Sarah Burton

The applicant, Boysie Alexander Murray, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence of a loaded firearm and cocaine seized during a police investigation.

He argued that the police arbitrarily detained him, used excessive force, and failed to provide his rights to counsel, all influenced by racial profiling.

The court found multiple serious Charter breaches, including shocking physical violence involving repeated taser use to the applicant's genital region.

Consequently, the court granted the Charter motion and excluded all seized evidence under section 24(2).

The court sentenced K.P. to 16 years in custody for attempted murder and related offences arising from a pattern of intimate partner violence, including multiple attempts to poison the complainant with fentanyl and hiring a hitman to kill her.

The decision details the facts found by the jury, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the harsh pre-sentence custody conditions experienced by the offender.

The court considered the offender’s mental health and addictions, but found his moral blameworthiness to be high due to planning, deliberation, and lack of remorse.

The sentence was reduced from 21 to 16 years to account for the particularly harsh pre-trial detention conditions.

The accused, previously found not criminally responsible for assault and uttering threats, appeared before the Ontario Review Board for an annual review.

The accused has a diagnosis of schizophrenia and stimulant use disorder, both in sustained remission.

The treatment team and all parties recommended an absolute discharge, noting the accused's years of stability, medication compliance, and successful community integration.

Applying the Winko threshold, the Board found the accused no longer poses a significant threat to public safety and ordered an absolute discharge.

The Ontario Review Board conducted an annual review of the disposition for an accused found not criminally responsible for assault and weapons offences.

The accused, who suffers from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, has been living in the community in supported housing and has been compliant with his medication under supervision.

However, he lacks insight into his illness and has stated he would discontinue medication if no longer under the Board's jurisdiction.

The Board accepted expert evidence that discontinuation of medication would likely lead to an exacerbation of psychotic symptoms and an increased risk of violence.

The Board found the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety but concluded his risk could be safely managed under a less restrictive conditional discharge, subject to terms including a consent to treatment condition.

This is a summary conviction appeal decision in which Richard Khan appealed his conviction for assault.

The trial judge had acquitted Mr. Khan on a 2015 count but convicted him on a 2019 count, sentencing him to an eight-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, Mr. Khan alleged the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to give sufficient reasons, and misapplied the W.(D.) test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Superior Court found no misapprehension of evidence, no error in the trial judge’s treatment of the evidence or factual findings, and that the reasons for judgment were sufficient.

The court emphasized the deference owed to trial judges’ factual findings and credibility assessments, and clarified the proper application of the W.(D.) test.

The defendant, S.K., facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, brought a second application for the presiding judge to recuse due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The defendant, self-represented, presented evidence including witness testimony and his own perceptions, arguing that the judge had shown bias against him.

The judge, G.P. Renwick, acknowledged several factors contributing to a reasonable apprehension of bias, including a former counsel's comment about the judge's perceived pro-Crown tendency, the judge's failure to adequately explain procedural matters to the self-represented defendant, and the defendant's genuine belief of bias.

The judge granted the application, recusing himself to ensure the appearance of justice and a fair trial.

The offender, M.S., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault against his stepdaughter, SLF.

This was a re-sentencing after a successful appeal of an earlier conviction.

The court addressed two main issues: whether the Crown proved both alleged acts of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt (the "apartment incident" and the "house incident"), and whether the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, justified a departure from the four-year sentence imposed at the first trial.

The court found both incidents proven, discrediting a defence witness's testimony.

It also determined that Friesen rendered the original sentence unfit, as it emphasized higher sentences for sexual offences against children, particularly adolescents, and the primacy of denunciation and deterrence.

The court imposed a sentence of seven years' imprisonment, along with various ancillary orders.

In a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations of sexual interference and sexual assault against a child during parenting visits, the court acquitted the accused.

Although the complainant was found to be honest and attempting to tell the truth, the court held that her evidence was not sufficiently reliable because of significant memory limitations and material inconsistencies on central aspects of the alleged incidents.

A second youth witness had previously recanted her allegations to police and later adopted a contrary account, creating serious credibility and reliability concerns.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard, the court held the Crown had not proven either count beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender was found guilty of sexual assault, assault, and uttering threats against his former intimate partner.

Prior to sentencing, the offender absconded and the sentencing proceeded in his absence.

The court emphasized the gravity of the sexual assault, which involved forced penetration, and the aggravating context of intimate partner violence.

The offender was sentenced to a global term of 5 years imprisonment, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, a no-contact order, and a 20-year SOIRA registration.

This ruling addresses a proposed jury instruction in a sexual interference trial concerning the complainant's memory.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility based on memory inconsistencies, arguing that judicial notice of traumatic memory principles should be limited.

The Crown sought an instruction to provide the jury with an alternative explanation for memory problems in traumatic contexts.

The court ruled to include the instruction, finding it necessary for the jury to properly evaluate the complainant's credibility and reliability, particularly regarding how traumatic experiences can affect perception and recall, and that such principles are properly subject to judicial notice based on established appellate case law.

The accused, Peyton Brown, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained during an investigative detention, search, and subsequent arrest, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges included possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and other related offences.

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect the individuals were connected to a criminal offence involving a firearm, justifying the investigative detention.

Furthermore, the court found that the firearm was observed prior to any pat-down search, and even if a search had occurred, it would have been reasonable for officer safety.

Consequently, no Charter violations were found, and the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant, facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, brought a s. 7 Charter application alleging disclosure failures by the prosecution and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found that the defendant had not been diligent in pursuing disclosure, having failed to avail himself of opportunities to view sensitive materials and having received notes of statements.

The court determined there was no breach of the defendant's s. 7 Charter right.

Even if there had been a delay in disclosure, it was not a "clearest of cases" warranting a stay, particularly given the defendant's lack of diligence in accessing the available information.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, S.K., facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, brought an application for the trial judge to recuse himself due to an apprehension of bias.

The application was based on the judge's comments during case management and pre-trial hearings, and a prior email from S.K.'s former counsel suggesting the judge was biased towards the Crown.

The court applied the objective test for reasonable apprehension of bias, which requires substantial and cogent evidence from the perspective of a reasonable observer.

The judge found no actual or perceived bias, noting the defendant's tendency for exaggeration and instances where the court had ruled in the defendant's favour or was critical of the prosecutor.

The application was dismissed without prejudice, with the court emphasizing that appellate courts are best placed to determine such applications after a trial's completion.

The defendant, S.K., facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, renewed his application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court had previously dismissed a similar application.

The renewed application focused on the calculation of delay, particularly when the "Jordan clock" begins, and whether the defendant waived or caused any delay by terminating counsel and seeking an adjournment.

The court, bound by appellate precedent, ruled that the s. 11(b) clock begins when the Information is sworn, not upon arrest.

It found that the defendant was responsible for the additional delay caused by his actions.

The total net delay was calculated at 14 months and 4 days, well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

She was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of her running vehicle after an argument with her boyfriend.

The trial judge found she failed to rebut the presumption of operation and that there was a realistic risk she would set the vehicle in motion.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge engaged in speculative reasoning and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and that the reasons for judgment were adequate.

The accused, S.C., brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The court calculated the total delay, subtracted defence-caused delay (including failure to follow up on disclosure and counsel unavailability for earlier trial dates), and accounted for exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and did not establish that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, especially considering the pandemic's impact on the justice system.

The accused was charged with multiple sexual offences relating to alleged conduct toward a young complainant while she stayed at his home during school holidays.

The court assessed credibility primarily through the W.(D.) framework, focusing on inconsistencies and corroborating details in the testimony of the complainant, the accused, and family members.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence that the accused briefly touched her vagina under the pretext of applying ointment, establishing sexual assault and sexual interference beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court was left with reasonable doubt regarding other alleged sexual touching during a movie and regarding whether pornography shown to the complainant was intended to facilitate sexual exploitation.

The accused was convicted on two counts and acquitted on the remaining counts.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault and uttering death threats against his wife.

The trial was a credibility contest where both parties testified to diametrically opposed accounts of a domestic dispute.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, relying in part on the complainant's after-the-fact emotional state as corroborative evidence.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the emotional state evidence was equally consistent with both accounts and therefore possessed no probative value.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant, a high school principal charged with offences relating to an alleged hug and kiss of a young person, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 19 months and 20 days.

The court deducted approximately 5 months of delay solely attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and a brief period of defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 14 months, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court then considered whether the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

Although the court found that the defendant took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and criticized the prosecution for a lack of diligence, it ultimately concluded that the 14-month net delay was not inordinate given the serious nature of the charges and the typical intake periods.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with assault and uttering death threats against his wife.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the defendant, applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The court found the complainant's testimony truthful and accurate, supported by circumstantial evidence, and rejected the defendant's testimony as internally inconsistent, unreliable, and untruthful.

The defendant was found guilty of both charges.