David Holmes

The accused stood trial for failing to comply with a breath demand and driving while suspended.

The court found that the six-minute delay between the police forming grounds and making the demand was lawful, as it was used to identify the driver.

The accused unequivocally failed to provide a sample by feigning attempts and later admitting he did not want to cooperate.

His subsequent offer to provide a sample 16 minutes after his arrest was not a valid 'change of heart' as it occurred after the time within which the police could have lawfully obtained a compelled sample.

The accused was found guilty of both offences.

Sentencing for summary conviction assault of offender's minor daughter in the family home, involving multiple applications of force causing visible injuries, committed to prevent the child from intervening in a spousal dispute.

Court rejected defence request for conditional discharge, finding it contrary to the public interest given the seriousness of the assault, statutory aggravating factors including breach of trust and victim under 18, significant victim impact, and absence of remorse or acceptance of responsibility.

Court also declined conditional sentence as inconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.

Intermittent jail sentence of 30 days imposed followed by 12 months probation, with DNA order.

The court sentenced K.P. to 16 years in custody for attempted murder and related offences arising from a pattern of intimate partner violence, including multiple attempts to poison the complainant with fentanyl and hiring a hitman to kill her.

The decision details the facts found by the jury, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the harsh pre-sentence custody conditions experienced by the offender.

The court considered the offender’s mental health and addictions, but found his moral blameworthiness to be high due to planning, deliberation, and lack of remorse.

The sentence was reduced from 21 to 16 years to account for the particularly harsh pre-trial detention conditions.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence of the respondent's prior U.S. bank fraud conviction at his trial for fraud, theft, and obtaining accounts by false pretences.

The court applied the R. v. Handy and R. v. L.B. tests, finding the evidence relevant to establish mens rea and negative innocent explanations.

Despite the time gap and some dissimilarities, the strong nexus between the schemes (circumventing high-risk business barriers in credit card processing) and the significant probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, which could be mitigated by jury instructions.

The application was granted.

Malcom Lee was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

The defence filed Charter applications, primarily alleging breaches of section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel.

The court found no breach of the informational or implementational components of the right to counsel, or if there was a minor breach, the evidence would still be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed both offences based on observations of impairment, the unexplained collision, and breath readings.

The accused, Carly Delorme, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.

The trial judge dismissed both charges.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in officer testimony and the accused's normal behaviour on video.

Regarding the "over 80" charge, while the Certificate of Analysis was admitted (the court held that virtual exhibits could be "duplicate originals" and satisfied legal requirements), the Crown failed to prove that the operation occurred within the two-hour timeframe preceding the officer's arrival, which is a necessary element of the re-worded offence.

The presumption of care and control was also rebutted as the vehicle was inoperable and the accused was trapped.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a RIDE checkpoint stop on June 21, 2019.

The Crown presented evidence from three police officers and a qualified technician demonstrating clear signs of impairment at the roadside and breath test results of 131 and 113 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on the basis that he was not properly advised of his right to counsel due to alleged language comprehension issues.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts, rejecting the Charter application and finding no language barrier to the defendant's understanding of his rights.

The applicant, Daniel Veldman, brought a motion for a stay of charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, calculating the total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion as 43 months, 18 days.

After subtracting defence delay and exceptional circumstances, the remaining delay was found to be 29 months, 24.5 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have or that he took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

Furthermore, considering the seriousness of the charges (including sexual assault, extortion, and uttering threats) and the public interest, and applying a contextual analysis for this transitional case (charges laid pre-Jordan), the court dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings.

The accused, Daniel Veldman, brought an application seeking a finding that the interviewing officer violated his s. 10(b) Charter rights by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel of choice.

The Crown had initially sought a ruling on the voluntariness of Veldman's videotaped statement, but the defence conceded voluntariness.

The court dismissed Veldman's Charter application, finding that his preferred counsel was not a lawyer and that Veldman had unequivocally waived his right to counsel by insisting on giving a statement despite being offered duty counsel multiple times and advised not to speak by duty counsel.

The defendant was charged with one count of assault and one count of mischief under $5,000.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant and the defendant, as well as photographic evidence.

The central issues were whether the Crown proved the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, the credibility of the witnesses, and whether self-defence applied.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the defendant's account as implausible and inconsistent.

The court determined that the defendant unlawfully assaulted the complainant by grabbing her neck and subsequently damaged her cell phone.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit and while impaired by alcohol, following incidents on October 11, 2015.

