Tom Goddard

Ertug Direk pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and fail to stop at the scene of an accident causing death.

The court considered a joint submission of 4.5 years imprisonment.

Aggravating factors included the high speed, the offender's extensive criminal and driving record (including prior dangerous driving convictions), and the moral blameworthiness of fleeing the scene.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea and surrender to police.

The court also considered harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and restrictive bail conditions for credit.

The judge accepted the joint submission for imprisonment but imposed a longer driving prohibition than sought by the defence.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving on March 3, 2018, after police responded to a report of an unconscious driver on Spadina Avenue in Toronto.

The defendant was found asleep at the wheel in a live lane of traffic with the engine running.

Police observed signs consistent with impairment including the smell of alcohol and bloodshot eyes.

The defendant was arrested and advised of his rights to counsel.

The Crown did not rely on breath sample results due to an error in the demand read by police.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest and no Charter breaches regarding arrest or rights to counsel.

However, on the merits of the impairment charge, the court found a reasonable doubt existed and acquitted the defendant.

The defendant applied for leave to cross-examine Detective Constable Mike Taylor, the affiant of search warrants that led to the discovery of two firearms in the defendant's home and car.

The defendant sought to question the officer regarding the timing of confidential informant information and the meaning of "operational needs" that resulted in the non-execution of an initial warrant.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on both areas, finding them relevant to whether reasonable and probable grounds existed for the warrants.

However, an addendum clarified that one line of questioning regarding the timing of confidential informant information was ultimately irrelevant to the defendant's actual inquiry.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant while she was asleep at his residence on November 18, 2015.

The Crown alleged non-consensual sexual contact while the accused claimed the sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and rejected the accused's evidence, determining that the accused placed his fingers in the complainant's vagina while she was asleep and knew she was asleep when he did so.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The Crown sought to adduce similar act evidence based on video surveillance footage showing the defendant standing in close proximity to two unknown women in a grocery store, allegedly engaging in conduct similar to the charged sexual assault of the complainant.

The defendant was charged with sexually assaulting a woman at a checkout counter by touching her buttocks three times in a deliberate manner.

The Crown argued that two other incidents captured on video—one occurring minutes before and one after the alleged assault—demonstrated a pattern of similar groping conduct.

The defence opposed admission, arguing the evidence was insufficiently similar and that the video footage was ambiguous and incapable of proving the alleged similar acts.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that neither incident shown on video demonstrated striking similarity to the charged conduct and that the evidence was not capable of proving the alleged similar acts to the requisite degree of certainty.

The accused sought leave under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant and adduce evidence regarding prior sexual activity between them.

The Crown charged the accused with sexually assaulting the complainant while she was asleep.

The accused sought to introduce evidence of: (1) a single prior act of sexual intercourse; (2) multiple acts of massaging over clothing; and (3) the complainant permitting the accused to photograph and video her while naked.

The court applied the three-part test under section 276, examining relevance, probative value, and prejudicial effect.

The court permitted cross-examination and evidence regarding the prior sexual intercourse and massaging incidents, finding them relevant to rebut the Crown's theory of motive and to establish the nature of the relationship.

The court prohibited admission of the actual photographs and videos but permitted cross-examination regarding the circumstances of their creation.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter motion seeking a stay of proceedings on grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time had been violated.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and excess alcohol on September 27, 2014.

The Crown conceded there was no case to meet on the fail to remain charge.

The motion was heard following trial evidence on June 22, 2016.

The court found that the total delay attributable to the Crown was approximately 12 months, consisting of 3.5 months of disclosure delay and 8 months 11 days of institutional delay.

This exceeded the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months.

The court found the defendant suffered modest prejudice and that the Crown's systemic failure to provide timely video disclosure was a significant factor.

The court concluded the defendant's section 11(b) rights had been breached and stayed the charges.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol on June 6, 2014, with trial scheduled for June 15, 2016.

The court conducted an attribution analysis of delay across multiple categories: neutral intake, trial readiness, institutional delay, and Crown delay.

The court found that the Crown was responsible for approximately 16 months of delay, primarily due to late disclosure of instrument calibration and maintenance records for the Intoxilyzer 8000C device.

This delay exceeded the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months.

Although the defendant suffered only modest prejudice, the court found that the defendant's interests and society's interest in a prompt trial outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits, particularly given the Crown's responsibility for the delay.

The charge was stayed.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation, excess alcohol, and fail to remain under the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle accident on September 27, 2014.

The defendant brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence, arguing that the arrest and demand for breath samples violated his section 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The court examined whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired operation and make an Intoxilizer demand.

Despite deficiencies in the officer's note-taking and some inaccuracies in his evidence, the court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including the report of a rear-end collision, the driver leaving the scene, reports of difficulty walking, bloodshot eyes, and a heavy odour of alcohol.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He was stopped at a RIDE checkpoint and registered a fail on a roadside approved screening device.

Following arrest and transport to the OPP Detachment, breath samples were taken approximately 76 minutes after the alleged offence, registering 150 and 130 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the Crown's reliance on the statutory presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), arguing that cumulative police delays in transporting the accused and administering the breath tests rendered the samples not "taken as soon as practicable." The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout and that the presumption of identity applied.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath sample analysis results from an intoxilyzer device.

The central issue was whether the police's failure to perform annual recommended maintenance on the intoxilyzer constituted improper operation of the instrument under section 258(1)(c)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the instrument had not been sent for annual maintenance for over 13 months at the time of testing, contrary to the Canadian Society of Forensic Science Alcohol Test Committee's recommendations.

The court determined that improper maintenance constitutes improper operation and therefore the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of accuracy of the breath test results.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and excess alcohol following a collision on Highway 401 on October 6, 2011.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable trial delay.

The application was heard on January 25, 2013, in advance of the trial date of April 22, 2013.

The court found that the total delay attributable to the Crown and institutional factors was approximately 13.5 months, which exceeded the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months by 3.5 months.

Despite modest prejudice to the defendant, the court determined that the defendant's interests and society's interest in a prompt trial outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The application was allowed and the charges were stayed.