Devyn Noonan

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of sexually assaulting his former spouse.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as breach of trust and physical restraint, and mitigating factors including the defendant's first-time offender status, positive community support, and health issues.

The court imposed a 2.5-year custodial sentence, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order, declining DNA and SOIRA orders due to low re-offense risk.

Z.A. was charged with failing to comply with a release order condition prohibiting him from being in the presence of anyone under 16 unless in the direct presence of his surety.

The Crown presented evidence of Z.A. being with a young child at a mall.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the existence of a valid release order and the absence of a surety.

The court found the release order valid but concluded that the Crown did not disprove the rational possibility of a surety being present, as the burden shifted to the Crown once the defence raised the exception with an air of reality.

Z.A. was acquitted due to reasonable doubt regarding the absence of the surety.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the scheduled trial date was 26.35 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court deducted 194 days of defence delay, including time for not promptly scheduling pre-trials and a trial scheduling conference, and 101 days for the delay in notifying the Crown of the 11(b) application.

Despite the remaining net delay of 19.98 months still exceeding the ceiling, the court found the Crown could not rely on the pandemic backlog as an exceptional circumstance because it failed to take steps to mitigate the delay once notified of the 11(b) issue.

The application was granted, and the charge was stayed.

The defendant, Nathaniel Dillon, was charged with two counts of breaching a no-attend term of bail.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and the defendant.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, finding the complainant's evidence believable and accurate, while largely rejecting the defendant's testimony due to its performative aspect, flippant manner, and lack of plausibility.

The court found that the defendant intentionally remained in the complainant's presence on two separate occasions despite knowing he was breaching his bail conditions.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts.

The defendant, Trista Forbes, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for stabbing her intimate partner during an argument.

The Crown sought a nine-month custodial sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including intimate partner abuse and elements of a home invasion, alongside significant mitigating factors such as the defendant's lack of criminal record, status as a single mother, history of abuse, and gainful employment.

Distinguishing the Crown's cited precedents, the court applied the criteria for conditional sentences from R. v. Proulx.

Concluding that a conditional sentence would not endanger community safety and was consistent with sentencing principles, the court imposed a nine-month conditional sentence with house arrest and curfew conditions, followed by one year of probation, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The accused, Jasgeen Singh, was charged with robbery under section 344 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown alleged that Singh stole a vehicle and used violence against a passenger, Bhawana, to overcome her resistance to the theft.

The defence challenged the identification of Singh as the perpetrator and argued that the violence occurred after the theft was complete.

The court found the identification evidence, including surveillance video and a key fob found on the accused, to be overwhelming.

It also determined that the struggle for a cell phone and the physical push of Bhawana from the vehicle constituted sufficient violence, occurring contemporaneously with the theft.

Singh was found guilty of robbery.

D.G. was convicted by a jury of sexual assault.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing.

The court determined the facts for sentencing, finding that D.G. engaged in penetrative vaginal intercourse with the complainant while she was intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the vulnerability of the victim, the opportunistic nature of the assault, and the significant psychological harm to the complainant.

Mitigating factors included D.G. being a first-time offender with prosocial antecedents and potential immigration consequences.

The court imposed a sentence of three years and six months imprisonment, consistent with the established range for similar offences.

A youth offender (I.A.) was convicted of sexual assault.

The court considered sentencing principles under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), including diminished moral blameworthiness, rehabilitation, and proportionality.

The Crown sought a nine-month custody and supervision order, while the defence sought probation or a deferred custody order.

The court determined that a deferred custody order was unavailable because the sexual assault caused serious bodily harm, including psychological harm, to the complainant.

Reviewing case law on youth sexual assault sentencing, the court found that a probation order alone would not be proportionate or adequately address rehabilitation, reintegration, specific deterrence, and denunciation.

The court imposed a custody and supervision order of 225 days (150 days open custody, 75 days supervision), followed by 12 months probation, a DNA order, and a no-weapons order.

The accused, Wendel Attard, was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a collision.

The Crown alleged that Attard's vehicle, travelling at an excessive speed (112-117 km/hr in an 80 km/hr zone), collided with another vehicle making a left turn, demonstrating dangerous driving.

The defence argued that while the driving might have been dangerous, it did not constitute a "marked departure" from the standard of care required for a criminal conviction, noting that other vehicles were also exceeding the speed limit.

The court found Attard's driving objectively dangerous due to speed and inattention, but ultimately concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct amounted to a "marked departure" from the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent person.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty.