Eugene J. Bhattacharya

D.G. was convicted by a jury of sexual assault.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing.

The court determined the facts for sentencing, finding that D.G. engaged in penetrative vaginal intercourse with the complainant while she was intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the vulnerability of the victim, the opportunistic nature of the assault, and the significant psychological harm to the complainant.

Mitigating factors included D.G. being a first-time offender with prosocial antecedents and potential immigration consequences.

The court imposed a sentence of three years and six months imprisonment, consistent with the established range for similar offences.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault and uttering death threats against his wife.

The trial was a credibility contest where both parties testified to diametrically opposed accounts of a domestic dispute.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, relying in part on the complainant's after-the-fact emotional state as corroborative evidence.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the emotional state evidence was equally consistent with both accounts and therefore possessed no probative value.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, Kim Tran, sought a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the total delay of 25 months and 20 days exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

The Crown attributed the delay to a discrete event (unavailability of a police witness due to health reasons) but failed to demonstrate that it took reasonable steps to mitigate the resulting delay.

The court found that the Crown did not meet its constitutional obligation to bring the accused to trial within a reasonable time, granted the application, and stayed the charge.

The applicant, Michael Buabeng, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in his criminal prosecution for assault and sexual assault charges.

The total delay was 1,401 days (46 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Courts.

The court deducted 105 days for defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 1,296 days.

The Crown argued for exceptional circumstances, including 181 days due to uncertainty surrounding Bill C-75 amendments to preliminary inquiries and 341 days due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

After deducting these exceptional circumstances, the remaining delay was 823 days (27.4 months), falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The onus then shifted to the defence to demonstrate that the delay was nonetheless unreasonable.

The court found that the applicant failed to meet this burden, and therefore, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment that ordered her to pay the respondent $200,000 under a promissory note and a related oral agreement for interest.

The funds were advanced by the respondent on the appellant's behalf for an investment in Metrozen, which subsequently misappropriated the funds.

The motion judge rejected the appellant's defenses, including lack of consideration, conditional repayment, and misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or law by the motion judge, and affirmed that the documentary record and the appellant's acknowledgments supported the judgment.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a $200,000 promissory note against the defendant.

The parties had jointly invested in a syndicated mortgage project that turned out to be a fraud, with the plaintiff advancing the defendant's share of the funds.

The defendant argued there was a failure of consideration and misrepresentation, but the court rejected these defences based on contemporaneous documentary evidence, including text messages and emails acknowledging the debt.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

This trial decision addresses the equalization of net family property, spousal support, and s. 7 child support expenses following a 20-year marriage.

Key disputes included the attribution of diamond rings and a joint bank account, the existence of a debt to the applicant's sister for a California property, the respondent's personal debts, and the valuation of a Honda and RRSPs at the date of marriage.

The court imputed income for both parties for support purposes and denied the respondent's request for a right of first refusal on a jointly-owned property.

The accused was charged with assaulting the complainant on November 12, 2014, in Oakville in an incident arising from a road rage altercation.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The court found that the accused initiated a confrontation after a minor traffic incident, blocked the complainant's vehicle at an intersection, approached the complainant's window, and assaulted him, causing injuries.

The accused also uttered threats and fled the scene.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as self-serving and defying common sense, accepting the complainant's account and that of an independent witness.

The accused was found guilty of assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change custody orders from 2005 and 2006, seeking to obtain custody of three children from the applicant paternal grandmother.

The children had been in the grandmother's care since 2005 following the mother's incarceration for dangerous driving causing death.

The mother had since rehabilitated herself, completed education, secured employment, and maintained sobriety.

The court found that while the grandmother had provided stable care, she lacked insight into the children's emotional needs and had failed to facilitate the mother's involvement in their lives.

The court granted custody to the mother, finding that the children's best interests, particularly the eldest child's strongly expressed wishes, warranted the change from the status quo.

The plaintiff sought an order to exclude co-defendant police officers from each other's examinations for discovery and to prohibit communication between them until the conclusion of discoveries.

The plaintiff argued this was necessary due to a risk of tailored or parroted testimony, citing the officers' prior conduct in criminal proceedings where they admitted to obstruction of justice.

The defendants opposed, asserting their right to attend and arguing no sufficient risk of tailoring existed.

The court granted the exclusion order, finding a clear risk of tailored evidence given the officers' past dishonesty, and determined that the ends of justice required the exclusion to ensure fair examinations, despite the logistical challenges for common counsel.