Court File No.: CR-22-00000003-0000 Date: 2024 06 19
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING v. JEREMY MENARY
R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE C. CONLAN on June 19, 2024, at MILTON, Ontario
APPEARANCES: M. Chant Counsel for the Crown
M. Luft Counsel for Jeremy Menary
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
W I T N E S S E S
WITNESSES Examination in-Chief Cross- Examination Re- Examination
E X H I B I T S
EXHIBIT NUMBER ENTERED ON PAGE: Reasons for Sentence 1
LEGEND [sic] Indicates preceding word has been reproduced verbatim and is not a transcription error. (ph) Indicates preceding word has been spelled phonetically.
Transcript Ordered: June 19, 2024 Transcript Completed: June 20, 2024 Ordering Party Notified: June 20, 2024
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2024
R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E
CONLAN, J. (Orally):
I am prepared to deliver some oral reasons for the sentence now. These are the court's oral reasons for sentence in the matter of Jeremy Brandon Menary.
I. Offences
In an indictment dated March 27, 2023, Mr. Menary was charged with three criminal offences.
Count one was an allegation that he did, on or about December 30, 2019, at Burlington, Ontario, unlawfully possess a controlled substance, namely cocaine, for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
Count two was an allegation that he, on or about the same date, at the same place, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, namely fentanyl, for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to section 5(2) of the CDSA.
And count three was an allegation that Mr. Menary, on or about the same date, at the same place, did possess a loaded, prohibited firearm, contrary to section 95(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
Count two, the fentanyl allegation, is not before this court. It was tried by a separate court and Mr. Menary was ultimately acquitted on that charge.
Counts one and three are before this court for sentencing. The findings of guilt on those two counts, the cocaine charge, and the firearm charge were entered by this court on February 29, 2024. On that date, on those two counts, Mr. Menary re-elected his mode of trial to be tried in the Superior Court of Justice with a judge sitting alone. Mr. Menary was then arraigned on the cocaine and firearm charges and pleaded not guilty to those charges.
The Crown's evidence was presented in a summary manner, and without the need for any viva voce evidence. The Crown's evidence was not contested by Mr. Menary. Mr. Menary did not present any evidence of his own and made no submissions.
The court then entered findings of guilt against Mr. Menary on the cocaine and firearm charges.
A pre-sentence report was ordered, and the matter was adjourned for sentencing.
II. The Facts
In terms of the facts underlying the findings of guilt on the cocaine and the firearm charges, they are as follows:
On December 30, 2019, in the early morning hours, Halton police responded to an emergency call placed by an individual who observed a motor vehicle in the area of Marley Court and Marley Crescent, in the City of Burlington. A police officer arrived on scene and observed a minivan parked and idling. Police investigated the vehicle and Mr. Menary was ordered to exit the vehicle, which he did. Mr. Menary was searched. During the search $4,320 was found in the front pocket of Mr. Menary's hoodie.
Mr. Menary was wearing a satchel that was connected to him by a strap under his right arm and across his neck. Sitting over his chest, in the satchel, police found a firearm and a torn bag containing 6.5 grams of cocaine. The firearm was a Glock 9mm Model 19 handgun. The firearm was loaded with a high capacity magazine, which had 15 rounds - bullets in it. The handgun was a prohibited firearm. Mr. Menary was not the holder of any authorization or license under which he could possess any firearm in Canada.
In terms of the 6.5 grams of cocaine, it was analyzed and tested positive for what it was suspected to be. An expert report was commissioned by the Crown, and a police officer opined that the cocaine was for the purpose of trafficking, in the possession of Mr. Menary. Mr. Menary was also in possession, at the time, of two cellular telephones.
III. The Offender
In terms of the circumstances of the offender, the court has the benefit of a rather thorough pre-sentence report. I agree with Mr. Luft that, generally speaking, the pre-sentence report is a relatively positive one. It confirms that Mr. Menary is still, although an adult, a relatively youthful adult with, hopefully, much life left to go. He is currently 31 years of age. He would have been a few years younger at the time that he committed these two offences. He is single without any dependants. He has no criminal history of any kind.
