Harpreet Saini

The accused was convicted after trial of possession of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for the purposes of trafficking.

The Crown and Defence reached a joint submission for a sentence of 7.5 years, less credit for pre-trial custody and jail conditions mitigation, resulting in a net sentence of 7 years.

The court accepted the joint submission as fit, considering the gravity of the offences, the accused's personal circumstances including systemic disadvantage and social context, immigration consequences, and mitigating factors including harsh pre-trial incarceration conditions at Maplehurst.

The court sentenced DD to eleven years’ imprisonment for two counts of sexual interference and one count of forcible confinement, conditionally staying two counts of sexual assault.

The offences involved the repeated sexual abuse of DD’s stepdaughter, L, over more than three years, beginning when she was twelve.

The decision reviews the legal principles of sentencing, the factual foundation, aggravating and mitigating factors, and comparable case law.

The court found the gravity, duration, and breach of trust to be highly aggravating, and determined that a sentence greater than that proposed by either party was necessary to reflect denunciation, deterrence, and the harm caused.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in their first-degree murder and attempted murder trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 37.12 months (1129 days).

The court deducted 98 days for defence delay (preference for consecutive preliminary inquiry dates) and 11 days for judicial illness, resulting in a net delay of 33.53 months (1020 days), which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown argued that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 pandemic and the complexity of the case.

The court found the case to be of moderate complexity and attributed 107 days (3.53 months) of the delay to the COVID-19 pandemic's systemic impact and backlog.

This brought the net delay down to 30 months, falling within the presumptive ceiling.

The court also found that the defence had not demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, O.Y., was charged with two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against his former partner.

The Crown faced significant obstacles in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including evidence of the complainant's motivation to fabricate, unconfirmed testimony, and the accused's denial.

The court also addressed a Crown application for the complainant to testify behind a screen, which was denied.

Ultimately, the court found a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The accused, Amandeep Malhi, applied to stay criminal proceedings for assault and threats, alleging unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, citing a total delay of 19 months.

The court, applying the *Jordan* framework, found the net delay to be approximately 17 months and 1 week after deducting time attributable to the defence's inaction regarding disclosure and trial date setting.

As the net delay was below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court, the onus was on the defence to show the case took markedly too long and that they made meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite.

The court found the defence failed to demonstrate sustained efforts, particularly by rejecting the Crown's willingness to set dates before full disclosure and by delaying communication with the trial coordinator.

The application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant, Rajin Sunda, abandoned his appeal from conviction but appealed his sentence for drug trafficking and possession.

The parties jointly proposed a resolution for the sentence appeal, suggesting the remaining custodial sentence be stayed and replaced with a one-year probation period.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, agreeing with the joint proposal.

The court emphasized the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress, including addiction treatment and compliance with release conditions, finding that re-incarceration would be detrimental to his rehabilitation and contrary to public interest.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role in the execution-style shooting of a 16-year-old victim.

The court determined the appropriate sentence range was 8 to 12 years, fixing the sentence at 8 years due to the offender's limited participation and young age.

The court then reduced the sentence to 7 years to account for the collateral consequences of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including lockdowns and the COVID-19 pandemic, before applying a 1.5:1 credit for time served.

The final sentence to be served was 2 years and 325 days.

A youth charged with assault and sexual assault against his former partner sought access to police records from a 2011 sexual assault investigation involving the complainant as a victim when both parties were youths.

The investigation resulted in no charges being laid.

The accused sought access to these records to challenge the complainant's credibility at trial.

The Youth Court judge determined that the records fall within the definition of "records" under the Youth Criminal Justice Act but that Part 6 of the Act does not provide a statutory avenue for access to police records where no charges were laid following an investigation.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant sought to exclude breath samples and test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter, including claims of racial profiling.

The court found no Charter breaches.

The officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body based on improper parking at an LCBO, admission of prior alcohol consumption, and detection of alcohol odour.

The screening demand was lawful and made within the immediacy requirement.

No racial profiling occurred.

The defendant was properly arrested and advised of her rights.

A conviction was registered.

The accused pleaded guilty to five firearm and ammunition manufacturing offences: possession of loaded restricted firearms (Glock 17 and Glock 22), possession of a loaded semi-automatic rifle (AR-15), manufacture of ammunition, and manufacture of prohibited/restricted firearms.

The accused manufactured three restricted firearms in his basement using commercially available POLYMER80 kits and carried one loaded firearm in his vehicle, which he displayed during a dispute with another person.

