Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE), and Animal Environmental Legal Advocacy (AEL Advocacy) were dismissed, primarily due to concerns about expanding the issues or duplication of arguments.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed their discrimination application.

The underlying complaint alleged age and family status discrimination because the minor applicants were initially denied access to the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as moot because the applicants received the requested vaccine prior to the hearing, and found no reasonable prospect of success.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's summary hearing process was procedurally fair and its conclusions on mootness and prospect of success were reasonable.

The Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC) brought an unopposed motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application for judicial review.

The underlying application concerns a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision regarding the Ministry's refusal of a Guide Dog Benefit to a person with a mental health disability.

The court granted the motion, finding that ISAC met the criteria for intervention given its extensive experience and expertise with social assistance, ODSP benefits, and the Human Rights Code, and that its participation would be useful without prejudicing the parties.

The moving party sought an extension of time to apply for judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions.

The Tribunal had dismissed his application alleging discrimination regarding a summer education program for Black youth, finding he lacked standing and the program was a valid special program under the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for an extension of time, concluding there were no apparent grounds for relief because the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable.

The applicants, animal rights activists, challenged the constitutionality of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act and its Regulation.

They argued that provisions voiding consent to enter agricultural premises if obtained under false pretences, and provisions prohibiting interaction with farm animals, violated their Charter rights to freedom of expression and assembly.

The court found that the Act's prohibition on interacting with animals did not violate the Charter, as there is no constitutional right to physically interact with another's private property.

However, the court held that Section 9 of the Regulation, which penalized any false statement made to gain access to agricultural premises, unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression.

The court struck down Section 9 and certain limitations within the whistleblower and journalist exemptions, while upholding the rest of the Act.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her claim under Rule 2.1.01(1) as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The original claim alleged obstruction of access to justice by court staff and Charter discrimination.

The motion judge found the claim unintelligible, incoherent, and an attempt to relitigate, noting statutory immunity for court staff.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01(6), finding the appellant's arguments lacked arguable errors and the appeal, like the original claim, made broad, unsustainable allegations with no prospect of success, consistent with Crown immunity principles.