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The court rescinded a previously granted screen order for a complainant testifying virtually, finding it unnecessary given the virtual hearing format.

The ruling emphasized that the virtual setting inherently reduces direct confrontation concerns, and witnesses have personal options (like adjusting Zoom view or physically blocking the screen) if they prefer not to see the accused.

The Crown applied under s 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting the complainant to testify from behind a one-way screen in a domestic violence case.

The complainant expressed fear of testifying while seeing the accused.

The defence opposed, arguing for face-to-face confrontation and questioning the genuineness of the fear, noting prior family court appearances.

The court granted the application, finding that the screen would facilitate a full and candid account by the witness without impairing the accused's right to cross-examination, especially given the nature of the domestic violence allegations.

The accused, Yuan-Hung Lo, was charged with Fraud Over $5000 and three counts of Possession of Property Over $5000.

The Crown alleged that Mr. Lo knowingly participated in a fraud scheme where the complainant was defrauded of $181,000, or was wilfully blind to it.

The defence argued that Mr. Lo believed he was involved in a legitimate business deal and was unaware of the fraud.

The court found that while Mr. Lo's business practices were odd and naive, his testimony and efforts to document transactions raised a reasonable doubt as to his knowledge or wilful blindness.

Consequently, the court found Mr. Lo not guilty of all charges.

This criminal trial concerned a single count of sexual assault.

The complainant and the accused provided starkly different accounts of the events.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, noting inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the showing of photographs, which undermined her reliability.

Despite the complainant's general credibility, the court found the accused's consistent and plausible account, coupled with the complainant's undermined reliability on a material issue, created a reasonable doubt.

The Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The defendant, Brian Tcheong, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography.

The court considered the appropriate sentence, weighing aggravating factors such as the size and vile nature of the child pornography collection (350 images, 14 videos, Level 4 depravity) and the duration of accessing such material (almost 5 years).

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, lack of criminal record, consistent employment, strong family support, demonstrated insight, and significant upfront counselling (26 sessions).

The court also considered the defendant's mental health issues, including mild intellectual disability, autism spectrum features, and hoarding tendencies, as contributing factors to his actions.

The Crown sought 15 months institutional custody, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence order (CSO) due to the defendant's mental health.

The court rejected the CSO, emphasizing that conditional sentences for child pornography are only appropriate in exceptional cases and that a CSO would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The court imposed an 8-month institutional custody sentence, followed by three years probation with counselling, and other ancillary orders.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion seeking an order for the preservation of $41,620 in Canadian currency, pending an application for civil forfeiture under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the currency was proceeds of unlawful activity, citing its discovery with drugs, a firearm magazine, multiple phones, and identification in other names, as well as the interested party's admission of being at an "underground casino" and outstanding fraud charges.

The court also determined that preserving the currency was in the interests of justice, as it was not "manifestly harsh" or "draconian," especially given the interested party's consent.

The motion for preservation was granted.

The three defendants, Tuan Tai Le, Ba Loc Nguyen, and Phap Hong Nguyen, pleaded guilty to cultivating cannabis plants in excess of the amount permitted by law at a licensed grow operation.

The Crown sought a six-month incarceration, while defence counsel requested absolute discharges.

The court found that the defendants were manual labourers with minimal moral culpability, having mistakenly believed their work was lawful due to cannabis legalization.

They suffered significant collateral immigration consequences, including loss of legal status and inability to work or return home.

The court dismissed the Crown's request for incarceration, finding it disproportionately punitive, and granted absolute discharges to all three defendants, deeming it in their best interests and not contrary to the public interest.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal of two accused on charges of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court applied the test for committal in circumstantial evidence cases, examining whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably draw the necessary inferences to establish the essential elements of the offences.

The court found insufficient evidence to support the inferences required for conviction.

Specifically, the court found that a reasonable jury could not infer a hand-to-hand drug transaction occurred, could not establish that both accused occupied the residence where drugs were found, and could not infer knowledge and control over the drugs.

Both accused were discharged on all counts.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under Section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that on December 31, 2017, the accused failed to provide a suitable breath sample into an approved screening device after multiple attempts.

The defence argued the accused attempted to provide a sample and lacked the requisite mens rea.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately and intentionally refused or failed to provide a sample.