The report indicates that Mr. Menary lives with his parents and siblings in the family home. The highest education level that he has attained is grade 10. Mr. Menary has a rather limited employment history. Mr. Menary did experience several difficulties during his upbringing, including an absent father, for much of the time, a father who, unfortunately, had several extramarital affairs, which placed some burden on the family, and also caused the family to experience some financial problems. As well, Mr. Menary and the family lived, for much of the time, in a violent, unsafe neighborhood, which exposed Mr. Menary to having to observe criminal activity, including criminal activity involving guns and drugs.
The defence has filed several character letters. Those letters confirm that, for the most part, the offender has been a law abiding and productive member of society. In the numerous letters that have been filed, Mr. Menary is described as being: a soft-spoken, kind-hearted, thoughtful person; a skilled athlete who has always showed great sportsmanship; someone who has displayed leadership qualities; a person with a consistent work ethic; a very supportive sibling; someone who has always supported other members of the family, including, but not limited to, the offender's late grandfather; a hard working and industrious person; a good friend who has, for example, helped the parents of a friend get their restaurant open; someone who has taken responsibility for his actions, and has expressed remorse for what he did, which was repeated here today in Mr. Menary's allocution to the court; a very caring and supportive brother; a person who has expressed to others deep regret for the improper choices that he made in the past; a person who has cut ties with some of those who he was previously involved with around the time of his arrest on these charges before the court; an intelligent person; a fast learner; a loyal family member and friend; and in summary, throughout all of the letters filed, a person of generally good character.
IV. The Principles of Sentencing
In terms of the principles of sentencing, as all of the cases demonstrate that have been filed, the toxic combination of firearms and drugs is a very real one that has been a scourge on our society. Drugs and guns have, independent of one another but particularly together, destroyed so many lives. Thus, a chief principle of sentencing in this case is denunciation. The court must denounce this serious unlawful conduct on the part of Mr. Menary. Mr. Menary could have killed or seriously injured himself when he had this Glock handgun in his possession. He could also have killed or seriously injured anyone else who he happened to come by.
I am not suggesting that Mr. Menary would have done so deliberately, but accidents happen, unfortunately, with loaded weapons. That is in part why it is a prohibited firearm. Apart from the principle of denunciation, general and specific deterrence are important sentencing principles in this case.
Mr. Menary has no criminal history, and I am relatively confident that he will not be back before the court. So, in terms of the types of deterrence, I think general deterrence is probably more important here than even individual deterrence. Other like-minded members of the public need to be deterred from these types of offences. They need to understand that they possess prohibited firearms, and/or hard drugs, to their own peril. That if they do so, the sentence to be imposed by the court will be a serious one.
Rehabilitation is a key sentencing principle in this case. Rehabilitation should always be taken into consideration, but especially, for a first offender like Mr. Menary, who is still in his very early 30s, who has, for the vast majority of his life, been a law abiding citizen of generally good character, and who has shown, since his arrest, that he is capable of continuing to be a law abiding citizen while he has been on bail for these offences. Denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation, I think, are the four most important sentencing principles in this case.
V. The Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Turning now to what I consider to be the aggravating and mitigating factors on sentence, in my view, the aggravating part of this case really boils down to that toxic combination of drugs and guns that I spoke about earlier. Mr. Menary was not only in possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking in it, but Mr. Menary was also in possession of a very dangerous prohibited handgun.
Those two things combined aggravate the seriousness of the facts of this case.
There are, however, in my view, important mitigating factors in this case. Although Mr. Menary did not enter guilty pleas to the two offences, he did not contest the facts. The trial was very, very brief. That is not a mitigating factor, but that Mr. Menary since then has expressed remorse for what happened, and has taken some responsibility for what happened, that is mitigating on sentence, and that is confirmed by the author of the pre-sentence report. It is confirmed in the character letters that were filed by the defence, and it was confirmed again today in Mr. Menary's allocution to the court. That acceptance of responsibility, and that expression of remorse, combined, is a mitigating factor on sentence. That Mr. Menary has absolutely no criminal record is a mitigating factor on sentence. That Mr. Menary has, for most of his life, been a productive member of society, a good person, has been a law abiding person, as evidenced by the letters filed with the court, that is a mitigating factor on sentence. And finally, it is mitigating, highly mitigating, in my opinion, that Mr. Menary has so much time spent in pre-sentence custody without incident.
