Lindsay N. Beck

The provincial legislature passed legislation to remove certain bicycle lanes in Toronto to reduce traffic congestion.

The respondents successfully challenged the legislation in Superior Court, arguing it violated section 7 of the Charter by depriving cyclists of security of the person in an arbitrary and grossly disproportionate manner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that the Charter does not create a positive right to bicycle lanes and that the legislature's decision to repeal or amend prior policy choices regarding road use does not violate section 7.

The Court found the legislation was neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate.

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of section 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which required the removal of protected bicycle lanes on Bloor Street, University Avenue, and Yonge Street in Toronto and their replacement with lanes for motor vehicle traffic.

The applicants argued that the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by putting cyclists at increased risk of injury and death, and that the infringement was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the stated objective of reducing traffic congestion.

The court found that the provision was unconstitutional, as the evidence established that removing the protected bike lanes would not achieve the stated objective of reducing congestion and would instead increase the risk of collisions and injuries for all road users.

The court also found that the government had been advised internally that the removal would not reduce congestion, yet proceeded with the legislation anyway.

The application was not moot despite subsequent amendments to the legislation, as the government retained the power and stated intention to remove the bike lanes.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the implementation of s. 195.6 of the Highway Traffic Act, which requires the removal of certain protected bike lanes in Toronto.

The court found that the applicants met the test for an interlocutory injunction, including a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and a balance of inconvenience favouring the applicants.

The injunction was granted, suspending the operation of the provision until the court’s decision on the constitutional application.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the removal of certain bike lanes in Toronto, arguing that the removal would unjustifiably infringe the section 7 Charter rights of cyclists by exposing them to a heightened risk of injury or death.

The court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm was established, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents due to the presumption that legislation serves the public interest.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula appealed its conviction for damaging Piping Plover habitat under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

The appeal raised issues regarding the interpretation of "damage" under the Act and the admissibility of expert evidence from a Ministry biologist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's interpretation of "damage" as including actions that make habitat less attractive, useful, or valuable from the species' perspective, and affirming the admissibility of the expert's evidence, despite concerns about impartiality, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and the evidence of another expert was sufficient.

The proposed interveners, Environmental Defence Canada Inc. and Federation of Ontario Naturalists, sought leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the statutory interpretation of s. 10(1) of the Endangered Species Act, 2007, which prohibits damage to habitats of endangered species.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula opposed the intervention, arguing it would not offer a useful contribution.

The court granted leave to intervene, finding the matter to be of public interest with broad implications, and that the interveners, as reputable environmental organizations, could offer a unique and useful perspective on the interpretation of "damage" and the application of principles like de minimis and the precautionary principle, without causing injustice to the appellant.

The plaintiff, a self-represented resident and shareholder of a cooperative housing complex, sued the corporation, its president, and its lawyer for defamation and conspiracy, seeking $850,000 in damages.

The claims stemmed from statements made at an annual general meeting in 2015 and in letters distributed in 2017.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against him, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on all his claims.

The court granted the defendant lawyer's motion, dismissing the claims against him as statute-barred or not defamatory and protected by qualified privilege.

The plaintiff's cross-motion was dismissed, and all his defamation and conspiracy claims against all defendants were dismissed, as no genuine issue requiring a trial was found.

Costs were awarded to the successful defendants.

In the context of two related actions involving a land banking business, the parties brought several preliminary motions before a scheduled summary judgment motion.

The moving parties (defendants in the first action) sought to bring a motion for security for costs, which the case management judge deferred until after the summary judgment motion due to delay and efficiency.

The responding parties (plaintiffs in the first action) brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the second action, arguing it was statute-barred and an abuse of process.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that the discoverability of the alleged unlawful act conspiracy raised factual issues that could not be resolved on a Rule 21 motion.

Finally, the court made several specific orders regarding documentary production, applying the principle of proportionality.

The applicants sold their company to the respondents, with $1 million held in escrow to secure indemnity claims.

The agreement required the applicants to object to any claims within 30 days, time being of the essence.

The applicants' lawyer inadvertently missed the deadline by seven days due to a medical emergency and a colleague's serious injury.

The applicants brought an application for relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that relief from forfeiture was available even without a strict breach of contract, and granted the relief because the applicants acted reasonably, the breach was minor, and the $1 million forfeiture was disproportionate to the minimal prejudice suffered by the respondents.