The court imposed a four-year penitentiary sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, along with a DNA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The court rejected the defence argument that a recent decision substantially changed the sentencing landscape, finding the accused's conduct fell within the "true crime" end of the spectrum of firearm offences.

The defendant sought a review of his detention order, arguing errors by the Justice of the Peace and a material change in circumstances due to a revised release plan and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found a material change in circumstances, allowing for review, but ultimately dismissed the application.

The proposed release plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the substantial risk of reoffending on the secondary ground and to maintain confidence in the administration of justice on the tertiary ground, despite the pandemic.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood following a high-speed pursuit on Highway 410.

The Crown relied on officer observations of excessive speed, odour of alcohol, and bloodshot eyes.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the arrest for dangerous driving was lawful based on excessive speed alone, but the breath demand lacked reasonable and probable grounds for impaired driving.

Despite Charter breaches, the breath evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge but acquitted of both dangerous driving and impaired driving charges.

The applicant, Tevin Wheatley, sought a bail review under section 520 of the Criminal Code after his detention was ordered due to breaching previous bail conditions related to serious human trafficking and dangerous driving charges.

The review was premised on a material change in circumstances: the presentation of a new surety (Minister Brenda Clarke) and a plan incorporating GPS electronic monitoring.

The court considered the admissibility of the new evidence under the modified Palmer criteria as per R. v. St. Cloud.

The judge found the new surety and GPS monitoring sufficiently mitigated the secondary (public safety) and tertiary (confidence in the administration of justice) grounds for detention.

Consequently, the applicant was released on a $5,000 recognizance with strict conditions, including GPS monitoring, residency with the surety, and restrictions on phone/internet use and travel.

The defendant was charged with two counts of assaulting police officers engaged in the lawful execution of their duties and one count of breaching a recognizance of bail.

The defendant was initially stopped for speeding and found to be in possession of two cellular telephones.

A computer check revealed the defendant was on bail for drug trafficking with a condition prohibiting possession of more than one cell phone.

The defendant argued the officer's arrest was unlawful due to misinterpretation of the bail condition, and therefore his assault on the officers was justified.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on objectively reasonable grounds, the defendant's assault was unjustified, and the defendant breached his bail condition by possessing two cell phones.

The defendant, Rajeev Henry Balendra, brought a motion for a directed verdict on four counts of an indictment: fraudulent possession of credit card data, conspiracy to commit fraud, possession of identity information with intent to commit an indictable offence, and possession of forged credit cards.

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence, including a USB drive with over 2,000 credit card numbers found on the accused, counterfeit driver's licenses, and financial institution affidavits detailing losses.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, determining whether sufficient evidence existed for a jury, properly instructed, to convict.

The court found ample evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer the accused's knowledge and intent, satisfying the elements of all remaining counts.

The motion for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The defendant applied to exclude evidence obtained from searches of a USB drive and a vehicle, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the USB drive but not the vehicle.

The search of the USB drive was deemed a lawful search incident to arrest, as it was conducted for a valid purpose connected to the arrest and was reasonable in scope.

The court also determined that a subsequent review and printing of the USB drive's contents did not constitute a new search.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence in a cocaine trafficking investigation.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain contained misleading information and failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged drug trafficking activities and the residence searched.

The court found that surveillance, intercepted communications, and investigative observations provided a reasonable basis to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be located at the residence.

The court further held that even if a Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would have been admitted under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant brought a Charter application challenging the admissibility of statements made during police interrogation.

The defendant claimed that the police violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his lawyer of choice before questioning him.

The Crown argued there was no breach or, alternatively, that any breach should not result in exclusion of evidence.

The court found that the police failed to afford a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice by placing only a single phone call and waiting less than half an hour on a Saturday night.

The court further found that any purported waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the defendant was not provided with the required Prosper warning.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained through a search warrant, alleging the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading statements suggesting prior robbery convictions that had in fact been stayed.

The court agreed the ITO included inaccurate and misleading information and held that those portions should be excised.

However, applying the Garofoli review standard and considering the totality of the remaining evidence—including surveillance, witness descriptions, and links between the suspect and seized items—the court concluded there remained sufficient grounds that could have justified issuance of the warrant.

In the alternative, the court held that even if a Charter breach occurred, admission of the evidence was warranted under s. 24(2) given the seriousness of the alleged armed robberies and society’s interest in adjudicating the matter on its merits.

The motion to exclude the evidence was dismissed.