VI. Analysis and Decision
Mr. Menary served 43 real days in jail on these offences. There would be no reason for this court not to give the statutory maximum Summers credit for that time, and gross it up from 1 day to 1.5 days, which would be the equivalent of 65 real days in jail served by Mr. Menary. As well, the offender was on strict bail for a total of 1,593 days. Counsel have jointly submitted that this court give Mr. Menary credit, Downes credit, for that time, at a rate just under thirty-three percent, which amounts to the equivalent of 480 days. I think that is a reasonable joint submission by counsel on how to credit the time that Mr. Menary has been on strict bail. I accept that joint proposal, and so, in total, if you add the 65 real days in jail to the 480 days of Downes credit, Mr. Menary has served, in pre-sentence custody, the equivalent of more than 18 months. To be exact, 18 months and five days. That is a lengthy period of time. That is an upper reformatory sentence.
During all of this time on bail, Mr. Menary has obeyed his conditions. He has not been found to be in violation of any of his bail terms for a lengthy period of time. Very often, offenders and their counsel come to court and emphasize the stringent nature of the bail. There are times where I question how stringent the bail really was, but in this case, there is no debate that the bail has been as strict as one sees. I am looking at the bail release order right now, and it has a house arrest term with very, very limited exceptions.
In fact, the main exception to the home confinement clause is if Mr. Menary happens to be in the presence of one, or both of his sureties, actually in the direct and continuous presence of one or both of his sureties. The release order includes a non-communication clause. It includes a no weapons or firearms clause. It includes a no drugs clause. It includes a GPS ankle bracelet and monitoring clause through Recovery Science. It includes an obligation that Mr. Menary follow all of the conditions for the electronic monitoring, and those conditions are extensive, and so on. It can only be described as the strictest form of bail.
In terms of the range of sentence for these offences, as I said recently in the decision in R. v. Aguiar, 2024 ONSC 3372, on the gun conviction the normal range of sentence starts at about two years imprisonment and goes up from there. On the cocaine conviction, it is hard to say, to be frank, because most of the jurisprudence dealing with the range of sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking deals with quantities much more substantial than what we have here.
As I said in Aguiar, however, at paragraph 46:
Sentencing ranges are not fixed tariffs. They are not meant to operate as straightjackets for sentencing judges. They are not "averages" that are designed to unduly confine the discretion that is inherent in the sentencing process. A judge can impose a sentence that is outside the normal range as long as it is in accordance with the principles and the objectives of sentencing. A sentence that falls outside the regular range of sentence is not necessarily unfit. There will always be cases that call for a sentence that falls outside a particular range. That is the very nature of the sentencing process – it is not a mathematical calculation or a scientific exercise but rather a highly individualized process that involves a myriad of factors that are difficult to define with any degree of precision.
We know all of that from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, 2015 S.C.J. No. 64.
The defence has asked this court to consider a conditional sentence order for Mr. Menary. The Crown takes the position that the sentence ought to be somewhere between three and four years in the penitentiary, less credit for pre-sentence custody. To her credit, Ms. Chant acknowledged that perhaps three years, less credit for pre-sentence custody would be appropriate if the court was of the view that the sentences on the two convictions ought to be made concurrent with one another, rather than consecutive. I am of the view that the sentences ought to be concurrent rather than consecutive. In my recent decision, in the Aguiar case, I stated the following at paragraphs 33, 34, and 35:
Finally, I am not persuaded by the Crown's submission that the sentences to be imposed on Mr. Aguiar ought to be made consecutive. The defence did not squarely address this issue, but it seems to me that the sentences ought to be made concurrent with one another.
The Glock handgun and the cocaine were found in separate motor vehicles but both in the name of Mr. Aguiar, both searched by the police on the same date, and both found at the same property. There is no admission or evidence that the handgun was a "tool of the trade" for Mr. Aguiar in his narcotics trafficking business.
