Sarah Burton

The court sentenced K.P. to 16 years in custody for attempted murder and related offences arising from a pattern of intimate partner violence, including multiple attempts to poison the complainant with fentanyl and hiring a hitman to kill her.

The decision details the facts found by the jury, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the harsh pre-sentence custody conditions experienced by the offender.

The court considered the offender’s mental health and addictions, but found his moral blameworthiness to be high due to planning, deliberation, and lack of remorse.

The sentence was reduced from 21 to 16 years to account for the particularly harsh pre-trial detention conditions.

This is a summary conviction appeal decision in which Richard Khan appealed his conviction for assault.

The trial judge had acquitted Mr. Khan on a 2015 count but convicted him on a 2019 count, sentencing him to an eight-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, Mr. Khan alleged the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to give sufficient reasons, and misapplied the W.(D.) test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Superior Court found no misapprehension of evidence, no error in the trial judge’s treatment of the evidence or factual findings, and that the reasons for judgment were sufficient.

The court emphasized the deference owed to trial judges’ factual findings and credibility assessments, and clarified the proper application of the W.(D.) test.

The defendant, S.K., facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, brought a second application for the presiding judge to recuse due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The defendant, self-represented, presented evidence including witness testimony and his own perceptions, arguing that the judge had shown bias against him.

The judge, G.P. Renwick, acknowledged several factors contributing to a reasonable apprehension of bias, including a former counsel's comment about the judge's perceived pro-Crown tendency, the judge's failure to adequately explain procedural matters to the self-represented defendant, and the defendant's genuine belief of bias.

The judge granted the application, recusing himself to ensure the appearance of justice and a fair trial.

The offender, M.S., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault against his stepdaughter, SLF.

This was a re-sentencing after a successful appeal of an earlier conviction.

The court addressed two main issues: whether the Crown proved both alleged acts of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt (the "apartment incident" and the "house incident"), and whether the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, justified a departure from the four-year sentence imposed at the first trial.

The court found both incidents proven, discrediting a defence witness's testimony.

It also determined that Friesen rendered the original sentence unfit, as it emphasized higher sentences for sexual offences against children, particularly adolescents, and the primacy of denunciation and deterrence.

The court imposed a sentence of seven years' imprisonment, along with various ancillary orders.

This ruling addresses a proposed jury instruction in a sexual interference trial concerning the complainant's memory.

The defence challenged the complainant's credibility based on memory inconsistencies, arguing that judicial notice of traumatic memory principles should be limited.

The Crown sought an instruction to provide the jury with an alternative explanation for memory problems in traumatic contexts.

The court ruled to include the instruction, finding it necessary for the jury to properly evaluate the complainant's credibility and reliability, particularly regarding how traumatic experiences can affect perception and recall, and that such principles are properly subject to judicial notice based on established appellate case law.

The accused, Peyton Brown, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained during an investigative detention, search, and subsequent arrest, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges included possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and other related offences.

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect the individuals were connected to a criminal offence involving a firearm, justifying the investigative detention.

Furthermore, the court found that the firearm was observed prior to any pat-down search, and even if a search had occurred, it would have been reasonable for officer safety.

Consequently, no Charter violations were found, and the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant, facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, brought a s. 7 Charter application alleging disclosure failures by the prosecution and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found that the defendant had not been diligent in pursuing disclosure, having failed to avail himself of opportunities to view sensitive materials and having received notes of statements.

The court determined there was no breach of the defendant's s. 7 Charter right.

Even if there had been a delay in disclosure, it was not a "clearest of cases" warranting a stay, particularly given the defendant's lack of diligence in accessing the available information.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, S.K., facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, brought an application for the trial judge to recuse himself due to an apprehension of bias.

The application was based on the judge's comments during case management and pre-trial hearings, and a prior email from S.K.'s former counsel suggesting the judge was biased towards the Crown.

The court applied the objective test for reasonable apprehension of bias, which requires substantial and cogent evidence from the perspective of a reasonable observer.

The judge found no actual or perceived bias, noting the defendant's tendency for exaggeration and instances where the court had ruled in the defendant's favour or was critical of the prosecutor.

The application was dismissed without prejudice, with the court emphasizing that appellate courts are best placed to determine such applications after a trial's completion.

The defendant, S.K., facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, renewed his application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court had previously dismissed a similar application.

The renewed application focused on the calculation of delay, particularly when the "Jordan clock" begins, and whether the defendant waived or caused any delay by terminating counsel and seeking an adjournment.

The court, bound by appellate precedent, ruled that the s. 11(b) clock begins when the Information is sworn, not upon arrest.

It found that the defendant was responsible for the additional delay caused by his actions.

The total net delay was calculated at 14 months and 4 days, well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, S.C., brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The court calculated the total delay, subtracted defence-caused delay (including failure to follow up on disclosure and counsel unavailability for earlier trial dates), and accounted for exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and did not establish that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, especially considering the pandemic's impact on the justice system.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault and uttering death threats against his wife.

The trial was a credibility contest where both parties testified to diametrically opposed accounts of a domestic dispute.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, relying in part on the complainant's after-the-fact emotional state as corroborative evidence.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the emotional state evidence was equally consistent with both accounts and therefore possessed no probative value.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant was charged with assault and uttering death threats against his wife.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the defendant, applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The court found the complainant's testimony truthful and accurate, supported by circumstantial evidence, and rejected the defendant's testimony as internally inconsistent, unreliable, and untruthful.

The defendant was found guilty of both charges.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a client.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and erred in assessing credibility and the defence of mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge improperly used the complainant's prior police statement and absence of embellishment to bolster her credibility, and failed to make necessary factual findings regarding the appellant's evidence and whether he took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused, Mr. Singh, was charged with possession of stolen property and dangerous driving.

The court considered two main issues: identification for the dangerous driving charge and knowledge/control for the possession charge.

The Crown had to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the identification evidence for dangerous driving unreliable due to its generic nature, the fleeting opportunity for observation, and the delay in the officer's note-taking, leading to an acquittal on that count.

For the possession charge, despite the doctrine of recent possession and the accused providing a false name, the court found no evidence that Mr. Singh had control over the stolen vehicle, as he was merely a passenger.

Consequently, Mr. Singh was acquitted on both counts.