E. Brown

This decision addresses urgent motions regarding the residential schedule of four children, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and a proposed nesting arrangement following the separation of Laura Anne Fennema and Trevor William Harry Fennema.

The court found the parenting time issues urgent due to the children’s removal from their home and school, but dismissed other requests for lack of urgency.

The court declined to order exclusive possession or nesting, primarily because of the Applicant’s criminal release conditions and the practicalities of the family farm.

The court ordered the children’s immediate return to their home with the Respondent and set a detailed interim parenting schedule, emphasizing the children’s best interests and stability.

Jarnail Randhawa pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his wife.

The court determined the parole ineligibility period, which is statutorily set at a minimum of 10 years, considering aggravating factors such as the brutality of the attack, gratuitous violence, abuse of trust, and leaving the victim to die, as well as mitigating factors including the guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior criminal record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 13 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The applicant agency brought a motion to vary a temporary placement and access order for three children involved in a high-conflict separation.

The agency and the mother sought to have the youngest child remain with the mother and the two older boys return to the mother's care, despite the boys expressing a preference to remain with the father.

The court found significant evidentiary issues with the children's hearsay statements and noted concerns about the mother's judgment, including the use of interior cameras to monitor the boys.

The court maintained the de facto status quo, leaving the youngest child with the mother and the boys with the father, subject to agency supervision and specific conditions, and ordered the boys to attend public school.

This case concerns an interim mobility motion where the respondent mother sought to relocate the child's primary residence from Brantford, Ontario, to Newfoundland.

The applicant father opposed the relocation and sought the child's return to Brantford and primary residence.

The court found that it was not in the child's best interests to be relocated, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the child's existing relationships and the shared parenting status quo.

The respondent's motion for relocation was dismissed, and an interim order was granted placing the child in the primary care of the applicant father in Brantford.

Following an interim motion where the responding party was entirely successful, the parties submitted written arguments on costs.

The moving party argued against a costs award, citing her limited financial means and the responding party's alleged unreasonable conduct.

The court rejected the moving party's arguments, noting that financial hardship does not shield an unsuccessful party from costs liability.

The court awarded the responding party partial indemnity costs fixed at $2,800.

The respondent mother brought an interim motion seeking to relocate with the parties' child from Norfolk County to Vaughan, Ontario, pending trial.

The applicant father opposed the move, arguing it would uproot the child from his established community and school.

Applying the test for interim mobility, the court found that there were genuine issues for trial regarding the parties' parenting time and that the mother had not provided compelling reasons to justify disrupting the status quo before a full evidentiary hearing.

The motion for interim relocation, along with requests regarding COVID-19 vaccination and therapy enrollment, was dismissed.

The accused was charged with second degree murder following the death of his friend, who was found beaten to death in his rented room.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the direct evidence of the accused's ex-wife, who testified that the accused confessed to the killing during a drunken phone call.

The court accepted the ex-wife's testimony, finding it corroborated by cell phone records and non-public details of the crime scene.

Despite evidence of the accused's intoxication, the court found he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder given the brutality of the assault and his subsequent actions to conceal the crime.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

In a sexual assault trial, the Crown applied to admit two out-of-court statements by the complainant (A.M.) as hearsay evidence: a spontaneous utterance to a life skills coach and a videotaped statement to police.

The defence conceded necessity but disputed reliability.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, finding both substantive and procedural reliability for the videotaped statement, particularly due to DNA evidence and corroborating video/audio.

The spontaneous utterance was admitted under the res gestae exception, as it was made under the stress of a startling event (learning video evidence was deficient).

Both statements were admitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking and weapons offences involving methamphetamine and firearms.

The Crown sought 18 months to two years less a day, while the defence sought a time-served disposition citing COVID-19 pandemic concerns in correctional facilities.

The court imposed five months additional custody following 207 days of presentence custody credit, followed by 18 months probation.

The judge considered the pandemic as a sentencing factor but concluded it did not warrant a substantial reduction from the range discussed at the judicial pretrial.

On a pre-trial application in a historical sexual assault and sexual exploitation prosecution, the Crown sought to adduce similar fact evidence from another witness alleging comparable sexual misconduct by the accused during the same period.

Applying the framework in Handy, the court found the proposed evidence highly probative on the actus reus, opportunity, and anticipated innocent-contact or fabrication issues, given the distinctive similarities in victim profile, relationship of trust, location, timing, and manner of the alleged assaults.

The court also found an air of reality to a collusion argument arising from Facebook contact between the complainant and the proposed witness, but concluded on a balance of probabilities that no actual collusion occurred.

Although the evidence carried substantial moral and reasoning prejudice, its probative value sufficiently outweighed that prejudice and the evidence was admitted.