The court acquitted the accused, finding reasonable doubt regarding her understanding of the demand and her intention to comply, particularly given language barriers and deficient police notes.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration following a multi-vehicle collision.

The Crown alleged the defendant caused a chain-reaction rear-end collision involving four vehicles.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The court found that while the defendant was present at the scene and possessed a key to the vehicle, the identification evidence was weak due to its generality, cross-racial nature, and discrepancies in the witness's description of the driver's age.

The court concluded that the evidence fell short of the requisite standard of proof and acquitted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown called two police witnesses: the arresting officer and a qualified technician who conducted breath analysis.

The defendant testified and introduced photographic evidence regarding her vehicle's colour.

The defendant conceded the excess blood alcohol concentration charge but contested the impaired operation charge.

The court found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol concentration but acquitted her of the impaired operation charge, finding insufficient evidence that her ability to operate the vehicle was impaired despite her elevated blood alcohol level.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a sample of breath into an approved screening device (ASD) pursuant to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that a police officer made a lawful demand for a breath sample at a RIDE spot check, which the accused refused.

The defence argued that no proper demand was made and that the accused was not advised of the consequences of refusal before arrest.

The court found that the officer did make a proper demand, the accused unequivocally refused to comply, and that there is no legal requirement for an officer to advise a driver of consequences before making a demand.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident on September 7, 2014.

The complainant and accused were friends of approximately 12 years with a purely platonic relationship.

While watching television at the complainant's newly purchased home, the complainant fell asleep on a loveseat while the accused was massaging her feet and legs.

The complainant awoke to find the accused's fingers inserted into her vagina without her consent.

The accused immediately told him to leave.

The court found that the accused sexually assaulted the complainant by inserting his fingers into her vagina while she was asleep and therefore incapable of consenting.

The accused's own admissions in his text message, statements to police upon arrest, and video-recorded police statement were determinative of guilt.

The accused applied to stay proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter to remedy an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) rights (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The information was sworn on July 22, 2015, and the trial date was September 1, 2016, representing 408 days of delay.

After accounting for defence-requested adjournments, the net delay was 380 days, falling below the presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that while the case took longer than it should have, it did not take markedly longer such that a stay was appropriate.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with four counts of threatening to kill the complainant, his wife, and two children on March 18, 2013.

The complainant was the defendant's supervising professor at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT).

The defendant claimed the reverse was true—that the complainant had threatened him.

After hearing evidence from four witnesses and reviewing numerous exhibits, the court found the defendant guilty.

The court rejected the defendant's testimony as inconsistent with his conduct and accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and corroborated by his actions.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results showing 160 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the defendant was in care and control of the vehicle at the time of the collision and whether the breath tests were taken within the required two-hour window.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the precise time of care and control, rendering the breath test evidence inadmissible.

Additionally, the court found insufficient evidence of impairment based on the officers' observations and the toxicologist's opinion alone.

The defendant was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to Criminal Code s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown called evidence of an anonymous report of impaired driving, police observation and pursuit of the vehicle, an approved screening device test showing an "F" reading, and two breath samples taken at the police station registering 120 and 110 milligrams respectively.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath test results, arguing there were unexplained delays between the time of the alleged offence and the taking of the first breath sample, which would undermine the presumption of identity under Criminal Code s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The court found the accused guilty, holding that the delays were explained and the police acted reasonably in the circumstances, particularly in ensuring the accused received access to counsel in his language of choice.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown proceeded on the basis of care and control rather than actual operation.

The court found that while the accused was in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and was impaired, the vehicle was truly inoperable due to severe structural damage that prevented it from moving or being started.

The court distinguished between an "immovable" vehicle (stuck but potentially drivable) and an "inoperable" vehicle (incapable of being driven).

Finding the vehicle inoperable and thus incapable of creating a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, the court acquitted the accused despite the presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and excess alcohol following a collision on Highway 401 on October 6, 2011.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable trial delay.

The application was heard on January 25, 2013, in advance of the trial date of April 22, 2013.

The court found that the total delay attributable to the Crown and institutional factors was approximately 13.5 months, which exceeded the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months by 3.5 months.

Despite modest prejudice to the defendant, the court determined that the defendant's interests and society's interest in a prompt trial outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The application was allowed and the charges were stayed.