As long as this Court remembers to keep in mind the "toxic combination" of drugs and guns in arriving at the global sentence to be imposed on this offender, I do not see it as being inappropriate that the sentences to be imposed on Mr. Aguiar be made concurrent with one another. R. v. Delchev, 2014 ONCA 448, at paragraphs 33-35.
I would make the same comments in this case involving Mr. Menary, and for very similar reasons I conclude that the sentences to be imposed on Mr. Menary ought to be concurrent, not consecutive.
So, the final question, the penultimate question for the court to answer is whether a conditional sentence order for Mr. Menary would be a fit sentence. Under section 742.1 of the Criminal Code, if a person is convicted of an offence, and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender's behavior in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the conditions imposed under section 742.3 if:
a) the court is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2; and
b) the offence is not an offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment; and
c) the offence is not an offence under any of certain specific provisions of the Criminal Code; and
d) the offence is not a terrorism offence, or a criminal organization offence prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more.
In this case it is common ground that this is not a terrorism offence. It is not a criminal organization offence. It is also common ground that this is not an offence under any of the specific provisions outlined in section 742.1(c), of the Criminal Code. As well, neither of these offences is punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment. So, the only debate is whether this court, within the meaning of section 742.1(a) of the Criminal Code, is satisfied that a conditional sentence order for Mr. Menary would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code, as well as the threshold requirement that the court must find that a fit sentence for Mr. Menary, on all of the facts and circumstances, is less than two years.
Turning to the latter, I am satisfied that a sentence of less than two years is a fit sentence for Mr. Menary, despite the seriousness of the charges, despite the aggravating feature of the toxic combination of drugs and guns. There are significant mitigating factors in this case that persuade me, that a fit sentence for Mr. Menary is less than two years' imprisonment. And thus, the threshold requirement for the imposition of a conditional sentence order has been met.
I am also satisfied that a conditional sentence order for this offender would not endanger the safety of the community. I do not see Mr. Menary as a go-forward threat to the safety of the community at large, and I think that the evidence of that is borne out by the character letters that have been filed on Mr. Menary's behalf, and his exemplary performance for a long time now on bail.
Finally, I am satisfied that a conditional sentence order for Mr. Menary would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. In this particular case it would sufficiently deal with the principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence. And it would, undoubtedly, assist the principle of rehabilitation for Mr. Menary. Conditional sentence orders for these types of offences are relatively rare, but I think that a conditional sentence order for this offender, on these facts, will achieve the ultimate objective of imposing a sentence that is fit. And so, I accept the submission made by the defence for the imposition of a conditional sentence order.
S E N T E N C E
In terms of the breakdown of the sentence among the two counts, the sentence of the court on the gun conviction is two years less one day imprisonment to be served by way of a conditional sentence order.
The sentence of the court on the cocaine conviction is six months in custody concurrent, also to be served in the community by way of a conditional sentence order.
So, two years less one day on the gun, six months concurrent on the cocaine, a global sentence of two years less one day imprisonment to be served by way of a conditional sentence order.
All of the compulsory conditions apply. These conditions are outlined in section 742.3(1) of the Criminal Code. Mr. Menary shall keep the peace and be of good behavior, appear before the court when required to do so by the court, report to a supervisor within two working days after today, and thereafter, when required by the supervisor, and in the manner directed by the supervisor.
Mr. Menary shall remain within the jurisdiction of the court, unless written permission to go outside that jurisdiction is obtained from the court or the supervisor, and Mr. Menary shall notify the court or the supervisor, in advance, of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court, or the supervisor of any change of employment or occupation.
Section 742.3(2) of the Criminal Code outlines possible optional conditions of a conditional sentence order. I will get to the home confinement and the curfew clauses in a moment, but there are going to be some additional conditions throughout the entire duration of the conditional sentence order.
So, these conditions are on top of the statutory, compulsory conditions, and the following conditions will persist for the entire two years, less one day:
- Mr. Menary shall abstain from the consumption of drugs, except in accordance with a medical prescription.
