Scott Reid

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault for stabbing the complainant four times during a physical altercation at a homeless shelter.

The Crown alleged the defendant initiated the confrontation and used excessive force.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting the complainant attacked him unprovoked and he stabbed in response to being pinned to the ground and punched repeatedly in the head.

The court found the defendant not guilty, determining that while the defendant initiated the confrontation by following the complainant, once the physical fight began, the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe force was being used against him, acted with the subjective purpose of self-protection, and the use of force was reasonable in the circumstances given the defendant's inability to escape and the ongoing threat posed by the larger, stronger complainant.

This decision concerns an application by Brandi Stewart-Sperry for a directed verdict following the close of the Crown’s case in a first-degree murder trial.

Stewart-Sperry argued that there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict her, particularly regarding her knowledge of the co-accused’s possession of a firearm and intent to shoot a police officer.

The court reviewed the legal principles for directed verdicts, the use of circumstantial and after-the-fact conduct evidence, and found that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Mario Bixhi, was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cannabis for the purpose of distributing and selling, possession of proceeds of crime, willfully resisting a police officer, and taking a weapon from a peace officer.

The case arose from a search warrant executed at Bixhi’s apartment.

The court found Bixhi guilty of the cannabis-related offences and resisting/taking a weapon from police, but acquitted him of the cocaine trafficking charge, finding a reasonable doubt as to his knowledge and control over the cocaine, given the evidence of a third party who claimed sole responsibility for the cocaine.

The court ruled on the admissibility of three police statements made by the accused, Rebecca Eden, in a first-degree murder investigation.

The first two statements (audio and video) were made on June 10, 2021, when she was a person of interest.

The third statement was made on March 11, 2022, after her arrest for first-degree murder.

The court found that the accused was detained during the second statement, and her Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) were violated due to police conduct, including failing to inform her of the true reasons for detention and the seizure of her phone without informed consent.

Applying the "tainting" doctrine from R. v. Pino, these Charter breaches retroactively rendered the first (audio) statement inadmissible as part of the same transaction.

For the third statement, the court found that the police violated the accused's section 7 right to silence by persistently questioning her despite her repeated assertions (106-108 times) that she wished to remain silent on advice of counsel.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded that admitting all three statements would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

All three statements were ruled inadmissible.

The accused, Roydel Ramsay-Morris, was charged with multiple firearm-related offences following the execution of two search warrants.

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The court found no breach of s. 10(a) (right to be informed of reason for arrest).

However, the court found a breach of s. 10(b) (right to counsel) due to significant delay in providing rights to counsel and a lack of privacy during the initial call to counsel.

Applying the Grant test for exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and its impact on the accused's Charter-protected rights outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.

Consequently, the loaded firearm and associated ammunition were excluded as evidence, leading to the acquittal of the accused.

The offender, Jerome Atkinson, pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime over $5000.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the nature of the offences, a prior youth firearms record, and violation of court orders.

However, substantial mitigating factors were also weighed, such as an early guilty plea, strong family support, and life experiences marked by systemic racism, poverty, and police harassment, which attenuated his moral culpability.

Harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and rehabilitative efforts in custody were also considered.

The Crown sought an eight-year global sentence, while the defence sought five years.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years' imprisonment, crediting 1,388 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 1 year and 2 months.

Additional orders included a two-year probation, forfeiture of seized items, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

Owen Silverthorne pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the unlawful killing of Shane Grenier.

The incident involved a drug transaction, an altercation in a vehicle, and the discharge of a handgun, followed by steps taken by Silverthorne to conceal his involvement.

The Crown accepted the manslaughter plea due to arguable self-defence and provocation issues.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a prohibited firearm in drug trafficking, the devastating impact on the victim's family, the offender's criminal record, and the threat to public safety posed by firearms.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, which spared judicial resources and provided certainty, the triable issues of self-defence and provocation, the offender's youth, family support, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court accepted the joint sentencing submission of 5.5 years jail, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a no-contact order.

The offender, a youthful first offender, was found guilty of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and possessing a firearm without a licence.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the lesser charge.

In sentencing, the court balanced the gravity of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence against the offender's significant rehabilitation, his role as the primary caregiver to a special needs child, and the collateral consequences of incarceration.

The court imposed a punitive conditional sentence of two years less 24 days, followed by three years of probation.

This decision addresses the sentencing of an offender convicted of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking within a custodial facility.

The court considered the seriousness of drug trafficking, particularly fentanyl, and the aggravating factor of the offence occurring in a detention centre.

The offender's extensive criminal record and his misconduct in fraudulently delaying sentencing proceedings were also significant factors.

The court applied a "Duncan credit" for harsh pre-trial conditions but limited the "Summers credit" due to the offender's deliberate attempts to obstruct justice.