The accused, J.E., brought an application under s.638(1)(f) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause on linguistic competence.

J.E. had previously obtained a s.530(1) order for an English trial, despite English being the predominant official language in the trial region (Brampton).

The Crown opposed the application.

The court denied the application, holding that a s.530 order does not automatically mandate a linguistic competence challenge for cause under s.638(1)(f) without an "air of reality" demonstrating a genuine need.

The court found no such air of reality, emphasizing that the standard jury screening process is sufficient in this context and that the s.530 order was not animated by a genuine language rights concern.

The Crown brought an application to admit the notes, diagrams, and Exhibit List prepared by a deceased police officer under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The officer had served as the Exhibit Officer during the execution of a search warrant in a child exploitation investigation.

The court found that necessity was established due to the officer's death and that threshold reliability was met given the administrative nature of the task, the officer's conscientious work habits, and the corroborative checks performed by other officers.

The application was granted and the evidence was ruled admissible.

During a trial, the Crown brought an application to admit into evidence an Agreed Statement of Facts that the accused had signed and filed in support of earlier guilty pleas which were subsequently struck.

The court dismissed the application, applying the reasoning from R. v. B.(D.M.), holding that the Agreed Statement of Facts was inextricably linked to the struck guilty pleas and fairness required it to be brought under the same protective umbrella.

Following a five-day trial, the offender was convicted of possessing, accessing, and attempting to distribute child pornography, as well as obstructing police by making a false statement.

The court stayed the accessing charge due to the Kienapple principle.

The offender possessed 5,602 images and six videos of child pornography, described by investigating officers as among the largest, most varied, and most vile collections encountered.

The court imposed a three-year penitentiary sentence, balancing the extreme nature of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence against the offender's status as a first offender with significant medical disabilities and likely deportation consequences.

The defendant was charged with accessing, possessing, and attempting to distribute child pornography, as well as obstructing police by giving a false statement.

The charges stemmed from an investigation following an attempt to distribute child pornography via email to a recipient in the United States, execution of a search warrant at the defendant's residence, and discovery of child pornography on two cellular telephones seized from the defendant's bedroom.

The defendant claimed that a friend named Chris had used the phones without his knowledge.

The court found the defendant guilty of all four offences after determining that the defendant's testimony was not credible, that he had knowledge of and control over the child pornography, and that he deliberately misled police to obstruct the investigation.

Dion Bacchus and Stephen Motoo brought an application for a stay of charges, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter rights due to an approximately 41-month delay between being charged and the impending trial date.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated the total delay, subtracted defence-attributable delay, and found the net delay for both applicants exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances, particularly regarding a significant delay in DNA evidence disclosure.

The court found the applicants' s. 11(b) rights were infringed and stayed the charges.

The accused, facing multiple charges including assault and sexual assault, elected to be tried by a judge and jury and obtained an order under section 530 of the Criminal Code for an English-speaking jury.

The accused subsequently brought an application to challenge prospective jurors for cause regarding their English language competency pursuant to section 638(1)(f) of the Code.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the statutory provisions do not create an automatic right to challenge jurors on linguistic competency without empirical evidence demonstrating a need for independent evaluation beyond the standard pre-screening mechanisms.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault against his six-month-old daughter, who presented at the hospital with severe, life-threatening injuries including a liver laceration and a bowel obstruction.

The accused claimed the injuries were accidental, resulting from him dropping and catching the infant.

The Crown alleged the injuries were caused by intentional blunt force trauma, specifically squeezing.

The court rejected the accused's accidental explanation, relying on medical evidence that the injuries were inconsistent with a drop/catch, and accepted the mother's evidence that the accused confessed to squeezing the infant in anger.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused challenged the validity of search warrants and sought to exclude seized evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the first Information to Obtain (ITO) fatally defective due to a systemic practice of not swearing ITOs, and the second telewarrant invalid because the precondition of impracticability to appear in person was not met.

Considering the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, including deliberate deception and systemic disregard for warrant procedures, the court excluded the firearm, shell casings, and surveillance equipment seized from the accused's residence.

In the context of CCAA proceedings for U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (USSC), the applicant sought approval for Transition Arrangements with its parent company, a Business Preservation Plan involving significant cash conservation measures (including suspension of pension, OPEB, and municipal tax payments), and Amended DIP Financing.

The court approved the motions, finding that the Transition Arrangements were fair and reasonable, and that the Business Preservation Plan and DIP financing were necessary to allow USSC to continue operations and pursue a restructuring solution, despite objections from the union and municipalities regarding the suspension of benefits and taxes.