Ahmad Farid Karzai

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after punching the complainant multiple times in the face following a slap, rendering the complainant unconscious and causing significant facial injuries.

The trial was re-opened to permit a third-party witness to testify, but her evidence was rejected as neither credible nor reliable due to her intoxicated state.

On summary conviction appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: uneven scrutiny of defence-led evidence, misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant striking the appellant in the back of the head, and failure to properly apply R. v. W.(D.).

The appeal court found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, no misapprehension of material evidence, and no W.D. error, as the substance of the reasonable doubt instruction was respected throughout the reasons.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant, David Holden, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000 and money laundering, and his 12-year sentence, in relation to a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge impermissibly inferred guilt from fabricated evidence.

The sentence appeal challenged the application of aggravating factors and sought a reduction due to COVID-19 incarceration conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the conviction and upholding the sentence as fit given the extensive aggravating circumstances, including the large scale of the fraud, its devastating impact on victims, and the appellant's history of similar offenses.

The appellant pleaded guilty to theft over $5,000 after taking $317,000 from his elderly godmother.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment followed by two years of probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in finding a conditional sentence was inappropriate given his restitution, remorse, and loss of professional license.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation could not be met by a conditional sentence.

This decision addresses a s. 11(b) Charter application to stay impaired driving charges due to unreasonable delay.

The court found 566 days (18.6 months) of net delay, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials established in R. v. Jordan.

The delay was attributed to issues with primary disclosure (cells video) and systemic court unavailability, including the closure of a courthouse due to structural issues, which was deemed not an exceptional circumstance.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the accused's refusal to waive his right to an in-person trial constituted defence delay, finding that a remote trial was not functionally feasible.

Consequently, the charges were stayed.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a client.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and erred in assessing credibility and the defence of mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge improperly used the complainant's prior police statement and absence of embellishment to bolster her credibility, and failed to make necessary factual findings regarding the appellant's evidence and whether he took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown brought an omnibus application in an in-person criminal trial seeking orders to permit two civilian witnesses to testify remotely under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code and for the prosecutor to participate remotely under section 715.25(2) of the Code.

The court granted the applications, finding that the Crown had met its onus, considering the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the witnesses' health and fear of the accused, and the capacity for remote testimony to ensure a fair and efficient proceeding.

This ruling addresses the scope of preliminary inquiries following the amendments introduced by Bill C-75 to the Criminal Code.

The defendants, jointly charged with numerous counts, including offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more and those punishable by less, sought a preliminary inquiry for all charges.

The Crown argued that preliminary inquiry jurisdiction is now limited to offences carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years or more.

The court, aligning with previous decisions in R. v. Davis and R. v. M.R., held that preliminary inquiries are restricted to charges attracting a potential sentence of 14 years' imprisonment or more, even when grouped with less serious charges arising from the same transaction.

The court clarified that while questions about less serious charges might be permitted if closely linked to the serious ones, the court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary inquiry or order a discharge for offences punishable by less than 14 years.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent had fled a car accident and was found hiding in her parents' shed after police conducted a warrantless search of her own home next door.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's finding that the warrantless search of the respondent's home violated s. 8 and was sufficiently connected to the discovery of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial on charges of carrying a concealed weapon and aggravated assault, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors.

The applicant had brandished a firearm during a domestic dispute, causing the complainant to flee down a staircase and break her ankle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge made no jurisdictional errors, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer the weapon had been concealed and that the applicant's actions were a significant contributing cause to the complainant's injuries with objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm.