Erin Norman

The accused was charged with second degree murder following the death of his friend, who was found beaten to death in his rented room.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the direct evidence of the accused's ex-wife, who testified that the accused confessed to the killing during a drunken phone call.

The court accepted the ex-wife's testimony, finding it corroborated by cell phone records and non-public details of the crime scene.

Despite evidence of the accused's intoxication, the court found he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder given the brutality of the assault and his subsequent actions to conceal the crime.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The accused, a taxicab driver, was charged with second degree murder after running over an intoxicated passenger with his minivan.

The incident was captured on a residential surveillance camera.

The accused testified that he accidentally struck the victim while looking for oncoming traffic.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as irreconcilable with the video footage and internally illogical.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally drove his vehicle at the victim in anger and possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his residence and motor vehicle, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained material misrepresentations and omissions.

The court found that the affiant included misleading information regarding a witness's belief about whether a firearm was real and whether it was kept at the applicant's residence.

Concluding that the affiant lacked reasonable and probable grounds to authorize the search, the court found a breach of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the serious impact of the breach on the applicant's privacy interests in his home.

The accused brought a Charter application to stay firearm charges or exclude a seized firearm, alleging excessive force during his arrest and breaches of his right to counsel.

The court found that the police did not use excessive force when arresting the fleeing accused.

The court also found no s. 7 breach regarding an officer commanding a witness to stop recording the arrest, as there was no actual prejudice to the accused's defence.

However, the Crown conceded that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were violated when an officer denigrated duty counsel's advice and threatened to charge the accused's family members if he did not confess.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct warranted the exclusion of the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter to maintain the long-term repute of the justice system.

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two to three years, while the defendant sought an intermittent jail sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less one day in a provincial reformatory followed by 18 months probation.

The court considered the seriousness of the offense, the defendant's youth and first-offender status, the significant psychological harm to the complainant, and the collateral consequences of imprisonment during the COVID-19 pandemic.

A show cause hearing on bail for a defendant charged with numerous firearms offences arising from an incident on April 15, 2019.

The defendant was alleged to have fled from police while carrying three loaded handguns, which were abandoned in publicly accessible locations.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The defendant proposed a strict release plan with a 24-hour curfew and four proposed sureties.

The court found the defendant met his onus on the primary ground but failed to overcome the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court was particularly concerned with the credibility of the proposed sureties, the defendant's apparent criminal lifestyle, and the absence of evidence of the defendant's commitment to supervision.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic context and expert evidence regarding jail conditions, but concluded that the serious nature of the allegations and likelihood of conviction outweighed the health concerns.

The appellant, a massage therapist, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a client.

He argued the trial judge erred by not considering the defence of accident, by drawing a negative credibility inference from his failure to ask about the allegations when confronted by the complainant's husband, and by dismissing the husband's evidence as irrelevant to the extortion theory.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of accident, that the credibility findings were reasonable, and that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the extortion theory.

Sohail Rajan's fourth bail application, heard via audioconference due to COVID-19.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the exclusion of a firearm from evidence and the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on correctional institutions.

The secondary ground (risk to public safety) was satisfied due to the weakened Crown case, accumulated pre-trial custody, and a robust bail plan including sureties and GPS monitoring.

The tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence) was fundamentally altered by the pandemic, as a reasonable and informed public would be concerned about the health risks in jails.

The applicant, suffering from psoriasis, was deemed more vulnerable.

The court granted bail with strict conditions, including house arrest, three sureties, and GPS monitoring with direct police notification for alerts.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault against a young adult female complainant.

The Crown alleged non-consensual sexual intercourse.

The defendant raised the defence of consent or, alternatively, an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The trial court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the defendant's testimony regarding consent.

The court found that the defendant knew the complainant did not consent to sexual intercourse and proceeded anyway, taking advantage of her silence and acquiescence.

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml.

At trial, it was found that the police breached his Charter rights by arbitrarily detaining him for five hours after his breath tests, as the officer in charge had no notes explaining the detention.

The trial judge declined to stay the proceedings under s. 24(1) and held that s. 24(2) was not applicable because the breath tests were completed before the over-holding occurred.

On appeal, the court found no error in refusing a stay of proceedings.

However, the appeal court held that the trial judge erred in finding s. 24(2) inapplicable, as there was a sufficient temporal and contextual connection between the breath tests and the subsequent unlawful detention.

Applying the Grant framework, the appeal court concluded that the admission of the breath test results would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

Sentencing for sexual interference, invitation to touch for a sexual purpose, and breach of a child-contact prohibition order arising from sexualized communications with and sexual touching of a 15-year-old complainant.

The court treated the offender's prior similar record, grooming conduct, exploitation of vulnerability, and the severe victim impact as significant aggravating factors, while also crediting harsh pre-trial detention conditions, family support, work history, counselling efforts, and rehabilitative prospects.