The defendant, Arkadiusz Buksinski, brought a motion for a mistrial after being found guilty of drug trafficking, alleging he required a Polish interpreter and received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, Ms. McArthur.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendant's claim of a language barrier to be disingenuous and a deliberate attempt to "game the system." The court found that his trial counsel provided effective assistance, relying on Ms. McArthur's testimony, the defendant's prior court appearances without an interpreter, and a probation officer's assessment of his English fluency.

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused, Christine Birt, who was charged with manslaughter.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of her Charter rights (right to silence and right to counsel).

The court found the statement inadmissible, ruling that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was voluntary, specifically due to an improper inducement by the police during interrogation.

The court found no breach of the right to silence or the right to counsel regarding a new charge, as the new charge was less serious and no interrogation occurred on it.

Ager Hasan was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.

This decision addresses the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 18 years, while the defence proposed 14-15 years.

The court considered aggravating factors including the brutal nature of the domestic attack (47 stab wounds), the offender's flight from the scene and country, attempts to fabricate evidence, and malicious post-offence communications to the victim's family.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of prior criminal record, family support, and completion of programs in custody.

The court also addressed the contentious issue of considering pre-sentence custody conditions as a mitigating factor, ultimately deciding to follow the approach in R. v. Morales.

Despite some mitigation, the significant aggravating factors led the court to impose a parole ineligibility period of 16 years, commencing from the date of arrest.

The accused sought a mistrial or adjournment of his jury trial after the jury panel inadvertently overheard discussions about his pre-trial incarceration.

The defence argued this created a risk of moral prejudice, while the Crown contended a pre-trial instruction would suffice.

The court granted the adjournment, finding it was in the interests of justice given the risk of moral prejudice, the inability to ascertain what jurors heard without further prejudice, and the fact that the trial had not yet commenced, distinguishing it from cases where mid-trial instructions cured similar disclosures.

This endorsement addresses the adjournment of three criminal trials (R. v. Q., R. v. D.O., R. v. J.N.) scheduled to commence in the Superior Court of Justice in Milton.

The trials were adjourned due to recent findings of contamination and ongoing assessment of the courthouse building, rendering it unsafe for in-person proceedings.

The court emphasized that the health and safety of all participants, including potential jurors, litigants, lawyers, accused persons, and witnesses, was the overarching priority, necessitating the extraordinary step of adjourning matters until further notice.

The Crown applied for an order under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code to permit the complainant (A.I.) to testify remotely via closed-circuit television (CCTV) in a sexual assault trial.

The complainant, an adult, reported anxiety and PTSD symptoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown did not establish on a balance of probabilities that CCTV would facilitate a full and candid account or be in the interests of justice.

The judge noted the evidence was dated, lacked sufficient foundation, and the application was premature, emphasizing that CCTV orders are not "automatic" and require proper evidentiary support and witness preparation.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of the retrial was 46 months.

After deducting 10.8 months of defence delay and 8.2 months of discrete exceptional delay, the net delay was 27 months.

As this fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in Jordan, the court found the delay was reasonable and dismissed the application.

The offender, a youthful first offender, was convicted of manslaughter following a trial for the stabbing death of a 15-year-old victim during an altercation in a park.

The Crown sought 11 years' imprisonment, while amicus curiae sought time served (69 months).

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the use of a concealed knife and the vulnerability of the victim, against mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 years' imprisonment, less 69 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 39 months to serve.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault of his stepdaughter, alleging errors by the trial judge regarding the admission of post-incident evidence, the Crown's closing submission, and the exclusion of photographs under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, upholding the trial judge's decisions on the high probative value of the post-incident evidence, the acceptable latitude of the Crown's closing given no objection, and the s. 8 ruling that the daughter was an independent actor.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Tyrelle Lee and Steven MacIsaac, were charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing at a park party.

A verbal altercation escalated into a physical melee, during which the deceased was chased to a hill and stabbed once in the chest by Lee.

MacIsaac was present, armed with a knife, and assisted in preventing the deceased from escaping.

The court found that while Lee caused the unlawful death, the Crown failed to prove the requisite intent for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both accused were found guilty of manslaughter, with MacIsaac convicted as a party to the offence for aiding and abetting.

This is an application by the accused, Jermaine Chapman, under s.520 of the Criminal Code to review a detention order.

The accused sought release based on a new bail plan with strong sureties and electronic monitoring, public interest concerns due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and potential trial delays.

The court found no error in the original justice's decision to detain and determined that the health emergency did not outweigh other considerations for detention.

The court also noted that while trial delays might occur, detention remained necessary and could be reviewed in the future.

The application for review was dismissed.