Nancy L. Dennison

On a summary conviction appeal from convictions and acquittals arising from domestic allegations, the appellant challenged the assault conviction on grounds including improper use of prior consistent statements, misapprehension of evidence, and reliance on prior case reasoning.

The appeal court held the trial reasons, read as a whole, did not show impermissible credibility bolstering and disclosed no material misapprehension affecting the verdict.

The court found it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant’s explanation for the injury evidence and to accept corroborative value in contemporaneous photographs.

The court further held the circumstantial-evidence argument was inapplicable because the case included direct testimony and proper reasonable-doubt analysis.

The summary conviction appeal was dismissed and the assault conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft over $5,000, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that it was not informed.

The appellant claimed he was unaware that a conviction would result in automatic deportation with no right of appeal.

The trial judge had imposed a suspended sentence and 12 months probation.

The appellate court found that the appellant was sufficiently informed of the immigration consequences through his trial counsel's advice that he could be deported and should seek independent immigration legal advice.

The court rejected the appellant's claim that he needed to know with certainty that he would be deported, finding that knowledge of the possibility of deportation was sufficient.

The court also found that the appellant had not established prejudice, as his primary concern was avoiding jail time, which the guilty plea achieved.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court considered whether Taverio Stewart had knowledge and control of a loaded firearm found in the glove compartment of his Audi, following police surveillance and a search warrant.

The defence argued that Stewart’s uncle, Mr. Downey, who regularly borrowed the car, could have placed the firearm there.

The court found the defence evidence credible and raised a reasonable doubt, resulting in Stewart’s acquittal.

This sentencing decision addresses whether "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-trial custody conditions can reduce a sentence below a mandatory minimum, specifically for robbery with a firearm.

The court found that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *R. v. Hilbach* undermined the rationale for applying Duncan credit to reduce mandatory minimum sentences.

The court distinguished Duncan credit as a mitigating factor from "Summers credit" (statutory pre-sentence custody credit), concluding that mitigating factors cannot reduce a sentence below a constitutional mandatory minimum.

The defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 5 years imprisonment for robbery with a firearm, with credit for pre-trial custody.

The applicant, charged with importing cocaine, sought a stay of proceedings alleging racial profiling by CBSA and RCMP officers under sections 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that Border Services Officer Coughlin did not racially profile the applicant, but Superintendent Ryan did, by relying on a stereotype based on the applicant's national origin (Jamaican-born Canadian travelling to a non-Jamaica Caribbean country) as an indicator of criminality.

This reliance on immutable characteristics was deemed discriminatory.

Consequently, the court found violations of the applicant's s. 7 and s. 15 Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The defendant, Antonio Canono, was convicted by a jury of operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood causing death and dangerous driving causing death.

The court determined the material facts for sentencing, finding that Canono was impaired and speeding significantly (105 km/h in a 50 km/h zone) at the time of the collision, which resulted in the death of his friend.

The court considered aggravating factors (impairment, excessive speeding, tragic outcome) and mitigating factors (no prior criminal or driving record, hardworking, family support, remorse).

The Crown sought 6-7 years, while the Defence sought 3 years.

The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 5 years' imprisonment on each count, along with a 5-year driving prohibition post-imprisonment and a non-communication order.

The Landlord and Tenant Board ordered the tenant's eviction due to fire and egress hazards caused by hoarding.

The tenant sought multiple reviews, which were dismissed.

The tenant appealed to the Divisional Court.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the appeal and lift the stay of eviction, arguing no question of law was raised and the appeal lacked merit.

The court found no error of law in the Board's decision that the tenant had notice and was able to participate in the hearing, nor in its consideration of the tenant's circumstances or the landlord's accommodation efforts.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted, and the stay of eviction was lifted.

The Applicant Father brought a motion for contempt against the Mother for failing to comply with a previous order regarding their child's school enrollment and attendance, and the Father's parenting time.

The court found that the Mother breached the orders by intentionally delaying school enrollment, using illness as an improper means to prevent school attendance, and withholding parenting time.

Despite finding breaches, the court exercised its discretion not to make a formal finding of contempt, emphasizing that such findings are a last resort in family law.

However, the court imposed new, specific orders to ensure the child's school attendance and the Father's parenting time, and ordered the Mother to pay costs to the Father due to her unreasonable behaviour.

The Applicant/Mother sought divorce, sole decision-making authority and primary residence for the child, supervised parenting time for the Father, retroactive and ongoing child support, a restraining order, and an order regarding a jointly purchased vehicle.

The Respondent/Father was noted in default and did not participate in the uncontested trial.

The court granted the Mother sole decision-making authority and primary residence, ordered supervised parenting time for the Father, imputed an interim income to the Father for child support purposes and ordered financial disclosure, issued a final restraining order against the Father, and ordered the Father to take over the car loan payments and reimburse the Mother for past payments, or transfer ownership to the Mother.

Costs were awarded to the Mother.

The appellant was convicted of possessing and accessing child pornography.

