Todd Ducharme

The applicant, Matthew Blake, sought to exclude evidence obtained via search warrants for his residence and vehicle, arguing a Section 8 Charter violation due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court found that while there were reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was a drug trafficker, the ITO lacked specific grounds to believe evidence would be found at his residence, relying instead on generalized assumptions about drug traffickers.

This violated the applicant's Section 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant test, the court weighed the seriousness of the state conduct (lack of specific grounds for search), the high impact on the applicant's privacy in his home, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Despite the reliability and criticality of the evidence, the court concluded that admitting it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude the evidence was granted.

Josiph Cardle, charged with first-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The court considered the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

While the gravity of the offence and potential sentence were significant, the court found no substantial likelihood of flight or risk to public safety.

Crucially, the court determined that the apparent strength of the Crown's case for first-degree murder was not strong, citing issues with causation and the accused's understanding of the oxygen machine's role.

The court also emphasized that poverty and homelessness should not be a basis for detention.

Cardle was released on a recognizance with conditions, without a surety or fixed residential address.

The appellant, Andrew Singh, appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The trial judge had found no breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice, or alternatively, that breathalyzer readings would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The appeal court found that police *did* violate Singh's s. 10(b) rights by failing to make adequate efforts to connect him with his counsel of choice and defaulting to duty counsel without asking.

However, applying the R. v. Grant framework for s. 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter breach to be moderately serious, the impact on Singh's protected interests minor (as he received legal advice and did not complain), and society's interest in adjudication on the merits high.

Consequently, the breathalyzer results were admitted, and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Jason Bartley, charged with firearms offences, sought to introduce evidence regarding two confidential informants who received benefits contingent on arrests or discovery of illegal items.

The Crown objected on grounds of lack of notice, "innocence at stake" requirements, and lack of "air of reality" to the third-party suspect defence.

The court dismissed the Crown's objections, finding that the evidence was logically relevant to the underlying facts of the offence and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its minimal prejudicial effect.

The defendant challenged a telewarrant used to search his residence, alleging a Section 8 Charter violation due to an incorrect address on the warrant and a missing appendix.

The court found the warrant facially invalid due to the address error, constituting a Section 8 breach.

However, applying the R. v. Grant test, the court declined to exclude the seized evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and critical to the Crown's case.

The sub-facial attack on the warrant was rejected, and a judicial summary of redacted ITO portions was deemed adequate.

The accused, Shevon McKitty and Celdon Parris-Thompson, were charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, R.H., had incomplete memory due to blackouts from intoxication but clearly expressed non-consent to sexual intercourse.

The court found that R.H. did not lack the capacity to consent to any sexual contact but explicitly withheld consent for sexual intercourse.

McKitty was found guilty of sexual assault for engaging in intercourse after R.H.'s clear non-consent.

Parris-Thompson was found guilty of sexual assault for physically pressing into R.H. and attempting penetration despite her verbal and physical resistance.

Neither accused was found to be a party to the other's offence.

The accused, O.K., was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, S.H., testified that the sexual contact (oral sex and vaginal penetration) occurred without her consent while she was heavily intoxicated.

The accused claimed consensual activity and honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court disbelieved the accused's testimony, finding his claims of consent and lack of awareness of intoxication to be untrue and lacking an air of reality.

The court accepted the complainant's account, finding her memory issues due to intoxication did not undermine her credibility regarding the assault itself.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicant, Irina Gordon, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of her right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 33 months and 3 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

However, the court deducted 6 months and 2 days attributable to defence waiver, bringing the net delay to 27 months and 1 day, which is below the Jordan ceiling.

The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

Furthermore, as a transitional case, the Crown satisfied the court that the delay was justified based on reasonable reliance on the pre-Jordan law (R. v. Morin guidelines), under which the actionable delay was less than the 18-month guideline.

The application was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud over $5,000 arising from a scheme in which he falsely held himself out as a sophisticated investment professional and induced vulnerable investors to entrust him with funds.

The frauds targeted elderly and financially unsophisticated victims and resulted in losses exceeding $1.1 million.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as the dominant sentencing objectives in large-scale commercial fraud, noting the offender’s manipulative conduct, breach of trust, and devastating impact on victims.

Although the offender had no prior criminal record and entered a guilty plea, the court found a penitentiary sentence necessary.

The court also ordered restitution in the full amount of the victims’ losses despite limited prospects of repayment, emphasizing the seriousness of the breach of trust and the victims’ interests.