The respondents' request for a reciprocal time extension was denied.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her negligence claim based on lack of informed consent following a laparoscopically assisted vaginal hysterectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which the appellant's left ureter was transected.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding of negligence in post-operative care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on informed consent, finding the trial judge properly applied the modified objective test and reasonably concluded that a reasonable person in the appellant's circumstances would have proceeded with surgery despite the risks.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent breached the standard of care in post-operative management was not supported by the expert evidence, as the experts acknowledged that declining to order a CT scan on July 7, 2008 was a reasonable decision within the standard of care.

The plaintiffs, owners of a fitness club, sued the defendants for alleged misrepresentations regarding the availability of parking spaces and for failing to provide adequate alternative parking during construction.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court found that the misrepresentation claims were barred by the 'four corners' clause in the lease agreement, the releases signed by the parties, and the expiry of the two-year limitation period, as there was no evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment.

The court also found no triable issue regarding the alternative parking, as the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence that membership cancellations were linked to parking issues.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claims against the moving defendants were dismissed.

In a supplemental endorsement following a trial decision where the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 for delayed diagnosis but failed on claims of informed consent and surgical negligence, the plaintiff's counsel requested an assessment of damages had all claims succeeded.

The court assessed the hypothetical damages at $100,000 for pain and suffering, $100,000 for past loss of income, and $125,000 for future loss of income, plus the Ministry of Health subrogated claim and prejudgment interest.

Following a medical malpractice trial where the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 in damages for delayed diagnosis, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The parties agreed the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs for both the first and second trials.

The court noted the high cost of expert opinion evidence but declined to penalize the plaintiff for these expenses, particularly given the defendant's poor recordkeeping which complicated the case.

Costs were fixed at $210,000.

The applicant, who has a mild cognitive impairment resulting from childhood cancer treatments, obtained a law degree from a university in Wales with Third Class Honours.

The respondent refused to recognize his degree because its policy requires a minimum of a Lower Second Class (2:2) standing.

The applicant alleged adverse effect discrimination, arguing his disability prevented him from achieving the required grades.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was accommodated during law school and failed to establish that his lower academic standing was attributable to his disability rather than his refusal to request additional recommended accommodations, such as extra time.

Following a successful trial, the plaintiff sought costs and disbursements against the defendant.

The defendant largely agreed with the plaintiff’s bill of costs but raised objections concerning certain travel expenses and the calculation of prejudgment interest.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to airfare to attend the trial but not travel costs for the pre‑trial hearing because participation could have occurred by teleconference.

The court also required proper receipts corresponding with trial dates and adjusted prejudgment interest to reflect a 16‑month period rather than the 19 months claimed.

Subject to those adjustments, the plaintiff was awarded the costs and disbursements set out in the bill of costs.

A former employee sought enforcement of a severance settlement reached following termination without cause after the employer refused payment upon later discovering a shortfall in funds related to an employee social committee activity.

The employer conducted an internal investigation and asserted after-acquired cause, alleging theft and material nondisclosure during settlement negotiations.

The court found the investigation inaccurate and unreliable, noting the employee had not admitted theft and the criminal charge had been withdrawn without admission.

The conduct occurred in relation to an informal arrangement unrelated to the employee’s job duties and was accompanied by an intention to repay the funds.

The employer failed to establish just cause or grounds to rescind the settlement.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that an agreement of purchase and sale was void because it was entered into while the respondent corporation was dissolved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the revival of a corporation under s. 241(5) of the Business Corporations Act is retroactive in effect.

The court reaffirmed its previous decision in Zangelo Investments Ltd. and explicitly rejected lower court jurisprudence that held otherwise, concluding that the revived corporation is deemed never to have been dissolved.

In a medical negligence appeal arising from a hysterectomy that resulted in ureter injury, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law in treating an alleged failure to disclose surgical risks as battery rather than informed consent governed by negligence principles.

Applying the informed consent framework from Reibl v. Hughes, the court found the reasons addressed only part of the subjective inquiry and failed entirely to consider the required objective test.

The court also held that the finding of negligent delayed diagnosis was unsupported because there was no evidence that the CT scan contemplated on July 7 would have revealed the ureter injury or that earlier diagnosis would have permitted immediate repair.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial ordered, and appeal costs fixed at $20,000.

Supplementary reasons clarifying aspects of an earlier medical negligence judgment arising from treatment provided at a hospital and by several physicians.

The court clarified that the action was dismissed against one physician and the hospital.

The court also clarified the appearance of additional defence counsel for two of the remaining physician defendants.

The reasons supplement the earlier judgment and resolve ambiguity in the disposition and counsel record.