Darrell Paul

The appellant challenged dismissal of a motion for leave to issue a third-party claim, arguing limitation issues were wrongly decided.

The court held the motion judge made no error in finding the claim was statute-barred and rejected arguments premised on separate proceedings and later party discussions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is a costs decision following the dismissal of the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim against the defendant.

The plaintiff sought compensation for alleged improvements made to property owned by the defendant during his common law relationship with the defendant's daughter.

The action was dismissed in its entirety after trial.

The defendant, having made a Rule 49 offer to settle on a without costs basis that was not accepted, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis from the date of the offer and partial indemnity basis prior to that date.

The court awarded costs in the amount of $74,029.04, finding the plaintiff's claim was improperly conceived and pursued, and noting that the claim had been repeatedly amended during trial, creating a moving target for the defence.

The plaintiff, Texford St. Bernard, sought compensation from the defendant, June Andrews, for alleged unpaid contributions to the construction and improvement of a property at 179 Bullis Road, Brighton, Ontario.

The court found that the claim was largely statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that the evidence did not support the plaintiff’s assertion that he was owed money for the work or expenses claimed.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiffs sued their real estate agent, alleging he defrauded them into purchasing a home with an illegal basement and securing a private mortgage.

The defendant agent moved for leave to issue a third party claim against the plaintiffs, a restaurant corporation, and his own investment company for contribution and indemnity regarding the mortgage loan default.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed third party claim was actually a breach of contract claim that was discoverable when the loan defaulted in December 2021.

Consequently, the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and granting leave would cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The defendants (Buyers) brought a motion to set aside their noting in default in a claim for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The plaintiff (Seller) had noted them in default after they failed to pay a deposit and complete the property purchase.

The Buyers argued improper service and a plausible defence that the agreement was void ab initio due to non-payment of the deposit.

The court found service was valid, the Buyers' delay in responding was significant and unexplained, and their proposed defence lacked an air of reality regarding liability and damages.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

Wasim Investments Ltd. appealed the dismissal of its statement of claim, which sought to enforce a mortgage.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as duplicative of a separate action commenced by the individual respondents, who sought to void the same mortgage, citing a clear risk of abuse of process due to potential inconsistent interpretations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's factual findings or her conclusion that the action was duplicative and an abuse of process, affirming that all issues regarding the mortgage's enforceability should be addressed within the original action.

The Applicants challenged the Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act, 2011, arguing it infringed their freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by prohibiting the right to strike and replacing it with compulsory binding interest arbitration.

The court found the Act substantially interfered with meaningful collective bargaining and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as the TTC was not an "essential service" in the constitutional sense, and the economic and equity concerns did not justify the complete prohibition of the right to strike.

The Act was declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The applicant sought damages of $137,772 for losses incurred in a foreign exchange trading account managed by the respondent, who was not registered with the Ontario Securities Commission.

The applicant brought the matter as an application, alleging negligence, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.

The court found that material facts were in dispute, particularly regarding the applicant's level of investment knowledge and the true nature of the parties' relationship, which required credibility assessments.

Consequently, the court ordered the application converted into an action pursuant to Rule 38.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, Ghulam Mujtaba, claimed the defendants, Mohammad Yasin and Fehra Yasin, borrowed $50,733.47 from him in 2011, which they promised to repay upon selling their home.

The defendants argued the funds were not a loan but payments towards amounts Mujtaba owed them under a separate agreement for housing and supervising his sister-in-law, Nazma, who was on bail.

The court found that Mujtaba proved the funds were a loan, separate from the agreement for Nazma's care, and that the defendants' evidence regarding their contribution to the funds and their set-off defence was not credible or properly pleaded.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the full amount plus pre-judgment interest.

The plaintiffs brought a partial summary judgment motion seeking declarations that a trust agreement was valid and binding, and that they each owned a 20% interest in a property.

In the alternative, they sought leave to register a certificate of pending litigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning the credibility of witnesses and allegations of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the trust agreement.

The court emphasized that such serious credibility issues could not be resolved on a paper record or through fact-finding tools on a motion.

The alternative request for a certificate of pending litigation was also dismissed, as the property was acquired as an investment, damages were an adequate remedy, and the balance of convenience favoured the defendant.

A third mortgagee appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment in a foreclosure action brought by the first mortgagee.

The appellant claimed he had an interest in the property with sufficient value to satisfy his third mortgage after the first and second mortgages were paid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant's assertion of equity in the property did not constitute a valid defence to the foreclosure.

The appellant had not disputed the validity of the mortgages and had failed to file a request to redeem or request for sale.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant sought to enforce a mortgage registered against residential property owned by the respondent.

The respondent's spouse had borrowed money from the appellant and signed a promissory note agreeing to register a mortgage as security.

The respondent contended the mortgage was unenforceable because she received no consideration and understood it was to replace an existing second mortgage, not to secure her spouse's debts.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's findings that the respondent received no consideration and that the mortgage's purpose was to discharge the existing second mortgage, not to secure new loans.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff, 2042066 Ontario Inc. O/A MSGD Petroleum, brought a motion for summary judgment against Basant Transport Ltd. and Ranjit Singh Ghuman for an unpaid debt of $32,500 for petroleum.

The central issue was whether Mr. Ghuman had personally guaranteed the debt.

The court, applying the principles from Hryniak v. Maudlin, found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

It weighed the contradictory evidence of Mr. Ghuman, the testimony of Mr. Dhillon, and an expert forensic document examiner's report, concluding that Mr. Ghuman had indeed signed the personal guarantee.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for $30,500 plus interest and fixed costs.

The applicant, Sahara Lawyer Professional Corporation, brought a motion to compel the respondent, Lata Menon, to attend cross-examination on her affidavits.

Menon had acted as outside counsel for Sahara and held referral fees in trust, leading to an application by Sahara for an accounting and payment of funds, and a separate interpleader application by Menon.

The motion to compel cross-examination was opposed by Menon, Subhash Sharma, and Amandeep Kapila, who raised issues of proper service, prematurity due to a dispute over Sahara's share ownership, and counsel authority/conflict of interest.

The court granted Sahara's motion, finding that Virender Sharma, as the sole director, had authority to instruct counsel for Sahara, and that prior court orders did not preclude the cross-examination.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a third mortgage against the defendant's property, claiming it secured loans previously made to the defendant's spouse.

The defendant argued she never consented to securing her spouse's debts and believed the mortgage was intended to replace an existing second mortgage.

The court found the mortgage was intended to replace the second mortgage and that no funds were advanced to the defendant.

The court also applied the defence of non est factum, finding the defendant did not consent to the mortgage's purported purpose.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed, and the mortgage was ordered discharged.

The defendant's counterclaim for slander of title was dismissed.