J. Stephen O'Neill

The applicants sought relief under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that a search warrant authorizing the search of their motel room lacked reasonable grounds and that the resulting drug evidence should be excluded.

The reviewing judge found that the information to obtain contained omissions and inaccuracies and that reasonable grounds to search the motel room did not exist, rendering the search unreasonable under s. 8.

However, applying the framework from Grant and Harrison, the court concluded the police acted in overall good faith and that the misleading aspects of the warrant materials were at the lower end of seriousness.

Given the reliability and importance of the seized drug evidence and society’s interest in adjudicating serious trafficking charges on their merits, exclusion under s. 24(2) was not warranted.

The court sentenced an Indigenous offender following a guilty plea arising from a fatal shooting within a First Nation community.

The sentencing judge emphasized the importance of reconciliation, the historical and social context affecting Indigenous communities, and the application of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and Gladue principles.

The offender received credit for significant pre‑trial custody and was sentenced to an additional custodial term pursuant to a joint submission by counsel.

The court also issued ancillary orders including a DNA order and a firearms prohibition order, subject to a limited exception permitting firearm use for sustenance hunting in accordance with Indigenous practices.

This was a family law costs ruling following a motion addressing interim custody, interim access, disclosure involving the children, and interim child support.

Some of the underlying orders were made on consent and others required adjudication.

The court held it would be unfair for the represented party to bear all legal fees attributable to the motion, but also recognized that not all relief was contested to determination.

The self-represented responding party was ordered to contribute approximately 50 percent of the legal bill, fixed at $1,275, payable by July 31, 2015.

The applicant mother brought a motion for interim orders regarding access, child and spousal support, and the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

The parties separated after the respondent father seriously assaulted the mother, for which he pleaded guilty.

The court ordered gradually increasing unsupervised access for the father, finding no risk of harm to the child.

The court ordered the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home to remain in trust.

For interim support, the court imputed the father's consulting income at his 2013 level and ordered spousal support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines until the matrimonial home is sold, along with child support.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of driving 'over 80'.

The trial judge had stayed the charge, finding that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to make a breath demand because he questioned the respondent about an open beer bottle found in the vehicle after the respondent failed a roadside screening test, thereby breaching the respondent's right to counsel and demonstrating doubt about the test's accuracy.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in equating the officer's doubt about the screening test's accuracy with a lack of reasonable and probable grounds to continue the arrest and breath demand.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a motor vehicle accident action on the basis that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The issue was when the plaintiff discovered, or ought reasonably to have discovered, that his injuries were serious and permanent for the purposes of the statutory threshold and deductible regime applicable to automobile claims.

The court reviewed the plaintiff’s medical history, treatment efforts, and the timing of diagnostic testing, including MRI confirmation of a cervical disc protrusion.

It held that ongoing pain alone did not establish discoverability of a serious and permanent impairment.

Discoverability arose only when objective MRI results confirmed the nature of the injury, and the action issued within two years of that date was therefore timely.

The municipal defendant brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing negligence claims as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged the municipality failed to enforce by-laws relating to a neighbour’s road construction, drainage issues, and fence encroachments affecting the use and enjoyment of her property.

The court held that the road and drainage allegations were discovered more than two years before the action was commenced and were therefore barred by the limitation period.

However, alleged fence alterations occurring in 2012 and 2013 could potentially constitute newly discoverable claims within the limitation period.

Summary judgment was granted in part, dismissing the road and drainage claims while permitting fence-related claims against the municipality to proceed to trial.

The accused applied for release following a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code after remaining in custody following a denied bail hearing.

The Crown argued that the court could only conduct a detention review under s. 515(10) where unreasonable delay in the proceedings had first been established.

The court rejected that interpretation and held that s. 525 allows the reviewing judge to consider whether continued detention is justified even absent proven delay.

The accused presented a new release plan involving supervision by her parents and participation in treatment for substance abuse.

The court concluded that continued detention was not justified and ordered release on strict conditions.

The Crown appealed an acquittal arising from impaired driving charges where the trial judge found the arrest was premature due to insufficient reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellate court held that the trial judge erred in law by applying an overly stringent standard when assessing whether the officer had objective grounds for arrest and a breath demand.

The court further held that the trial judge failed to conduct the required Charter s. 24(2) analysis after finding a potential Charter breach.

The right to counsel under s. 10(b) was a live issue and required proper consideration, particularly regarding the accused’s request to contact counsel of choice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Parents appealed a child protection decision finding three children in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and ordering Crown wardship without access for two children, with the third placed with the biological father under supervision.

The trial judge had concluded that one or both parents inflicted serious injuries on one child but could not determine which parent was responsible, and that the other parent failed to protect the child.

The appellants argued errors in credibility findings, failure to properly assess evidence, and improper consideration of changed circumstances.

The court held that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence and attracted appellate deference absent palpable and overriding error.

Considering the severity of the injuries and the ongoing risk to the children, the court found that the disposition was in the children’s best interests.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of an action.

