Gérard V. La Forest

The plaintiffs sought damages for economic loss and property damage after a fire broke out on an oil drilling rig.

The fire was caused by arcing in a heat trace system that ignited inflammable Thermaclad wrap.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the manufacturer, Raychem, breached its duty to warn the rig owner of the product's inflammability and could not rely on the learned intermediary defence.

However, the builder, SJSL, was shielded from liability by an exclusion clause in its contract with the owner.

The Court declined to allow the rig's lessees to recover contractual relational economic loss due to policy concerns over indeterminate liability.

Finally, the Court abolished the common law maritime rule that contributory negligence acts as a complete bar to recovery, allowing the rig owner to recover 40% of its damages despite being 60% at fault.

Appeal in a major Aboriginal title claim involving hereditary chiefs asserting rights over a large area of British Columbia.

The Court held that Aboriginal title is a sui generis right in land protected by s. 35(1), conferring exclusive use and occupation for a variety of purposes subject to an inherent limit against uses irreconcilable with the group’s attachment to the land.

The Court also held that oral histories must be given due weight in Aboriginal litigation and that the trial judge erred in his treatment of such evidence, requiring a new trial.

On the cross-appeal, the Court held that the province lacked constitutional authority after 1871 to extinguish Aboriginal rights, either directly or through s. 88 of the Indian Act.

The Crown and the Attorney General of Canada applied to extend the stay of a previous Supreme Court of Canada judgment regarding the requirement of a warrant to effect an arrest in a dwelling.

The Court granted the motion, extending the stay to December 19, 1997, or until Bill C-16 receives Royal Assent, whichever occurs first.

The appellant agency sought an order to detain a pregnant woman who was addicted to glue sniffing in a health centre for treatment until the birth of her child, to prevent harm to the unborn child.

The superior court judge granted the order under the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, but it was set aside on appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the agency's appeal, holding that neither the law of tort nor the parens patriae jurisdiction recognizes an unborn child as a legal person possessing rights.

The Court concluded that extending the law to permit the detention of a pregnant woman to protect her fetus would involve major policy changes and complex ramifications that are best left to the legislature.

The appellant municipality appealed a judgment invalidating a residence requirement imposed on permanent municipal employees and ordering the respondent’s reinstatement and damages.

A majority of the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the requirement unjustifiably infringed the respondent’s right to privacy under s. 5 of the Quebec Charter, while one set of reasons also held that municipalities are subject to the Canadian Charter and that the requirement violated s. 7 liberty.

The Court held that the decision where to establish one’s home is a fundamentally personal choice protected from unjustified interference and that the municipality’s objectives were insufficient or disproportionate.

The respondent’s cross-appeal seeking additional interim damages was also dismissed because the damages were not properly quantified and the Court of Appeal committed no reversible procedural error.

The appellant insurance companies used an agent to collect premiums.

The agent deposited the premiums into a general bank account with the respondent bank.

The bank subsequently transferred funds from this account to the agent's parent company's account to reduce an overdraft, leaving the agent unable to remit the premiums to the appellants.

The appellants sued the bank for breach of trust.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was liable as a constructive trustee under the 'knowing receipt' head of liability, as it received trust property for its own benefit and had constructive knowledge of the breach of trust.

The appellant, a beneficiary of an estate, sued the respondent bank seeking a declaration that a guarantee given to the bank by an estate company was invalid.

The guarantee was authorized by the appellant's uncle, who held a power of attorney for the appellant and was a co-executor.

The bank required the guarantee to secure a loan to the uncle's personal company.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the bank was not liable for knowing assistance because it lacked actual knowledge of the breach of trust, relying on a legal opinion letter.

The majority also held that the bank was not liable for knowing receipt, as it acted reasonably in the circumstances and had no duty to inquire further or require the appellant to obtain independent legal advice.

The appellant was induced to leave secure employment and worked for the respondent for 14 years before being summarily discharged without explanation.

The employer maintained allegations of cause until the start of the trial.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, sued for wrongful dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an undischarged bankrupt can maintain an action for wrongful dismissal because damages in lieu of notice constitute exempt 'salary, wages or other remuneration' under the Bankruptcy Act.

The Court also held that while there is no separate tort of 'bad faith discharge', employers have an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the manner of dismissal.

Breach of this obligation, as occurred here, justifies an extension of the reasonable notice period.

The trial judge's award of 24 months' notice was restored.

The appellants, deaf patients, challenged the failure of British Columbia’s publicly funded health care scheme to provide sign language interpreters where necessary for effective communication in medical settings.

The Court held that although the impugned statutes were not unconstitutional on their face, the Charter applied to hospitals and the Medical Services Commission when they implemented the statutory medicare program.

The failure to provide interpretation where necessary denied deaf persons the equal benefit of the law under s. 15(1) by creating adverse effects discrimination in access to insured medical services.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 because the government failed to show that a total denial of medical interpretation minimally impaired equality rights.

A declaration was granted, suspended for six months, directing the province to administer the legislation consistently with s. 15(1).