The central issues involved Charter violations regarding warrantless entry into an underground parking garage, reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and the right to counsel.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to enter the garage based on hot pursuit and exigent circumstances, that the arrest was lawful, and that the right to counsel was not violated.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt both excess alcohol and impairment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 130 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The arresting officer transported the accused to a detachment in Port Credit rather than attempting to arrange testing at closer Halton Police Service stations.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tests were taken as soon as practicable and therefore could not rely on the presumption of identity.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was convicted after trial of two counts of assault and two counts of assault with a weapon arising from an incident where he approached two young women fundraising for charity, mistakenly believing one had stolen money from him.

He grabbed one by the wrist and brandished a knife.

Subsequently, while on bail pending sentencing, he was arrested carrying a concealed 12-inch knife and pleaded guilty to breaching a no-weapons recognizance and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The sentencing judge imposed a custodial sentence of six and a half months, taking into account the accused's paranoid schizophrenia and its causal connection to the offences, while balancing the need for denunciation and protection of the public.

The accused was tried on a charge of making child pornography available after images of his clothed nine-year-old niece were posted on a Russian website together with requests for sexualized commentary and ensuing sexually explicit exchanges.

The only live issue was identity, as the defence conceded that whoever made the posts committed the offence but argued that another person used the accused's identity and the restaurant Wi‑Fi beneath his apartment.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's testimony and found the circumstantial and admissions evidence overwhelming, including his police statement, his admitted sexual interest in children and his niece, and forensic evidence showing incest-related searches on his computer.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the online user and entered findings of guilt on both counts.

Arthur John Blackwood was convicted of production of marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of ammunition while prohibited.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior criminal record for similar offences, and mitigating factors such as cooperation with police and remorse.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of 402 days (after credit for pre-trial custody) and ordered forfeiture of offence-related property, including the net proceeds from the sale of his home, finding the forfeiture not disproportionate given the nature and gravity of the offences and his criminal record.

Arthur John Blackwood was charged with multiple offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Criminal Code.

He pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana (Count 3) and was deemed to have pleaded guilty to production of marijuana (Count 1).

The trial proceeded on charges of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking (Count 2), possession of ammunition while prohibited (Count 5), and possession of proceeds of crime (Count 6).

The court found Blackwood guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking based on his statements, lack of conventional income, and the large quantity of marijuana and plants.

He was found not guilty of possession of proceeds of crime due to insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

He was found guilty of possession of ammunition, as his ownership of the residence and knowledge of the ammunition constituted "control" despite his argument that he did not bring it into the house.

The accused, Devyn Barclay, was detained by police based on a confidential informant's tip after disembarking a train with two large black suitcases.

Despite officers not detecting a marijuana odour, a police dog later indicated positively on the suitcases, leading to Barclay's arrest and the discovery of 33 pounds of marijuana.

Barclay challenged his investigative detention, the warrantless search, and arrest as violations of his Charter rights (sections 7, 8, and 9).

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity based on the compelling, credible, and corroborated informant's tip, justifying the detention and canine search.

The subsequent arrest and search incidental to arrest were also deemed lawful.

Barclay was found guilty of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and breaching a probation order.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence obtained through a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act search warrant, alleging violations of s. 8 of the Charter.

The accused argued that information supporting subsequent warrants was derived from an improper earlier search and from unreliable confidential informants.

The court found the police observations of marijuana material inside an open shed were lawfully obtained and fell within the plain view doctrine, and that the accused had only a limited expectation of privacy in the shed.

Even if the disputed information were removed from the Informations to Obtain, sufficient remaining evidence supported reasonable and probable grounds for the subsequent warrants.

The court held the warrants were valid and the seized evidence admissible.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings pending the provision of state-funded counsel following the denial of legal aid, relying on ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and seeking a Rowbotham order.

The court accepted that legal aid had been finally refused but held the applicant failed to establish indigence due to incomplete and unreliable financial disclosure, unexplained deposits, asset ownership, and lack of corroborating evidence regarding claimed financial limitations.

The court also concluded that the fraud prosecution, involving cheque transactions and documentary evidence, was not legally complex and could proceed fairly with a self‑represented accused supported by interpretation and trial management by the court.

As the applicant failed to satisfy the prerequisites for a Rowbotham order, the application was dismissed.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to cross‑examine the affiant officer and to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant authorizing a search of his residence for offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused argued that the warrant was issued without reasonable grounds because the Information to Obtain relied heavily on unproven confidential informants whose reliability had not been sufficiently established.

The court held that cross‑examination of the affiant was unnecessary because it would not assist in determining whether the authorizing justice could have granted the warrant.

Applying the totality of the circumstances approach from Debot, the court found that the informant information was compelling, credible, and corroborated by police investigation including background checks and electricity consumption data.

The search warrant was therefore valid and the Charter application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.