Maria Stevens

The court ruled on the voluntariness of a statement made by the accused, David Scott, to police after his arrest for importing child pornography.

The statement was found inadmissible because the interviewing officer improperly induced the accused by insinuating that cooperation would positively impact his bail release, creating a false dichotomy between confessing and securing liberty.

The court emphasized that such a threat, especially when false, compromises the detainee's free choice to remain silent.

David Scott was found guilty of possession and importation of child pornography.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court addressed the Kienapple principle, finding that the possession count should be conditionally stayed as it arose from the same delict as importation.

The court then determined that a sentence of two years less a day was within the appropriate range.

Crucially, the court held that the one-year mandatory minimum sentence for importing child pornography under section 163.1(3) of the Criminal Code violated Section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was of no force or effect, thereby allowing for a conditional sentence.

Considering mitigating factors such as the offender's age, first-offender status, remorse, family support, and the impact of Charter breaches by law enforcement, the court imposed a 23-month conditional sentence with strict conditions, along with ancillary orders including DNA analysis, SOIRA registration, forfeiture of devices, and a 20-year Section 161 order.

The accused was tried for possession and importation of child pornography after border security officers found numerous digital devices in his luggage at Pearson Airport.

The central issue was whether the accused had knowledge of the child pornography on the devices.

The court rejected demeanour evidence but found that the volume and dispersal of the illicit material across seven different devices constituted overwhelming circumstantial evidence of knowledge.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant, charged with possession and importation of child pornography, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence found on his digital devices during a border search.

The court previously found that s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that the applicant was detained under s. 10 of the Charter when border officers requested his device passwords, resulting in a breach of his rights to counsel and to be informed of the reasons for detention.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded because the officers acted in good faith under the law as it existed at the time, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicants, who were charged with child pornography offences following searches of their digital devices at the border, brought a constitutional challenge against s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act.

They argued that the provision, which allows customs officers to search imported goods without any legal threshold, violates the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter when applied to personal digital devices.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the profound privacy interests in digital devices require a legal threshold for searches.

The court held that the provision violates s. 8 and is not saved by s. 1, declaring it of no force or effect with respect to digital devices, but suspended the declaration of invalidity.

The applicant, Jeremy Pike, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his digital devices at the border.

The court found that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he was asked for his password, as he was detained at that point and should have been informed of his rights.

While the s. 8 breach (unreasonable search under a provision later found unconstitutional) was in good faith, the Border Services Officer's failure to take proper notes increased its seriousness.

Considering the seriousness and significant impact of both breaches, particularly the s. 10(b) violation, the court concluded that the evidence obtained from Mr. Pike's digital devices should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, Robert Stack, brought a Charter challenge to a search warrant issued for his Samsung tablet, alleging misleading statements in the Information to Obtain (ITO) and overreaching in the request to search cloud-based storage.

The charges against him included communicating with a person under 16 for sexual assault and interference, arising from an undercover police operation on the Grindr app.

The court found that while some statements in the ITO were misleading and were excised, they were not deliberately so.

The court also found that the request to search cloud storage was not overreaching given common technological practices.

Ultimately, the court upheld the warrant, concluding that there were reasonable and probable grounds for its issuance and that the police conduct did not subvert the pre-authorization process.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 11(b) alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The accused was arrested on February 5, 2019 and charged with communicating with a person under the age of sixteen for the purpose of facilitating sexual assault and sexual interference, failure to comply with recognizance, and failure to comply with undertaking.

The trial was scheduled to commence approximately 22 months after arrest, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that the delay attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and court suspension of operations constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying the delay.

The court found that 7 months and 10 days of delay could be attributed to the pandemic, reducing net delay to 14 months and 20 days, below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter after finding the search warrant invalid.

The trial judge had excised a paragraph from the Information to Obtain (ITO) because it lacked support for the affiant's belief that the suspect was a collector, rendering the warrant invalid.

However, the trial judge admitted the evidence, finding the police conduct was inept but not blatant, and the balance of factors favoured admission.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework and dismissed the appeal.

The defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography following a trial.

At sentencing, the defendant challenged the mandatory minimum sentence of six months imprisonment under section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code as a violation of section 12 of the Charter (cruel and unusual punishment).

The court determined that the appropriate sentence was seven months imprisonment followed by three years probation.

The court found that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate and therefore did not constitute a Charter breach.

The court declined to impose a section 161.1(a)-(c) order, finding the defendant posed a low risk to reoffend based on expert evidence.

The accused was convicted of possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering after receiving $348,751.57 from a sophisticated phishing fraud and immediately dispersing the funds.

