Lindsay N. Beck

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which required the removal of protected bicycle lanes on Bloor Street, University Avenue, and Yonge Street in Toronto and their replacement with lanes for motor vehicle traffic.

The applicants argued that the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by putting cyclists at increased risk of injury and death, and that the infringement was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the stated objective of reducing traffic congestion.

The court found that the provision was unconstitutional, as the evidence established that removing the protected bike lanes would not achieve the stated objective of reducing congestion and would instead increase the risk of collisions and injuries for all road users.

The court also found that the government had been advised internally that the removal would not reduce congestion, yet proceeded with the legislation anyway.

The application was not moot despite subsequent amendments to the legislation, as the government retained the power and stated intention to remove the bike lanes.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the implementation of s. 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which requires the removal of certain protected bike lanes in Toronto.

The court found that the applicants met the test for an interlocutory injunction, including a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and a balance of inconvenience favouring the applicants.

The injunction was granted, suspending the operation of the provision until the court’s decision on the constitutional application.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the removal of certain bike lanes in Toronto, arguing that the removal would unjustifiably infringe the section 7 Charter rights of cyclists by exposing them to a heightened risk of injury or death.

The court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm was established, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents due to the presumption that legislation serves the public interest.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula appealed its conviction for damaging Piping Plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The appeal raised issues regarding the interpretation of "damage" under the Act and the admissibility of expert evidence from a Ministry biologist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's interpretation of "damage" as including actions that make habitat less attractive, useful, or valuable from the species' perspective, and affirming the admissibility of the expert's evidence, despite concerns about impartiality, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and the evidence of another expert was sufficient.

The proposed interveners, Environmental Defence Canada Inc. and Federation of Ontario Naturalists, sought leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the statutory interpretation of s. 10(1) of the Endangered Species Act, 2007, which prohibits damage to habitats of endangered species.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula opposed the intervention, arguing it would not offer a useful contribution.

The court granted leave to intervene, finding the matter to be of public interest with broad implications, and that the interveners, as reputable environmental organizations, could offer a unique and useful perspective on the interpretation of "damage" and the application of principles like de minimis and the precautionary principle, without causing injustice to the appellant.

The plaintiff, a self-represented resident and shareholder of a cooperative housing complex, sued the corporation, its president, and its lawyer for defamation and conspiracy, seeking $850,000 in damages.

The claims stemmed from statements made at an annual general meeting in 2015 and in letters distributed in 2017.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against him, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on all his claims.

The court granted the defendant lawyer's motion, dismissing the claims against him as statute-barred or not defamatory and protected by qualified privilege.

The plaintiff's cross-motion was dismissed, and all his defamation and conspiracy claims against all defendants were dismissed, as no genuine issue requiring a trial was found.

Costs were awarded to the successful defendants.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her negligence claim based on lack of informed consent following a laparoscopically assisted vaginal hysterectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which the appellant's left ureter was transected.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding of negligence in post-operative care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on informed consent, finding the trial judge properly applied the modified objective test and reasonably concluded that a reasonable person in the appellant's circumstances would have proceeded with surgery despite the risks.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent breached the standard of care in post-operative management was not supported by the expert evidence, as the experts acknowledged that declining to order a CT scan on July 7, 2008 was a reasonable decision within the standard of care.

Following a medical malpractice trial where the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 in damages for delayed diagnosis, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The parties agreed the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs for both the first and second trials.

The court noted the high cost of expert opinion evidence but declined to penalize the plaintiff for these expenses, particularly given the defendant's poor recordkeeping which complicated the case.

Costs were fixed at $210,000.

In a supplemental endorsement following a trial decision where the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 for delayed diagnosis but failed on claims of informed consent and surgical negligence, the plaintiff's counsel requested an assessment of damages had all claims succeeded.

The court assessed the hypothetical damages at $100,000 for pain and suffering, $100,000 for past loss of income, and $125,000 for future loss of income, plus the Ministry of Health subrogated claim and prejudgment interest.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of the defendant’s statement of defence and counterclaim in a civil assault action.

The defendant had previously pleaded guilty in criminal proceedings to assault with a weapon arising from the same incident.

The court held that the guilty plea conclusively established that the defendant engaged in intentional conduct and that attempts in the pleading to characterize the incident as accidental constituted an abuse of process by attempting to relitigate matters already determined.

However, the defendant remained entitled to contest damages, describe surrounding events, and pursue a counterclaim for assault arising from the altercation.

Paragraphs attempting to deny intentional conduct were struck, but the balance of the defence and counterclaim were allowed to stand.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a solicitor’s negligence claim arising from a commercial real estate transaction involving a building encroaching on a municipal laneway.

The plaintiffs alleged their lawyers failed to warn that the municipality might require payment to convey the laneway and that the title insurance obtained did not cover such a cost.

The court rejected arguments that the claim was statute‑barred and held that expert evidence was unnecessary because the failure to warn of a significant legal risk was apparent on the record.

Applying the “but for” causation test, the court found that had proper advice been given the plaintiffs likely would have sought protection such as a holdback or price abatement.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and partial summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs, leaving only the assessment of damages and the claim against the title insurer for trial.

A law firm brought a motion under the Solicitors Act to oppose confirmation of an Assessment Officer’s certificate that substantially reduced the firm’s solicitor‑client accounts arising from family law litigation.

The court reviewed the assessment on the standard of error in principle and held that the officer committed several errors, including mischaracterizing the complexity of the matter, improperly relying on the former Costs Grid to reduce agreed hourly rates, rejecting the firm’s team staffing model without evidentiary basis, and criticizing counsel’s skill and competence without expert evidence.

The court found the assessment reasoning arbitrary and result‑oriented.

Rather than remitting the matter for reassessment, the court substituted its own determination of the appropriate fees and disbursements.