Shawn Michael Benjamin Ford

The defendants brought a motion for leave to cross-examine the affiant who obtained a search warrant, and a disclosure motion requesting all source documents for the investigation.

The Crown opposed both motions.

The court dismissed the disclosure motion as untimely and lacking focus, noting that disclosure had been deemed complete at a prior judicial pretrial and the parties had confirmed readiness to proceed.

The court also dismissed the motion for leave to cross-examine, finding that the defendants failed to identify any material misrepresentations, errors, or omissions in the Information to Obtain that would undermine the grounds for issuance of the warrant.

The court emphasized that cross-examination is only permitted in narrow circumstances where the defendant demonstrates a basis for believing the cross-examination will elicit evidence tending to discredit a precondition for the authorization.

The accused brought a motion for a change of venue for a jury trial on impaired driving charges, arguing that significant pre-trial publicity and community hostility in the Niagara/Welland area would prevent a fair trial.

The court applied the two-part test, requiring the defence to prove a reasonable likelihood of partiality or prejudice that cannot be overcome by judicial safeguards.

The court found that while there was some media coverage and a petition, the evidence did not establish widespread hostility or prejudice in the large community that could not be mitigated by jury screening and other trial protections.

The application was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the scope of preliminary inquiries following the amendments introduced by Bill C-75 to the Criminal Code.

The defendants, jointly charged with numerous counts, including offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more and those punishable by less, sought a preliminary inquiry for all charges.

The Crown argued that preliminary inquiry jurisdiction is now limited to offences carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years or more.

The court, aligning with previous decisions in R. v. Davis and R. v. M.R., held that preliminary inquiries are restricted to charges attracting a potential sentence of 14 years' imprisonment or more, even when grouped with less serious charges arising from the same transaction.

The court clarified that while questions about less serious charges might be permitted if closely linked to the serious ones, the court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary inquiry or order a discharge for offences punishable by less than 14 years.

The defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his wife and failure to comply with probation.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's testimony that the defendant ejaculated on her face without consent while standing over her and calling her derogatory names.

The trial judge found the complainant to be an unreliable witness due to serious credibility issues, including memory gaps regarding key dates, inconsistencies between her trial testimony and prior statements to police and the 911 dispatcher, evidence of significant alcohol abuse affecting her judgment and memory, and contradictions regarding her intoxication on the night in question.

The court found that while the complainant appeared sincere, sincerity alone does not establish reliability.

The defendant was acquitted on both charges.

The defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking in fentanyl.

On two occasions in January and February 2018, the defendant sold fentanyl patches from her prescription to another individual, totaling 18 patches of 25 micrograms each.

The Crown sought three years in penitentiary while the defence sought one year in reformatory.

The court imposed a sentence of one year in jail followed by one year of probation, considering the defendant's extraordinary personal circumstances, including a history of childhood sexual abuse, multiple mental and physical health conditions, genuine remorse, and lack of prior custody, balanced against the serious danger posed by fentanyl trafficking and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The applicants, Marco Maone and Carlo Fazzari, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in their criminal trial.

The court applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases, as established in R. v. Jordan, finding the 29-month delay to the anticipated trial completion to be reasonable.

The court rejected the argument that a preferred indictment should trigger an 18-month ceiling.

It also found that Maone failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings, while Fazzari, despite some efforts, did not establish that the case took 'markedly longer' than it should have, considering the complexity of the multi-accused drug trafficking investigation.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

A First Nations woman pleaded guilty to multiple drinking and driving offences and related charges.

The court found that Ontario's failure to proclaim the curative discharge provision violated the equality rights of Indigenous offenders under the Charter.

The court applied a remedial approach under s. 24(1) of the Charter and granted curative discharges on the impaired driving counts, finding that intensive culturally-based treatment through an accredited NNADAP facility was in the public interest.

The decision emphasizes the intergenerational trauma stemming from residential schools and the need for a realistic, progressive approach to assessing treatment success for Indigenous offenders.

The applicant, an Aboriginal woman from the Mississauga First Nation, entered guilty pleas to drinking and driving offences and sought a curative discharge as a remedy for alleged Charter violations.

She argued that Ontario's failure to proclaim section 255(5) of the Criminal Code—which permits curative discharges for impaired driving offences—violated her equality rights under section 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the provincial policy created differential treatment of Aboriginal offenders by denying them access to restorative sentencing options mandated by section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the non-proclamation constituted systemic discrimination against Indigenous persons and violated their equality rights, which were not saved by section 1 of the Charter.

The court granted a remedy permitting consideration of a curative discharge.