The Crown sought 30 months' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, noting the significant impact on the corporate victim and the accused's rapid diversion of the funds.

The accused was sentenced to 18 months' incarceration, two years' probation, and ordered to pay $348,751.57 in restitution.

The accused, Fattah Abdel, was charged with possession of money obtained by an indictable offence and transferring money with intent to conceal or convert it, knowing it was derived from a designated offence, contrary to section 462.31(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that Abdel received illicit funds totaling $348,751.57, which were obtained through an email hacking fraud committed against Air Palace and Rotor Maxx.

Abdel deposited these funds into a company account he controlled and then quickly dispersed them via bank drafts to pay off his personal and business debts.

He provided conflicting and false explanations for the funds' origin to his business partners.

The court found Abdel guilty on both counts, concluding that he either had actual knowledge that the funds were illicit or was wilfully blind to their illicit nature, given the unusual transaction, his desperate financial circumstances, and his deceptive actions.

Following a five-day trial, the offender was convicted of possessing, accessing, and attempting to distribute child pornography, as well as obstructing police by making a false statement.

The court stayed the accessing charge due to the Kienapple principle.

The offender possessed 5,602 images and six videos of child pornography, described by investigating officers as among the largest, most varied, and most vile collections encountered.

The court imposed a three-year penitentiary sentence, balancing the extreme nature of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence against the offender's status as a first offender with significant medical disabilities and likely deportation consequences.

The defendant was charged with accessing, possessing, and attempting to distribute child pornography, as well as obstructing police by giving a false statement.

The charges stemmed from an investigation following an attempt to distribute child pornography via email to a recipient in the United States, execution of a search warrant at the defendant's residence, and discovery of child pornography on two cellular telephones seized from the defendant's bedroom.

The defendant claimed that a friend named Chris had used the phones without his knowledge.

The court found the defendant guilty of all four offences after determining that the defendant's testimony was not credible, that he had knowledge of and control over the child pornography, and that he deliberately misled police to obstruct the investigation.

The applicant brought a section 8 Charter application challenging the validity of a production order and search warrant obtained in connection with an investigation into child pornography downloaded via the Freenet peer-to-peer network.

The applicant argued that both investigative orders lacked reasonable grounds because there was no nexus between the downloading activity observed in December 2014 and January 2015 and the subscriber information obtained in March 2015, given that IP addresses are dynamically assigned and can change frequently.

The court found that the production order and search warrant should be set aside due to lack of reasonable grounds.

The court also identified multiple defects in the investigative orders, including erroneous information about Freenet's counter mechanism, incorrect calculations regarding file blocks and even share, and the inclusion of printed materials without evidentiary foundation.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence, finding that the seriousness of the breach and the significant invasion of privacy outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The applicant sought to exclude his statements to police on the grounds that his Charter rights were violated.

Police executed a search warrant at the applicant's home and questioned him in the kitchen without informing him of his right to counsel or the reasons for his detention.

The applicant was arrested and later provided a video-recorded statement at the police station after speaking with duty counsel.

The court found that the applicant was subjected to a psychological detention and that his rights under sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were breached.

Although the statements were found to be voluntary under common law, they were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as the admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The three accused, Amandeep Jodha, Manjot Chadde, and Gurvir Deol, were charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following a violent brawl.

The Crown's theory relied on identifying the perpetrators and establishing a common intention to bring weapons.

The court found all three accused not guilty, concluding that the Crown failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to the unreliability and internal inconsistencies of all witness testimonies, making it impossible to identify the perpetrators.

A joint application for a stay of proceedings based on s.11(b) Charter delay was dismissed as moot, though the court noted it would have been dismissed on its merits due to a combination of defence delay, inherent delay, and exceptional circumstances.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm to his former common-law spouse.

The Crown alleged that the accused intentionally slammed a washing machine door on the complainant's finger, causing a tear requiring five stitches.

The court found that while the accused deliberately slammed the door out of frustration during an argument, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to catch the complainant's finger or was reckless as to whether the door would injure her.

The accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt regarding the element of intent.

The court declared a mistrial in a judge-alone criminal trial for sexual assault and threatening death.

The complainant, K.M., testified with a Punjabi interpreter, but it became evident during the trial that she had sufficient English proficiency.

This raised concerns about the necessity of the interpreter under Charter s. 14 and the trier of fact's ability to assess credibility through an interpreter.

The court found that a "needs" assessment for interpreter services was not properly conducted, and K.M. should have testified in English with stand-by interpreter assistance.

Given the trial's focus on credibility and the material interference of the interpretation filter, a mistrial was deemed the appropriate remedy to prevent a miscarriage of justice.