Reza Raeesi

The court sentenced B.O. for sexual interference and exposing a person under 16 to sexually explicit material, both involving his daughter, M.A. The court reviewed the circumstances of the offences and the offender, the harm to the victim, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 5 years for sexual interference and 2 years for exposing a child to sexually explicit material, with ancillary orders including prohibitions and registration requirements.

The decision applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Friesen and emphasizes the gravity of sexual offences against children, the importance of denunciation and deterrence, and the need for proportionality and parity in sentencing.

This sentencing decision addresses possession of child pornography under section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Christopher DaSilva, pleaded guilty to possessing a large and disturbing collection of child pornography, including over 35,000 images and nearly 200 videos, amassed over several years.

The court considered extensive forensic and psychological assessments, including phallometric testing indicating pedophilic interests, and a detailed therapy report demonstrating the accused's remorse and commitment to rehabilitation.

The court emphasized the paramount importance of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing child pornography offences, referencing recent appellate decisions updating sentencing ranges post-R. v. Friesen.

The sentence imposed was 18 months incarceration followed by two years probation with strict conditions, including internet restrictions and ancillary orders such as SOIRA registration and DNA sampling.

Stanislaw Dunajski pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought a 90-day intermittent jail sentence, while the Defence proposed a 6-9 month conditional sentence.

The court, applying a child-centred approach and considering mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of criminal record, low risk of re-offending, engagement in therapy, and the nature of the images (sexualized posing of pre-pubescent children, small collection), imposed a six-month conditional sentence.

This was followed by eighteen months of probation and various ancillary orders, including a 10-year SOIRA order, a 5-year section 161 order, and a DNA order.

The court found that a conditional sentence, with strict conditions, could achieve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence while promoting rehabilitation.

Annisha Sergeant appealed her conviction for assaulting her daughter, primarily on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (alleging counsel ignored instructions to testify or gave incompetent advice) and, alternatively, that the trial court erred by convicting her of assault with a weapon when the findings only supported simple assault.

The court found that while counsel's conduct could have been better, the advice not to testify was reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance.

However, the court agreed there was an error in the verdict, as the trial judge's reasons only supported a finding of simple assault, not assault with a weapon, creating sufficient uncertainty.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Wojciech Kuleczka, appealed a Justice of the Peace's decision to impose a one-year weapons prohibition and forfeit seized firearms under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The original decision was based on concerns about the appellant's mental stability, specifically detailed hallucinations he experienced, which led to high-risk police responses.

The appellant argued the Justice unreasonably inferred risk from his mental health history and misapprehended evidence from his doctors.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Justice's conclusion reasonable given the unexplained nature of the hallucinations and the potential for recurrence, which raised legitimate public safety concerns despite the appellant's lack of prior violence or misuse of firearms.

The defendant, Antonio Canono, was convicted by a jury of operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood causing death and dangerous driving causing death.

The court determined the material facts for sentencing, finding that Canono was impaired and speeding significantly (105 km/h in a 50 km/h zone) at the time of the collision, which resulted in the death of his friend.

The court considered aggravating factors (impairment, excessive speeding, tragic outcome) and mitigating factors (no prior criminal or driving record, hardworking, family support, remorse).

The Crown sought 6-7 years, while the Defence sought 3 years.

The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 5 years' imprisonment on each count, along with a 5-year driving prohibition post-imprisonment and a non-communication order.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (a handgun and statements) obtained during a police investigation.

The court found that the police arbitrarily detained the accused and unlawfully seized and searched his satchel, violating his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court rejected the claim of racial profiling but found the police conduct to be overzealous and egregious.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the seriousness of the charges.

A jury found the accused guilty of child luring and making sexually explicit material available to a child, involving communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The court considered the circumstances of the offences, the accused's background (first offender, difficult childhood, mental health issues, low risk to reoffend, significant collateral consequences), and the parties' sentencing positions.

The Crown sought 30 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or 14 months.

The court rejected the Crown's proposed sentencing range of three to five years for these offences, aligning with the view that a new range has not yet been definitively established post-Friesen.