- Mr. Menary shall abstain from the consumption of alcohol or any other intoxicating substances.
- Mr. Menary shall provide, for the purpose of analysis, a sample of a bodily substance prescribed by regulation on the demand of a peace officer, the supervisor, or someone designated under subsection 7 to make a demand at the place and time, and on the day specified by the person making the demand, if that person has reasonable grounds to suspect that the offender has breached a condition of the order that requires them to abstain from the consumption of drugs, alcohol or any other intoxicating substance. Section 742.3(2)(a.2) requires an offender to give bodily samples at regular intervals. I am not imposing that optional condition.
- Mr. Menary shall abstain from owning, possessing, or carrying any weapon or firearm.
- Mr. Menary shall perform 180 hours of community service over a period not exceeding 23 months. The place, or places that Mr. Menary performs the community service work is at the discretion of the supervisor.
- Mr. Menary shall attend counseling, and/or any treatment program recommended to him by the supervisor.
- For the first 12 months of the 2 years, less one day, Mr. Menary shall be subject to home confinement. He shall, at all times, be inside his residence, or on the property of his residence, except for any purpose as approved of in advance by the supervisor, and except for medical appointments, or medical emergencies involving himself, or a member of his immediate family, and except for meetings with legal counsel, and except for appointments with the supervisor, and except for required court attendances, and except for attending any counseling or treatment as approved by the supervisor, and except for any purpose between the hours of twelve o'clock noon, and three o'clock p.m., every — what day do you want? To do things like banking, shopping for necessities. JEREMY MENARY: Saturday. THE COURT: Between the hours of twelve o'clock, noon, and three o'clock p.m. every Saturday. JEREMY MENARY: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. That is the home confinement clause, and the exceptions to the home confinement for the first 12 months of the conditional sentence order. For the next six months of the conditional sentence order, there is no home confinement. There is a curfew. The hours of the curfew are between eleven o'clock p.m., and six o'clock a.m. daily, with the same exceptions that applied to the home confinement clause.
I recognize that some of those exceptions are very unlikely to arise in terms of the curfew hours, like meetings with a lawyer, but it makes it more understandable for the offender to have the same exceptions mirrored for both the home confinement stage of the order, the first 12 months, and the next six months. So, for the six month period following the 12 month period, there is no home confinement. The curfew is daily between 11:00 p.m. and six o'clock a.m. Same exceptions as applied to the home confinement. For the final six months, less one day, of the conditional sentence order, there is no home confinement and no curfew.
But all of the other terms that I outlined earlier still apply. I will ask in a moment if there is anything else I left out, but I want to move now to the rest of the sentence.
The conditional sentence order of two years less one day, will be followed by a period of probation for 12 months. The statutory terms apply to the 12 month probation order, and the only additional conditions that form part of the probation order are as follows:
- Mr. Menary shall report to a probation officer within two working days of the commencement of the probation order, and thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.
- Mr. Menary shall attend any counseling or treatment program as recommended by the probation officer.
- Mr. Menary shall not be in possession of any firearm or weapon, as defined by the Criminal Code.
- Mr. Menary shall not consume, or be in possession of any narcotic, or controlled drug, or substance, except in accordance with a medical prescription in his own name.
Those are the conditions of the 12 month probation order.
The ancillary orders are as follows:
- The forfeiture order has been signed as presented by the Crown.
- There is a DNA order imposed. There is a section 109 Criminal Code of Canada, firearms and weapons prohibition order, for 10 years and life, according to the two subsections. Certain items are prohibited for 10 years. Certain other items are prohibited for life.
- In light of the fact that Mr. Menary has been on strict house arrest bail for a lengthy period of time, and in light of the community service hours that the court has imposed, the victim fine surcharges are waived on both convictions.
