Igor Osowski

This decision concerns a Crown application under s. 111 of the Criminal Code to prohibit Clint Rogers, a licensed gun owner and gunsmith, from possessing firearms following two non-criminal incidents in 2024 involving mental health crises and self-harm concerns.

The court considered evidence from police, Mr. Rogers, and his wife, including medical letters and testimony about his mental health, substance use, and ongoing possession of firearms.

The judge emphasized the forward-looking nature of the test, the balance of probabilities standard, and the need to assess risk to self or others.

Despite the Crown's concerns, the court found insufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Rogers's possession of firearms posed a danger, noting his longstanding responsible engagement with firearms and progress in counselling.

The application was dismissed.

The court sentenced Nathaniel Dillon for assault, sexual assault, and threatening, all committed against his then-girlfriend, ZK, on June 25, 2018.

The court found the complainant credible, with physical evidence corroborating her account.

The court considered Dillon’s significant mental health issues, including a history of psychosis and schizophrenia, as a mitigating factor, but not a major one.

The sentence imposed was three years’ imprisonment for sexual assault, with concurrent sentences for assault and threatening, and a recommendation for treatment in a specialized correctional facility.

The court also imposed ancillary orders, including probation, DNA, and weapons prohibitions.

This decision addresses the Crown's application to adjourn the trial of an in-custody accused, Daniel May, charged with violent home invasion robbery.

The Crown sought the adjournment to facilitate a joint trial with two newly arrested co-accused.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown failed to demonstrate that a joint trial was in the interests of justice, particularly given the accused's expeditious efforts to proceed to trial, his in-custody status, and the speculative nature of the proposed joint trial.

The court emphasized the accused's s. 11(b) Charter rights and the right to counsel of choice.

The accused, Nathaniel Dillon, was charged with assault, forcible confinement, threatening bodily harm, and sexual assault against his then-girlfriend, ZK.

This judgment specifically addresses the assault and sexual assault counts.

The court admitted prior discreditable conduct evidence to demonstrate the accused's control and coercion over the complainant.

The complainant's testimony, supported by photographic evidence of bruising, was found credible despite inconsistencies regarding her movements during the incident and delayed reporting, as these were understood within the context of an intimate partner relationship and the psychological realities of abuse.

The court found that the complainant did not consent to the sexual acts, which were performed out of fear of further harm, and rejected arguments of implied consent or honest belief in consent.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and breach of recognizance.

He pleaded guilty to the breach but not guilty to the sexual assault.

The trial centered on whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse in the back of a vehicle.

Both the complainant and the accused testified, presenting conflicting narratives.

Applying the W.(D) framework, the court found significant credibility and reliability issues with both witnesses, including inconsistencies in the accused's testimony and a potential motive to fabricate by the complainant.

Ultimately, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused of sexual assault.

The Crown sought an order for the complainant in a criminal trial (assault and sexual assault charges) to testify remotely from her home via Zoom, citing fear of the accused, medical conditions, and childcare issues.

The defence opposed, arguing the application fell under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code, requiring exceptional circumstances, rather than s. 486.2.

The court determined s. 714.1 applied, requiring exceptional circumstances, especially given credibility was a key issue.

The court found the complainant's circumstances, including medical conditions and childcare, did not meet the threshold of exceptional circumstances, particularly considering prior in-person interactions with the accused and the uncontrolled nature of home testimony.

The Crown's motion was dismissed, requiring the complainant to testify in person.

Manuel Maric appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a breath demand, alleging errors by the trial judge regarding judicial notice of duty counsel advice, consideration of his Covid-19 fear as a reasonable excuse, handling of his Charter application, and limitations on cross-examination.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's assessment of credibility, the finding that Covid-19 fear was not a genuine excuse, and the proper disposition of Charter issues and control over cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and having an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC).

He brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of his ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that the initial arrest for failing to remain at the scene of an accident was unlawful, constituting a s. 9 Charter violation, as the offence was not legally applicable to the facts.

A s. 10(b) violation also occurred due to the police's inadvertent failure to fully advise Duty Counsel of all charges, delaying the defendant's ability to receive complete legal advice.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests strongly favoured exclusion of the breath test results.

Without the breath readings, the excess BAC charge could not be proven.

The court also found insufficient evidence to establish impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, both remaining charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with one count of sexual assault against his former wife, involving two touches of her breasts.

The trial focused on assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant, her work assistant, and the defendant.

The court found the complainant's testimony compelling but unreliable due to admitted trauma, inconsistencies, and potential motives related to ongoing family litigation and a prior assault charge against her.

The assistant's testimony also contained inconsistencies and was not considered truly independent.

While the defendant's testimony was found to be rehearsed and implausible, the court ultimately determined that the prosecution had not proven the sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The defendant, self-represented, faced two serious charges of intimate partner violence.

At the close of the prosecution's case, the court invited submissions on a directed verdict, specifically regarding the issue of identification.

Applying the test from R. v. Arcuri, the court found that the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient admissible evidence to establish the identity of the defendant as the alleged perpetrator.

Despite the defendant sharing the same name as the alleged offender, the court could not infer identity due to a lack of direct or circumstantial evidence, including a failure to physically identify the defendant in court or provide a detailed physical description.

Consequently, the application for a directed verdict was granted, and the defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation by drug and dangerous driving.

He brought a Charter application alleging excessive force during arrest (ss. 7 and 12 violations) and sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence (an inculpatory statement and blood analysis results).

The court found the police use of force, including a forced vehicle stop, firearm display, window smash, and taser deployment, to be objectively reasonable and justified under s. 25 of the Criminal Code.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The defendant conceded the dangerous driving charge.

The court found the defendant guilty of both impaired operation by drug and dangerous operation based on circumstantial evidence and expert toxicological testimony.

The self-represented accused applied for certiorari to quash an Ontario Court of Justice order that appointed counsel to cross-examine the complainant, appointed counsel for the complainant on a third-party records application, and authorized a witness to testify via Zoom.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error and emphasizing that extraordinary remedies should not be used to interfere with ongoing trial matters in the absence of truly exceptional circumstances.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to provide a breath sample using an Approved Screening Device (ASD).

He initially refused due to distrust of the device, believing he would be taken to the police station for a more reliable Intoxilyzer test.

Upon learning he would be released from the scene and not taken to the station, he offered to provide a sample into the ASD.

The court found that his subsequent offer, made approximately 10 minutes after the initial refusal and while the device was still available, effectively cancelled his prior refusal as it was part of the same transaction.

The defendant was found not guilty.