The court agreed with prior Superior Court authorities holding the one-year mandatory minimums for the sexual offences unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter.

A global sentence of 42 months was imposed, with 35.8 months' credit for pre-trial custody, followed by probation and extensive ancillary orders; an addendum clarified that the invitation count was not stayed and attracted a concurrent 36-month sentence.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and breach of a prohibition order arising from online communications with a 15-year-old complainant and a late-night drive from Mississauga to Kitchener.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as illogical and implausible on key issues, including his claimed ignorance of the complainant's age and his explanation for requesting sexual acts and providing transportation.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable despite immaterial inconsistencies, and rejected the defence theory that she fabricated the allegation to avoid parental discipline.

Convictions were entered on all four counts.

At a preliminary hearing, the accused was charged with multiple firearm-related offences, including unauthorized possession of a handgun, possession of a prohibited firearm, possession of a prohibited magazine and ammunition, and breach of recognizance, arising from the discovery of a loaded handgun under a mattress in a motel room.

The Crown sought to establish that the accused possessed the firearm based on circumstantial evidence including his presence in the room, his use of a key card to access it, and his nervous demeanor upon encountering police.

The preliminary hearing judge found insufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of possession, specifically knowledge and control over the firearm, and discharged the accused on all counts.

In a judge-alone historical sexual abuse trial, the court assessed competing testimony from the complainant, family witnesses, and the accused concerning allegations of repeated sexual abuse by an adoptive father over several years during the complainant's childhood.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court rejected the accused's denial, accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, and found material support in sibling evidence concerning opportunity, missing clothing, tampons, and nighttime activity in the home.

The court held that delayed disclosure and continued emotional attachment to the abuser did not undermine credibility in the circumstances.

Convictions were entered on counts of buggery, indecent assault, and sexual assault, and the gross indecency count was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with failing to provide an approved screening device (ASD) sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

After being stopped for a traffic investigation, the accused was asked to provide a breath sample into an ASD but failed to do so despite 26 attempts.

The accused challenged the admissibility of evidence of his refusal on the grounds that his Charter rights to counsel (section 10(b)) and protection against arbitrary detention (section 9) were violated.

The court found that the accused was not handcuffed prior to arrest and that evidence of his refusal to provide a sample, as opposed to evidence obtained from compelled participation, was admissible.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood (exceed 80) following a roadside sobriety check.

A police officer observed the defendant exiting a bar at 2:39 am, conducted an approved screening device (ASD) test at 2:49 am after the defendant reported consuming a shot of tequila at approximately 2:35 am, and obtained a "Fail" result.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the ASD result on two grounds: (1) violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to facilitate contact with counsel at the roadside, and (2) potential unreliability of the ASD test due to insufficient waiting time to account for mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no violation of the right to counsel and, assuming arguendo a potential breach regarding the mouth alcohol protocol, concluded that the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was found guilty.

The Offender, A.H., was found guilty of child luring over the internet, contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada, involving a 15-year-old victim.

The offence included sending offensive material and invitations for sexual acts.

A.H. had no prior criminal record but denied the offence and expressed no remorse.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15 months imprisonment and probation, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing principles.

The court considered the statutory minimum sentence of one year and the revised sentencing range for child luring, noting the upward adjustment from previous case law (Jarvis) as clarified by Woodward.

The judge imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment and one year probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA sample, 20 years on the Sex Offender Registry, and a 10-year prohibition from certain locations and contact with persons under 16.

A young person (C.L.), age 14 at the time of the alleged offences, was charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against a younger complainant (J.P.), age 9 at the time.

The complainant alleged that C.L. forced him to perform oral sex on multiple occasions between November and December 2014.

The defence denied all allegations.

The case turned primarily on credibility assessment.

The court found that while the complainant was an impressive witness for his age, significant discrepancies existed regarding how the allegations were initially disclosed.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

A young person charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault applied under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity by the complainant.

The applicant sought to cross-examine the complainant about an alleged incident from summer 2013 to challenge the complainant's credibility regarding a prior inconsistent statement made to police.

The court granted the application, finding that the evidence met the requirements of section 276(2): it was a specific instance of sexual activity, relevant to the credibility issue at trial, and had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The Crown applied for permission to allow a certified support dog to attend court beside the complainant during her testimony at a preliminary inquiry into allegations of historical sexual assault.

The court granted the application, finding that while the dog did not qualify as a "support person" under Section 486.1 of the Criminal Code, the Canadian Victims' Bill of Rights provided jurisdiction to allow the dog as a testimonial aid.

The court was satisfied that the dog's presence would not interfere with the proceedings or the accused's right to make full answer and defence.