The court considered the established factors for setting aside such dismissals, including explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

While the court accepted that these four factors generally favoured the plaintiff, it considered the additional factor of the merits of the action where the evidence was clear and unchallenged.

The court found that a previously executed full and final release barred the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants relating to an earlier action and a prior court order.

As a result, the claim lacked merit and the administrative dismissal would not be set aside.

The applicants brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of cocaine evidence following a traffic stop and subsequent searches.

The court found that the passenger was psychologically detained when police requested identification and that using the passenger’s health card to conduct a CPIC check breached s. 8 of the Charter.

Although a protective pat‑down search was justified for officer safety, opening a cigarette package discovered during the search exceeded the lawful scope and constituted an unreasonable search.

The court also found there were no reasonable grounds to arrest the driver for possession based solely on cocaine found on the passenger.

However, the vehicle search that uncovered a larger quantity of cocaine was justified as a lawful inventory search following mandatory vehicle impoundment under the Highway Traffic Act, and the evidence was therefore admissible.

Following reasons on the underlying application, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Applying s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the discretionary factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized the result of the proceeding, the reasonableness of the steps taken, and proportionality.

Although the respondent argued that the applicants’ legal fees were high relative to his own expenses, the court found the applicants’ partial indemnity bill of costs and disbursements generally reasonable.

Exercising its discretion, the court fixed partial indemnity legal fees at $65,000 plus HST and disbursements.

The respondent was ordered to pay total costs of $84,092.17.

The defendants brought a motion seeking to transfer the trial venue from Timmins to Toronto and to strike the plaintiff’s jury notice in an action for damages arising from the denial of an aviation insurance claim after the destruction of an aircraft.

The court applied Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and held that the moving parties failed to establish that Toronto was a substantially better venue than the plaintiff’s chosen forum.

The court also rejected the argument that the action was essentially one for declaratory relief requiring determination by a judge alone.

The court found that significant factual issues concerning the purpose of the flight and the meaning of “ab initio instruction” under the insurance policy required factual determination suitable for a jury.

The motion to change venue and strike the jury notice was dismissed.

A municipality sought an order requiring demolition of a waterfront structure constructed on Lake Rosseau, asserting that the respondent had built a boathouse with living accommodations in violation of zoning and planning by-laws.

The respondent argued the structure was a water aerodrome registered with Transport Canada and therefore immune from municipal regulation under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.

The court examined the chronology of events, the respondent’s intentions, and the actual use and design of the structure.

It concluded the aerodrome registration was an attempt to circumvent municipal zoning restrictions and that the structure functioned as a boathouse rather than an aeronautical facility.

The court held that municipal planning and zoning laws applied and ordered demolition of the structure.

Three ODSP recipients appealed the Social Benefits Tribunal's decision denying them medical travel benefits to attend a therapeutic aquafitness program for severe mental illness.

The Tribunal had found the program was not a 'medical treatment' and questioned why alternative funding or programs were not used.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, holding that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to apply a purposive interpretation to the ODSPA.

The Court found the medically prescribed, psychiatrist-supervised aquafitness program constituted 'medical treatment' and that the regulation does not require applicants to prove no alternative programs or funding sources exist.

The moving party sought an order appointing a computer forensic expert to inspect the responding party’s computer systems to determine the authenticity of certain emails allegedly exchanged between employees.

The motion alleged a lack of transparency in the responding party’s investigation and requested inspection of servers and archived email systems.

The court accepted the responding party’s evidence that no trace of the emails existed in its live exchange system or archival vault and that prior internal and forensic reviews found no record of the communications.

Applying a threshold requirement that there be a real likelihood the emails once existed and were deleted, the court held the moving party’s request was based on speculation.

Given the intrusive nature of inspecting a competitor’s computer systems and the principle of proportionality in discovery, the court refused the requested order.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board Chair, which dismissed their request for review of an earlier OMB decision regarding draft plan conditions for a subdivision.

The applicants argued the Chair erred in applying the public interest test to deny an extension of time, applied the wrong legal test to strike Charter arguments, failed to recognize Charter rights related to home ownership, and ignored new evidence about inconsistent slope setbacks.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness or reasonableness of the Chair's decision on any of the grounds raised.

The employer applied for judicial review of a labour arbitration award that reinstated an employee who had been terminated for sexually harassing and assaulting a contract cleaner.

The arbitrator found the employee committed the acts over five years and showed no remorse, but substituted a lengthy suspension for termination because the complainant did not want him discharged and another cleaner had successfully stopped his harassment by threatening violence.

The Divisional Court held the arbitrator's decision was unreasonable, as it relied on irrelevant factors and undermined the employer's statutory duty to provide a harassment-free workplace.

The application was allowed and the termination upheld.

The accused, an Aboriginal offender, pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm after a single-vehicle collision that injured a passenger.

The Crown sought 75 days' incarceration, while the defence sought a six-month conditional sentence.

Applying the Gladue principles and considering the accused's lack of a prior record, steady employment, remorse, and the victim's support, the court imposed a six-month conditional sentence with house arrest and a two-year driving prohibition.