Todd Ducharme

The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and failure to provide necessaries of life to a child.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings due to a 21-month delay between the appellant's arrest and the trial date.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the delay did not infringe the appellant's right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was defective.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied its decision in R. v. Rhee and found no reason to interfere with the majority of the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the charge was in substantial compliance with the principles articulated in Lifchus.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence, arguing primarily that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus jury instruction on reasonable doubt contained reversible error.

The majority held that although the charge improperly suggested reasonable doubt had its ordinary meaning and failed to state that probable guilt was insufficient, the charge as a whole substantially complied with Lifchus because it strongly linked reasonable doubt to the presumption of innocence and clearly framed the self-defence issue.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial on the basis that the combined misdirection and non-direction created a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the burden of proof.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had allowed a Crown appeal from an acquittal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge stated a conclusion before the trial was completed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal's reasons for ordering a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and choking with intent to commit an indictable offence.

At trial, the Crown called rebuttal evidence to counter the appellant's alibi, which also served as similar fact evidence going to identity.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Crown improperly split its case, the verdict was unreasonable, and the Crown abused its stand-by power to empanel an all-female jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Crown improperly split its case by adducing evidence in rebuttal that should have been presented in its case in chief, prejudicing the defence.

The Crown appealed a decision setting aside robbery convictions on the basis that the trial judge gave no reasons for ruling incriminating statements admissible on a voir dire.

Applying the governing principle from Burns, the Court held that the absence of reasons is not, by itself, a ground of appeal where the finding is supportable on the evidence or its basis is apparent from the circumstances.

The only issue on the voir dire was credibility, and the ruling made clear that the trial judge rejected the accused's evidence.

The Court also found no error in law in the jury charge and restored the convictions.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and received a mandatory firearms prohibition under the Criminal Code.

Before his appeal was heard, the Criminal Code was amended to make the prohibition discretionary.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'adjudged' in section 44(e) of the Interpretation Act includes appellate review of a sentence.

Therefore, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment provided by the amended legislation.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the trial judge.