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of provisions in Quebec's Referendum Act that limited spending by independent individuals and groups during a referendum campaign.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions infringed the freedoms of expression and association guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

While the objective of ensuring fairness and equality in the referendum process was pressing and substantial, the strict limits on independent spending failed the minimal impairment test.

The Court found that the exceptions for unregulated expenses were too restrictive and amounted to a near-total ban on independent political expression.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The appellant, a black youth, was acquitted of assaulting a police officer after the Youth Court Judge accepted his testimony over the conflicting testimony of the white arresting officer.

In her oral reasons, the judge remarked that police officers have been known to overreact when dealing with non-white groups.

The Crown appealed, arguing these comments raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the judge's comments, viewed in context by a reasonable and informed person aware of the social reality of racism, did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias but rather reflected an appropriate recognition of the social context.

The appellants sought judicial review to quash notices of potential findings of misconduct issued by the Commissioner of the Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada.

The appellants argued the Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction by making findings that amounted to civil or criminal liability, and that the late delivery of the notices breached procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a commissioner may make findings of misconduct and evaluate facts according to standards of conduct, provided they do not amount to conclusions of legal liability.

The Court also found the procedural protections afforded to the parties were extensive and the timing of the notices was fair given the complexity of the inquiry.

The appellants faced citizenship revocation proceedings for allegedly concealing their involvement in WWII atrocities.

Due to delays in the Federal Court Trial Division, a senior Department of Justice official met privately with the Chief Justice of the Federal Court to express concern.

The Chief Justice then spoke to the Associate Chief Justice handling the cases, who subsequently expedited the schedule.

The appellants successfully moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that this ex parte communication compromised judicial independence.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that while the appearance of judicial independence was significantly compromised, a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy.

The Court directed that the cases proceed before a different judge, balancing the affront to judicial independence against society's pressing interest in seeing alleged war criminals brought to justice.

The police stopped a car for speeding and, after the driver could not produce documentation, conducted a computer check.

While waiting, the officer questioned the passenger and noticed garbage bags full of new clothing with price tags in the back seat and trunk.

The driver and passenger were charged with possession of stolen property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the passenger had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the bags.

Although the search violated the driver's section 8 Charter rights, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) because the breach was minimal, the evidence was reliable, and its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellants sought an extension of time and a re-hearing on the issue of costs following an appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the applications and awarded costs of the appeal, the application to extend time, and the re-hearing to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the rejection of his citizenship application.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, quashed the Registrar's decision, and directed that the application be dealt with in accordance with its reasons for judgment.

The Court declared certain words in section 5(2)(b) of the Citizenship Act inoperative and ordered that several other sections of the Act and Regulations be read without reference to section 5(2)(b).

The accused, a stockbroker, was convicted of fraud after a jury trial.

The trial judge instructed the jury that 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' should be understood in its 'ordinary, natural every day sense'.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the jury charge insufficient.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that trial judges must explain the concept of reasonable doubt to juries.

The Court provided a model charge, emphasizing that reasonable doubt is inextricably linked to the presumption of innocence, is not an ordinary everyday concept, and must be based on reason and common sense rather than sympathy or prejudice.

The trial judge's failure to properly define the standard of proof was a fundamental error that could not be saved by the curative proviso.

The appeal concerned the constitutional validity of federal toxic-substances provisions and an interim order limiting PCB releases after a prosecution for alleged discharge into a river.

The majority held that environmental protection through prohibitions against toxic substances is a legitimate criminal law purpose and that Part II of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act created a valid scheme targeting toxic substances through prohibitions backed by penal sanctions.

The dissent concluded that the scheme was fundamentally regulatory rather than prohibitory and could not be sustained under either the criminal law power or the national concern branch of peace, order and good government.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the summary conviction court.

Following a fatal crane collapse at a construction site, injured workers and dependants of deceased workers received workers' compensation benefits.

They subsequently brought a tort action against the Government of Saskatchewan, alleging negligence in its capacity as a regulator under occupational health and safety legislation.

The Workers' Compensation Board determined that the action was barred by the Workers' Compensation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board's decision was protected by a full privative clause and that the question of whether the statutory bar applied fell within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.

Applying the patent unreasonableness standard of review, the Court concluded that the Board's decision to bar the action against the government was not patently unreasonable.

The appellant municipality sought dismissal of a bodily injury action on the basis that the respondent failed to comply with the 15-day notice requirement in municipal legislation after a sidewalk fall.

The appeal turned on whether art. 2930 of the Civil Code of Québec, which preserves the three-year prescriptive period for bodily injury claims notwithstanding contrary provisions, applies to municipalities and overrides s. 585 of the Cities and Towns Act.

The Court held that art. 2930 is a mandatory provision of public order, applies to legal persons established in the public interest, and takes precedence over the municipal notice regime insofar as that regime hinders bodily injury claims.

The Court also held that the Minister of Justice’s commentaries may assist with interpretation but are not binding.