Bronwyn June Roe

This is a case management decision in an appeal of a Superior Court judgment that declared section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act infringed section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The decision addresses the timetable for the appeal and the appellants' motion to expedite the hearing.

The Court of Appeal established a detailed timetable culminating in a hearing date of January 28, 2026, balancing the public importance of the issues with the need for proper briefing and consideration of intervention requests.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which required the removal of protected bicycle lanes on Bloor Street, University Avenue, and Yonge Street in Toronto and their replacement with lanes for motor vehicle traffic.

The applicants argued that the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by putting cyclists at increased risk of injury and death, and that the infringement was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the stated objective of reducing traffic congestion.

The court found that the provision was unconstitutional, as the evidence established that removing the protected bike lanes would not achieve the stated objective of reducing congestion and would instead increase the risk of collisions and injuries for all road users.

The court also found that the government had been advised internally that the removal would not reduce congestion, yet proceeded with the legislation anyway.

The application was not moot despite subsequent amendments to the legislation, as the government retained the power and stated intention to remove the bike lanes.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the implementation of s. 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which requires the removal of certain protected bike lanes in Toronto.

The court found that the applicants met the test for an interlocutory injunction, including a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and a balance of inconvenience favouring the applicants.

The injunction was granted, suspending the operation of the provision until the court’s decision on the constitutional application.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the removal of certain bike lanes in Toronto, arguing that the removal would unjustifiably infringe the section 7 Charter rights of cyclists by exposing them to a heightened risk of injury or death.

The court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm was established, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents due to the presumption that legislation serves the public interest.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula appealed its conviction for damaging Piping Plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The appeal raised issues regarding the interpretation of "damage" under the Act and the admissibility of expert evidence from a Ministry biologist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's interpretation of "damage" as including actions that make habitat less attractive, useful, or valuable from the species' perspective, and affirming the admissibility of the expert's evidence, despite concerns about impartiality, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and the evidence of another expert was sufficient.

The proposed interveners, Environmental Defence Canada Inc. and Federation of Ontario Naturalists, sought leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the statutory interpretation of s. 10(1) of the Endangered Species Act, 2007, which prohibits damage to habitats of endangered species.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula opposed the intervention, arguing it would not offer a useful contribution.

The court granted leave to intervene, finding the matter to be of public interest with broad implications, and that the interveners, as reputable environmental organizations, could offer a unique and useful perspective on the interpretation of "damage" and the application of principles like de minimis and the precautionary principle, without causing injustice to the appellant.