Morie Luft

This is a sentencing decision for an offender convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a loaded, prohibited firearm.

The court considered the "toxic combination" of drugs and guns as an aggravating factor, alongside significant mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of criminal record, expression of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and exemplary performance on strict bail.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a global conditional sentence order of two years less one day, followed by 12 months of probation, with strict conditions including home confinement and a firearms prohibition.

The defendant, Nathaniel Dillon, was charged with two counts of breaching a no-attend term of bail.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and the defendant.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, finding the complainant's evidence believable and accurate, while largely rejecting the defendant's testimony due to its performative aspect, flippant manner, and lack of plausibility.

The court found that the defendant intentionally remained in the complainant's presence on two separate occasions despite knowing he was breaching his bail conditions.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts.

During a jury trial for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor complainant, the Crown called the complainant's mother to testify.

In response to a question from the Crown, the mother stated that she believed the allegations because her daughter would never lie about something like that.

The defence moved for a mistrial on the basis that this constituted inadmissible oath-helping evidence.

The court granted the motion, finding that the mother's statement caused irremediable prejudice to the accused that could not be cured by a limiting instruction to the jury.

The accused were charged with firearm and narcotic offences after police executed search warrants on a vehicle and a residence, discovering a handgun and drugs.

The court previously found that the search warrants were invalid because the information to obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

In this decision, the court applied the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter and concluded that the police conduct was grossly negligent and misleading.

Given the seriousness of the breach and the impact on the accused's privacy interests, the court excluded both the handgun and the drugs from evidence.

Demetre Hibbert and Raquel Williams sought to exclude gun and drug evidence seized under search warrants, alleging s. 8 Charter violations due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that a traffic stop leading to information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) violated Mr. Hibbert's s. 9 Charter rights, leading to the excision of that paragraph.

Furthermore, the court determined that the ITO lacked sufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds that the items would be found in Mr. Hibbert's BMW or Ms. Williams' residence three months after the alleged shooting, primarily due to the staleness of the information and speculative inferences regarding ongoing criminal activity or gang feuds.

Consequently, both Mr. Hibbert's and Ms. Williams' s. 8 Charter rights were violated, rendering the search warrants invalid.

The applicants, charged with firearm and drug offences following the execution of search warrants, brought a Garofoli application to exclude the seized evidence.

Prior to step five of the application, they sought to amplify the Information to Obtain (ITO) based on cross-examination of the affiant and an email.

The court allowed certain amplifications to correct good-faith errors in the ITO, but declined to add omitted information, noting that omissions could still be raised during the substantive argument on the warrant's validity.

The applicants, charged with firearm and drug offences following the execution of search warrants, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) under step five of a Garofoli application.

The court applied the Garofoli test, assessing whether there was a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit the preconditions for the warrants.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on specific issues, including the omission of information regarding the shooter's name and the use of conclusory statements in the ITO, but denied leave on several other grounds where cross-examination was unlikely to assist or where the issues were better suited for argument at the Garofoli hearing.

The applicants challenged the issuance of three search warrants and sought disclosure of a confidential informant's (CI) handler's notes under step five of the Garofoli process.

They argued that the CI handler was a co-affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) or, alternatively, that the notes were relevant to demonstrate material omissions or deliberate/reckless falsehoods in the ITO, which could lead to the warrants being set aside.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the CI handler was not a co-affiant and that the applicants had not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the disclosure of the handler's notes would assist in challenging the issuance of the search warrants.

The applicants, Demetre Hibbert and Raquel Williams, challenged search warrants that led to the seizure of a firearm and drugs, arguing insufficient grounds and seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

They requested judicial summaries of redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO), specifically Appendix "D" and other paragraphs, which were withheld based on Confidential Informant (CI) privilege.

The court, acting as case management judge for pre-trial Charter applications, ordered the Crown to provide judicial summaries under step two of the Garofoli process.

The court emphasized that a mere assertion of CI privilege was insufficient; the summaries needed to enable applicants' counsel to meaningfully participate in the editing process.

The court also prepared a judicial summary comparing different drafts of Appendix "D" as requested by the applicants.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted handgun and three counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The offender was bound by a weapons prohibition at the time of the offence.

