Benjamin Moss

Joseph Marcel Kovacs was found guilty by a jury of three counts of assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of forcible confinement, all involving intimate partner violence against his former partner over four years.

The Crown sought a two-year jail sentence, while the defence sought a two-year conditional sentence.

The court imposed a total sentence of two years less five days imprisonment, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation due to the gravity of the offences, the offender's criminal record, and the need to protect the public.

A conditional sentence was deemed inappropriate given the circumstances.

Joseph Kovacs, convicted of five counts of violence, brought a post-conviction application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay minimally exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown successfully argued that a 35-day jury blackout period due to the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a discrete exceptional circumstance, which, when deducted, brought the delay below the ceiling.

The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate that the remaining delay was unreasonable, as they did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or put the court on timely notice of s. 11(b) concerns.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and committing an indecent act.

The court found the Crown proved the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on the complainant's identification evidence and the arresting officers' observations.

However, the accused was subjected to a strip search at the police station.

The court found the strip search violated the accused's Charter rights, as there were no reasonable and probable grounds to justify it.

Given the systemic failure and high-handed disregard for established law regarding strip searches, the court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The accused, charged with serious drug offences, brought a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel after being refused Legal Aid.

The court found that counsel was essential for a fair trial due to the complexity of the case, the accused's limited English, and the severe potential consequences.

Despite vague financial evidence, the court accepted that the accused, a gig economy worker, lacked the means to afford the substantial retainers required by private counsel.

The application was granted, and proceedings were stayed until funding is provided, subject to the accused contributing $5,000.

In a combined criminal trial and Charter voir dire on multiple firearm possession charges, the court held that police lacked both reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention and reasonable grounds to believe for the more invasive search of a satchel.

The detention and search were based on weak, third-hand confidential source information, sparse and inadequately corroborated descriptors, and evolving police evidence.

The court also found breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter because the accused was not promptly informed of the reason for detention or of the right to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the firearm and ammunition under s. 24(2) and entered acquittals on all counts.

The court delivered reasons for sentence for Bradley Screen, who pleaded guilty to an offence carrying a maximum 10-year imprisonment.

Aggravating factors included a criminal record dating back to 2009 and a considerable amount of money obtained.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility.

The court accepted a joint submission from Crown and defence, sentencing Mr. Screen to eight months in jail, consecutive to his current sentence, followed by 12 months of probation with specific conditions, a DNA order, and a $200 victim fine surcharge with 24 months to pay.

Following conviction after trial for a violent home invasion robbery involving firearms, the offender was sentenced for multiple offences including armed robbery, aggravated assault, discharge of a firearm with intent to endanger life, unlawful confinement, and several firearms possession offences.

During the robbery three armed assailants entered an apartment, confined the victim, and shot him in the back as he attempted to flee, causing life‑threatening injuries.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives in home invasion and gun crimes.

Considering aggravating factors such as the use of firearms, the grievous injuries inflicted, and the offender’s prior youth record and breach of a firearms prohibition, the court imposed a significant penitentiary sentence within the established range for home invasion offences.

The accused were tried for offences arising from a home invasion armed robbery where the victim was shot.

The Crown alleged one accused was one of the three armed robbers and another was the getaway driver.

The court found the first accused guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and firearms offences based on circumstantial DNA and cell phone evidence, but acquitted him of attempted murder.

The getaway driver was acquitted of being an accessory after the fact and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, as his evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding his intent and knowledge, but he was convicted of dangerous driving for turning his vehicle into the path of a bus.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of forensic DNA evidence obtained under a bodily substances warrant.

The court held that police breached s. 8 by failing to specifically comply with the informational requirements in s. 487.07 of the Criminal Code and the warrant, even though the warrant itself was valid and several matters could be inferred from the circumstances.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court found the misconduct minor, the impact on the accused’s protected interests limited, and the DNA evidence reliable and important to adjudication on the merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed and the DNA evidence was admitted.