Is there anything I left out in terms of the conditional sentence order, or the probation order? MS. CHANT: Your Honour, in terms of the probation order, I just wasn't sure if I heard a term about signing releases to allow probation to monitor the counseling or treatment, and I'm not sure if Your Honour thinks that's necessary. THE COURT: There should be a term... MS. CHANT: Thank you. THE COURT: ...that Mr. — as part of the probation order, and as part of the conditional sentence order, both, because both of those orders have the counseling or treatment provision. In both the conditional sentence order and the probation order, there is a term that Mr. Menary shall sign any necessary releases of information demanded of him to check compliance with the counseling, and/or treatment term. Anything else? MS. CHANT: No. Thank you, Your Honour. MR. LUFT: Your Honour, just with respect to the first 12 months, if Mr. Menary were to find employment, is the idea that he should be able to work or is that something that you want the conditional sentence supervisor to manage? THE COURT: He would have to take it up with the supervisor. MR. LUFT: Okay. Thank you. Then there's nothing else, Your Honour. THE COURT: So, Mr. Menary, stand up please. It's going to take a little bit of time to do the paperwork, because there's a lot of paperwork for the registrar to complete, and you'll see some of these orders in writing, but I want to ask you some questions. The forfeiture order, it's self-explanatory. You're not getting certain items back. You understand that? JEREMY MENARY: Yes. THE COURT: The firearms and weapons prohibition order, under section 109, you must obey that order. If you do not obey the order, you could be charged with a further criminal offence, and if found guilty you would likely go to jail. Do you understand that? JEREMY MENARY: Yes. THE COURT: The DNA order, it will be done by way of a blood sample that you provide to the police. You must cooperate with the police in giving the blood sample. If you do not cooperate, they could charge you with a further criminal offence and you could go to jail if found guilty. Do you understand that? JEREMY MENARY: Yes. THE COURT: The victim fine surcharges have been waived. I don't need to ask you anything about that. The 12 month probation order, you will get a copy of the order with all of the terms and conditions. You must obey that order entirely. If you want to change something in the order, you have to speak with the probation office. If you do not obey the probation order, you could be charged with breach of probation, and if found guilty you very likely would go to jail for that. Do you understand? JEREMY MENARY: Yes. THE COURT: That's the 12 month probation order. The conditional sentence order is a sentence of imprisonment, but you serve it in the community. It lasts two years less one day. It has a lot of terms and conditions in it. You must obey the conditional sentence order. If you do not, serious consequences could result. First of all, you could be charged with breaching the conditional sentence order, and if found guilty of the breach, you could go to jail for that. As well, you would very likely not be granted bail. If you were arrested on a breach of a conditional sentence order, your chances of getting bail are slim. Perhaps most important, if you are found to have violated the conditional sentence order, you could be forced to serve the balance of the order in a real prison, behind bars, in a cell, for whatever is left of the two years less one day. So, if 30 days from now you are found to have violated the conditional sentence order, you may have to go into a jail and serve the remaining 23 months in real jail. Do you understand all of those potential consequences? JEREMY MENARY: Yes. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. You may have a seat. Okay, so, Madam Registrar, what I would recommend is that you — I'm not sure how long counsel will be around, but they can leave their emails for you if they are leaving, and I'd like you to show the paperwork to counsel, particularly, I'm sure they're not too interested in the 109, the DNA, and those types of things because they're rather simple, but the conditional sentence order and the probation order, show counsel, and have them review those orders before you give them to me to review and sign, okay? Is there anything else that I left out, counsel? MR. LUFT: Not from the defence end of things, Your Honour. MS. CHANT: Not from the Crown. Thank you very much, Your Honour. THE COURT: Okay, thank you. MR. LUFT: Thank you very much, Your Honour. THE COURT: Thank you. I'd like to order a transcript of the oral reasons for sentence. I'd like to have it done as soon as possible, please. Sometimes it's helpful for the condition - for Mr. Menary may want it for the conditional sentence supervisor and/or probation officer, and I'd like to have it as well. Counsel may want it as well. So, transcript of the oral reasons for sentence, and I'll be in my chambers until we do the next matter, okay? CLERK REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. COURT SERVICES OFFICER: Order, all rise. MR. LUFT: Thank you. MS. CHANT: Thank you. THE COURT: And best wishes, Mr. Menary. JEREMY MENARY: Thank you, Your Honour.
...WHEREUPON THESE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED
FORM 3
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June 24, 2024 (Date)
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