The court considered the aggravating factors of carrying a loaded gun in a city and abandoning it in a house with civilians, as well as the mitigating factors of a guilty plea and family support.

A global sentence of 40 months was imposed, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

Shiloh Pettipas-Lizak pleaded guilty to pointing a firearm at his girlfriend.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the domestic context, the presence of children, the sustained nature of the threat, and the victim's lasting psychological harm, alongside mitigating factors such as the offender's genuine remorse, significant rehabilitative efforts over six years, stable employment, sobriety, and reconnection with his children.

The court found that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the unique circumstances, including the judicial error that led to separate sentencing proceedings.

A conditional sentence of 21 months was imposed, with house arrest for the first seven months, followed by a curfew, along with other conditions, a lifetime section 109 order, and a DNA order.

At a preliminary hearing, the Crown sought committal of two defendants on various charges arising from a shooting investigation and subsequent search warrants.

The Crown did not seek committal of D.H. on the shooting or drugs charges, and D.H. conceded committal on a firearm charge.

The central issue was whether R.W. should be committed to stand trial for possession of drugs and proceeds of crime found in her apartment.

The justice found sufficient evidence to commit R.W. on counts for possession of marijuana, possession of methamphetamine for trafficking, and possession of heroin for trafficking, but discharged her on the proceeds of crime count.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault, assault causing bodily harm, threatening death, threatening bodily harm, mischief, and breach of probation arising from a violent domestic incident.

The accused, subject to a probation order prohibiting contact with his common-law partner, entered her residence late at night while intoxicated, forced entry, and engaged in a prolonged physical and verbal assault against her and her father who intervened.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 341 days pre-sentence custody credited as 511 days plus 90 days additional imprisonment, followed by three years probation with strict conditions including no contact orders, substance abuse counselling, and anger management programming.

The court applied Gladue principles as the accused is of Métis heritage but found that denunciation and deterrence were the predominant sentencing objectives given the serious and violent nature of the offences.

The defendant was charged with assault with a weapon following an incident on February 27, 2014, in which the complainant alleged the defendant struck her with a rum bottle, causing lacerations to her left ear.

The defendant denied striking the complainant and testified that the injury resulted from an accidental fall onto broken glass during a struggle over the bottle.

The trial judge found that while the complainant's account was facially reliable, the physical evidence and forensic findings were more consistent with the defendant's version of events.

The judge concluded that reasonable doubt existed as to the defendant's guilt and acquitted him of the charge.

Four accused were jointly charged with offences relating to a loaded firearm discovered in a vehicle in which they were occupants.

Two accused faced additional counts of transporting, possessing, and controlling the firearm and related ammunition offences.

After the Crown closed its case, all accused sought directed verdicts of acquittal on the basis that the Crown had failed to establish a prima facie case of knowledge or control of the firearm.

The court held that mere presence in a vehicle containing a firearm, coupled with nervous behaviour and seat movements, was insufficient to establish knowledge or control beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly where another unidentified occupant fled the vehicle from the seat where the firearm was located.

Concluding that the circumstantial evidence could not permit a properly instructed jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court granted directed verdicts and acquitted all accused.

The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to exclude portions of his criminal record from being used for impeachment if he testified at trial on charges including firearm and drug offences.

The court considered the principles under s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the balancing test from R. v. Corbett regarding whether the probative value of prior convictions outweighs their prejudicial effect.

While credibility was central because the defence alleged police officers fabricated or moved evidence, the court held that admitting convictions similar to the charged drug and firearm offences would risk impermissible propensity reasoning.

The court therefore excluded all firearm and drug-related convictions but permitted other convictions, including offences involving dishonesty and disregard for court orders, to be put before the jury if the accused testified.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused following arrest, while the accused applied to exclude them on the basis of alleged breaches of s. 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and lack of voluntariness.

The accused argued that police failed to properly provide right to counsel warnings and that subsequent questions improperly expanded the scope of the investigation toward a search of his residence.

The court found the officer’s evidence credible that the accused was cautioned and advised of his right to counsel before questioning and that the accused declined to contact counsel.

The statements were held voluntary and the questioning did not constitute a new investigative focus requiring renewed Charter warnings.

Even if a breach had occurred, exclusion under s. 24(2) would not be warranted.