During a preliminary inquiry into charges including attempted murder, the Crown sought to introduce a written report from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police indicating that a DNA specimen from a jacket found at the crime scene matched the accused Russell Bullock on the National DNA Data Bank.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the report, arguing inadequate notice was given and that the evidence was not credible or trustworthy.

The court ruled the report admissible under section 540(7) of the Criminal Code, finding that the legislative framework governing the National DNA Databank and the statutory duties of the RCMP Commissioner provided sufficient credibility and trustworthiness to the evidence at the preliminary inquiry stage.

Four accused were jointly charged with offences relating to a loaded firearm discovered in a vehicle in which they were occupants.

Two accused faced additional counts of transporting, possessing, and controlling the firearm and related ammunition offences.

After the Crown closed its case, all accused sought directed verdicts of acquittal on the basis that the Crown had failed to establish a prima facie case of knowledge or control of the firearm.

The court held that mere presence in a vehicle containing a firearm, coupled with nervous behaviour and seat movements, was insufficient to establish knowledge or control beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly where another unidentified occupant fled the vehicle from the seat where the firearm was located.

Concluding that the circumstantial evidence could not permit a properly instructed jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court granted directed verdicts and acquitted all accused.

The accused was charged with robbery and using an imitation firearm following a jewelry store hold-up by two men.

The Crown's case relied on eyewitness identification from a photo lineup and DNA found on a baseball cap left at the scene, which the Crown alleged was worn by the other perpetrator.

The defence called an alibi witness who testified the accused was with her at the time of the offence.

The court found the alibi evidence, while not fully believed, raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also noted frailties in the eyewitness identification and found the circumstantial DNA evidence insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown brought a K.G.B. application seeking to admit two prior out‑of‑court statements made by an alleged accomplice who recanted at trial.

The statements included an audio‑recorded confession describing multiple robberies and a subsequent identification of the accused as a participant.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, considering necessity and threshold reliability under the framework articulated in Khelawon and related authorities.

Although the statements were unsworn and not fully video‑recorded, the declarant testified and was available for cross‑examination, and comparator evidence allowed the trier of fact to assess accuracy.

The court held that these factors sufficiently addressed the hearsay dangers and granted the Crown’s application to admit both statements for the truth of their contents.

Sentencing following convictions for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, breach of a firearms prohibition order, and conspiracy to commit forcible confinement arising from a planned home invasion-style abduction.

Police discovered the offenders while they were surveilling the intended victim using GPS tracking and preparing restraints, disguises, and weapons.

The court held that the conspiracy had progressed beyond mere planning and was partially implemented, making denunciation and deterrence paramount.

For the primary offender, the presence of a loaded firearm and a significant violent criminal history were major aggravating factors.

The court imposed consecutive sentences but applied the totality principle to reduce the aggregate sentence.

The accused were charged with conspiracy to commit unlawful confinement, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The police discovered the accused and others in a secluded area with a rental vehicle containing items such as homemade zip-tie handcuffs, a mask, and a loaded handgun.

The accused were also using a laptop to track the GPS location of the intended victim's vehicle.

The court found both accused guilty of conspiracy to commit unlawful confinement.

The driver of the vehicle was found guilty of the firearm offences, while the other accused was acquitted of the firearm offences due to lack of evidence of knowledge or control.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the conduct of a police officer constituted entrapment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the brief conversation between the police officer and the appellant did not ground a finding of entrapment.

The Court noted that the appellant was not induced to commit a crime but was already engaged in criminal activities when he allowed the officer to witness a drug transaction.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug trafficking charges.

The trial judge had found that an undercover police officer entrapped the accused by asking 'Can you hook me up?' without reasonable suspicion, and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the officer's question was merely an investigative step and did not provide an opportunity to commit an offence.

The Court set aside the finding of entrapment, entered guilty verdicts, and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The Court also noted that entrapment should only be considered after a finding of guilt, and that a stay of proceedings, rather than exclusion of evidence, is the proper remedy.