P. Ryan

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the removal of certain bike lanes in Toronto, arguing that the removal would unjustifiably infringe the section 7 Charter rights of cyclists by exposing them to a heightened risk of injury or death.

The court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm was established, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents due to the presumption that legislation serves the public interest.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The Applicants challenged the Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act, 2011, arguing it infringed their freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by prohibiting the right to strike and replacing it with compulsory binding interest arbitration.

The court found the Act substantially interfered with meaningful collective bargaining and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as the TTC was not an "essential service" in the constitutional sense, and the economic and equity concerns did not justify the complete prohibition of the right to strike.

The Act was declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The applicants, comprising raw milk producers and consumers, challenged federal and provincial prohibitions on the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk, alleging violations of their freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the applicants' belief in raw milk's health benefits did not constitute a profound moral dimension for freedom of conscience, the religious interference was trivial and insubstantial, and the equality claim lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court further held that even if Charter violations were established, they would be justified under section 1 due to the compelling public health objective of preventing milk-borne illnesses, which pasteurization effectively mitigates.

M.N., suffering from terminal cancer with a prognosis of less than six months, sought a court order declaring that she met the criteria for a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption granted in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4.

She also sought a declaration that her physician-assisted death would not require physicians to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The court found M.N. to be a competent adult with a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that she clearly consented to the termination of her life.

The application was granted, allowing M.N. to proceed with physician-assisted death and exempting involved healthcare providers from certain Criminal Code provisions and coroner notification requirements.

The applicant brought an application for a constitutional exemption to permit a physician-assisted death, along with a motion for confidentiality measures including a publication ban and an in camera hearing.

The court granted the publication ban and use of pseudonyms but denied the request for an in camera hearing, citing the open court principle.

On the main application, the court found that the applicant suffered from a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that the request was made freely by a competent adult.

The application for physician-assisted death was granted.

In a motor vehicle collision action involving a police officer driver, co-defendants sought an order compelling a police officer witness to re-attend for cross-examination and to answer previously refused questions regarding internal police review reports assessing fault and potential charges.

The dispute concerned whether undisclosed internal police “tracking reports” prepared by senior officers reviewing the collision investigation were relevant and producible under Rule 30.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that relevance in discovery is broadly construed and that the senior officers’ assessments of fault formed part of the investigative process relating directly to the issue of liability.

The fact that the officer involved was not charged did not render the internal reports irrelevant.

The motion was granted and the police defendants were ordered to disclose the tracking report and permit further cross‑examination.