The sole issue at trial was the defence of legitimate educational purpose under s. 163.1(6) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge rejected this defence, finding the appellant's evidence not credible and lacking an objective connection to an educational purpose, and also found an undue risk of harm to minors.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decision to allow Crown reply evidence, the assessment of the educational purpose's merit, and the finding of undue risk of harm.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on the admissibility of reply evidence and the lack of a legitimate educational purpose.

The appellant, P.G., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed suspended sentence with probation.

The trial judge had found P.G. sexually assaulted a Walmart employee, relying significantly on after-the-fact conduct evidence (following other women and masturbating in the store shortly after the incident) to establish sexual intent.

P.G. argued the trial judge erred in admitting this evidence, failed to consider alternative inferences, and imposed an overly harsh sentence.

The appeal court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the after-the-fact conduct evidence was properly admitted as probative of intent, the alternative inferences proposed by the appellant were speculative and not reasonable possibilities, and the suspended sentence was not demonstrably unfit or based on an error in principle.

The appellant, Vu Truong, appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge properly determined the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the appellant's evidence compared to the police officer's.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof and did not unfairly scrutinize the evidence.

The court noted numerous inconsistencies and implausibilities in the appellant's testimony, contrasting with the consistency and common-sense nature of the police officer's evidence.

The applicant sought divorce, equalization of net family property, and spousal support after a 38-year marriage.

The respondent refused to participate in the legal proceedings, leading to an uncontested trial.

The court determined the value of marital assets, attributed income to the respondent based on recent tax assessments, and found the applicant entitled to compensatory spousal support due to career sacrifices made during the marriage.

The court ordered a significant equalization payment and a lump sum spousal support award, citing the respondent's non-participation and the need for a clean break.

Costs were also awarded to the applicant.

The appellant, Manuel Fernandes-Desa, appealed his conviction for impaired driving, raising three grounds: insufficient reasons from the trial judge regarding an officer's inconsistent statement, misapprehension of evidence leading to a reversed burden of proof, and an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the officer's credibility despite the inconsistency, that there was no misapprehension of evidence or reversal of the burden of proof, and that the verdict was reasonable based on the constellation of factors presented at trial.

The Plaintiff, having obtained summary judgment, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Defendant failed to file cost submissions.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 and Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, determined that while the Plaintiff was entitled to costs as the successful party, the Defendant's conduct did not meet the threshold for substantial indemnity.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $22,509.90, after deducting previously awarded costs.

Demetre Hibbert and Raquel Williams sought to exclude gun and drug evidence seized under search warrants, alleging s. 8 Charter violations due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that a traffic stop leading to information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) violated Mr. Hibbert's s. 9 Charter rights, leading to the excision of that paragraph.

Furthermore, the court determined that the ITO lacked sufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds that the items would be found in Mr. Hibbert's BMW or Ms. Williams' residence three months after the alleged shooting, primarily due to the staleness of the information and speculative inferences regarding ongoing criminal activity or gang feuds.

Consequently, both Mr. Hibbert's and Ms. Williams' s. 8 Charter rights were violated, rendering the search warrants invalid.

The applicant sought an order to quash an indictment as a nullity due to improper joinder of charges, or to stay the charges as an abuse of process.

In the alternative, the applicant sought to sever the Toronto and Peel charges.

The court found no legal impediment to the Crown's procedure of withdrawing an information and laying a new one combining charges from different regions, nor did it constitute an abuse of process.

The court also dismissed the application for severance, finding a sufficient factual and legal nexus between the charges and a viable similar fact application, which outweighed the risk of prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The applicants, Demetre Hibbert and Raquel Williams, challenged search warrants that led to the seizure of a firearm and drugs, arguing insufficient grounds and seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

They requested judicial summaries of redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO), specifically Appendix "D" and other paragraphs, which were withheld based on Confidential Informant (CI) privilege.

The court, acting as case management judge for pre-trial Charter applications, ordered the Crown to provide judicial summaries under step two of the Garofoli process.

The court emphasized that a mere assertion of CI privilege was insufficient; the summaries needed to enable applicants' counsel to meaningfully participate in the editing process.

The court also prepared a judicial summary comparing different drafts of Appendix "D" as requested by the applicants.

The applicants challenged the issuance of three search warrants and sought disclosure of a confidential informant's (CI) handler's notes under step five of the Garofoli process.

They argued that the CI handler was a co-affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) or, alternatively, that the notes were relevant to demonstrate material omissions or deliberate/reckless falsehoods in the ITO, which could lead to the warrants being set aside.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the CI handler was not a co-affiant and that the applicants had not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the disclosure of the handler's notes would assist in challenging the issuance of the search warrants.

The accused was charged with robbery and breach of recognizance.

Counsel consented to severing the counts, with robbery proceeding before a jury.

The court ordered the selection of two alternate jurors under s. 631(2.1) of the Criminal Code, granting Crown and defence 14 peremptory challenges each.

A race-based challenge for cause was permitted under s. 638(1)(b) due to the accused being Black, and rotating triers were ordered under s. 640(2).