It also found that a conditional sentence was not appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence, despite mitigating factors.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and over 80 contrary to the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 10(a) and 10(b), seeking exclusion of breath samples and police observations under section 24(2).

The court found minor breaches of both sections: a 45-second delay in informing the defendant of the reason for detention (s. 10(a)) and a six-minute delay in providing rights to counsel (s. 10(b)).

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the breaches were of low to moderate seriousness and had low impact on the defendant's Charter rights, while society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission of the reliable evidence.

Consequently, no evidence was excluded.

The court also found that the Crown proved the technical requirements for breath samples under sections 258(1)(c)(iii) and 320.31(1)(a) of the Code.

The defendant was convicted on both impaired operation and over 80 charges.

The Appellant, Romain Landu, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

He raised five grounds of appeal, including that the trial judge erred by reversing the burden of proof on self-defence, misapprehending material evidence, failing to consider significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, applying different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, and concluding without evidence that the appellant was not in shock during a 911 call.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, made findings of fact entitled to deference, adequately addressed inconsistencies, and did not engage in uneven scrutiny or stereotypical thinking in assessing credibility.

The defendant, Jay Singh Toor, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in his impaired driving case.

The defence argued the delay from arrest (May 16, 2020) to the anticipated end of trial (January 19-21, 2022) exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown contended that the s. 11(b) clock began when the information was sworn (September 7, 2020) and that there was defence-caused delay.

The court, following R. v. Kalanj, confirmed that the s. 11(b) clock starts when the information is sworn.

After deducting defence delay (approximately 7.5 weeks), the net delay was calculated to be under 15 months, falling below the 18-month ceiling.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance impacting court operations.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, as the delay was not found to be markedly longer than it reasonably should have been, especially given the pandemic context, and no s. 7 Charter violation was established.

The accused was charged with sexual assault after the complainant awoke to him having sexual intercourse with her.

The complainant testified she had no memory of returning to the accused's home due to intoxication and did not consent.

The accused claimed the complainant initiated the sexual activity while they were sleeping on the couch.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding the complainant lacked the capacity to consent while asleep and did not consent upon waking.

The court found no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and found the accused guilty.

The defendant, charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg, brought a pre-trial application to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from information sworn to trial date was 750 days (25 months).

The court considered a significant portion of this delay, specifically 224 days spent in resolution discussions, as implicitly waived by the defence, following the reasoning in R. v. Lim.

After deducting implicitly and explicitly waived periods, the net delay was calculated to be 505 days (16.8 months), which falls below the presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

Consequently, the application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by misstating the applicability of the second stage of the W.(D.) test and by applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and another witness.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the trial judge's initial misstatement regarding W.(D.), her reasons as a whole demonstrated a proper application of the burden of proof to the credibility assessment.

The court also found no evidence of uneven scrutiny, as the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable and supported by the record.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant sought to exclude breath samples and test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter, including claims of racial profiling.

The court found no Charter breaches.

The officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body based on improper parking at an LCBO, admission of prior alcohol consumption, and detection of alcohol odour.

The screening demand was lawful and made within the immediacy requirement.

No racial profiling occurred.

The defendant was properly arrested and advised of her rights.

A conviction was registered.

A child protection proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 involving a child apprehended at age nine from her mother's care.

The court found the child in need of protection under sections 74(2)(b)(i) and 74(2)(b)(ii) of the CYFSA based on risk of physical harm resulting from the mother's failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, and a pattern of neglect.

The risk arose from the mother's substance abuse, involvement in domestic violence relationships, and poor choices in male partners.

The court rejected the society's other grounds for finding (actual physical harm, emotional harm, and risk of emotional harm).

For disposition, the court made a deemed custody order under section 102(1) of the CYFSA in favour of the maternal grandparents, with whom the child had been residing.

The court made an access order permitting the child to initiate contact with her mother, with the child controlling the terms and conditions of visits.

No access order was made for the stepfather.