Douglas Christopher Shawn Holt

This decision concerns an application by Brandi Stewart-Sperry for a directed verdict following the close of the Crown’s case in a first-degree murder trial.

Stewart-Sperry argued that there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict her, particularly regarding her knowledge of the co-accused’s possession of a firearm and intent to shoot a police officer.

The court reviewed the legal principles for directed verdicts, the use of circumstantial and after-the-fact conduct evidence, and found that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict.

The application was dismissed.

The court sentenced Carl Richard for convictions arising from a shooting at a Hamilton bar, including discharging a firearm with intent, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and assault with a weapon.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including Richard's lengthy criminal record, the seriousness of the offence, provocation, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

A global sentence of 10 years was imposed, less pre-trial custody and mitigation for harsh conditions, resulting in approximately 5 years and 11 months to be served.

The court sentenced Nathaniel Dillon for assault, sexual assault, and threatening, all committed against his then-girlfriend, ZK, on June 25, 2018.

The court found the complainant credible, with physical evidence corroborating her account.

The court considered Dillon’s significant mental health issues, including a history of psychosis and schizophrenia, as a mitigating factor, but not a major one.

The sentence imposed was three years’ imprisonment for sexual assault, with concurrent sentences for assault and threatening, and a recommendation for treatment in a specialized correctional facility.

The court also imposed ancillary orders, including probation, DNA, and weapons prohibitions.

The applicant, Wendel McLean, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable post-conviction delay in the context of a dangerous offender application.

McLean was convicted of robbery with a firearm and break and enter, and the Crown initiated dangerous offender proceedings.

McLean argued that the 20-month delay between conviction and the scheduled dangerous offender hearing exceeded the 5-month presumptive ceiling for post-conviction delay set by R. v. Charley, after deducting delays attributable to him and the s. 752.1 assessment application.

The Crown contended that the entire dangerous offender proceeding is an exceptional circumstance to be deducted and that it acted reasonably.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the dangerous offender application as a whole is an exceptional circumstance, and the Crown had mitigated any resulting delay, thus no delay exceeding the presumptive ceiling was found.

A young person, T.G., was found guilty of kidnapping with a firearm, firearm possession, possession of heroin (laced with fentanyl) for trafficking, possession of cocaine for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The defence argued for the maximum youth sentence.

The court found that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted due to T.G.'s leadership role in the serious and prolonged kidnapping, his active participation in violence, and his established criminal lifestyle.

The court determined that a youth sentence would not adequately hold T.G. accountable.

Consequently, T.G. was sentenced as an adult to a global sentence of 9 years, with credit for time served, resulting in 4 years and 5 months remaining to be served in a federal penitentiary.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the deceased victim to police officers, firefighters, and paramedics shortly after a stabbing.

The defence objected on the basis that the statements were hearsay.

The court considered whether the statements qualified as dying declarations, res gestae statements, or were admissible under the principled approach to hearsay.

The judge concluded that although the strict requirements for dying declarations were not met, the statements were admissible as res gestae and also satisfied the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled hearsay exception.