William Ian Corneil Binnie

Media appellants challenged the federal election provision prohibiting the broadcasting, publication, or dissemination of new opinion survey results during the final three days of an election campaign.

The majority held that the ban infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1 because the measure was overbroad, underinclusive, and failed minimal impairment.

The Court accepted that guarding against the possible influence of inaccurate late polls was a pressing and substantial objective, but found the evidentiary basis for broad deference insufficient and emphasized the central constitutional value of political expression.

The appeal was allowed and the provision was declared of no force or effect.

The appellant challenged federal jurisdiction over proposed natural gas gathering pipeline and processing plant expansions in British Columbia, arguing the facilities remained provincial works despite their connection to an interprovincial transmission pipeline.

The majority held that the facilities, together with the existing gathering, processing, and transmission system, formed a single federal transportation undertaking under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867 because they were functionally integrated and subject to common management, control and direction.

The Court further held that s. 92A did not derogate from Parliament’s pre-existing jurisdiction over interprovincial transportation undertakings.

It also concluded that the processing plants fell within the definition of “pipeline” in s. 2 of the National Energy Board Act.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent holding the facilities retained their distinct provincial character.

The plaintiffs sought damages for economic loss and property damage after a fire broke out on an oil drilling rig.

The fire was caused by arcing in a heat trace system that ignited inflammable Thermaclad wrap.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the manufacturer, Raychem, breached its duty to warn the rig owner of the product's inflammability and could not rely on the learned intermediary defence.

However, the builder, SJSL, was shielded from liability by an exclusion clause in its contract with the owner.

The Court declined to allow the rig's lessees to recover contractual relational economic loss due to policy concerns over indeterminate liability.

Finally, the Court abolished the common law maritime rule that contributory negligence acts as a complete bar to recovery, allowing the rig owner to recover 40% of its damages despite being 60% at fault.

The appellants faced citizenship revocation proceedings for allegedly concealing their involvement in WWII atrocities.

Due to delays in the Federal Court Trial Division, a senior Department of Justice official met privately with the Chief Justice of the Federal Court to express concern.

The Chief Justice then spoke to the Associate Chief Justice handling the cases, who subsequently expedited the schedule.

The appellants successfully moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that this ex parte communication compromised judicial independence.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that while the appearance of judicial independence was significantly compromised, a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy.

The Court directed that the cases proceed before a different judge, balancing the affront to judicial independence against society's pressing interest in seeing alleged war criminals brought to justice.

The moving party brought a motion to abridge time and expedite the hearing of its appeal.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that while the Court could accommodate the parties and Attorneys General, it could not abridge the time granted under Rule 18(2) for unknown potential interveners to apply for intervener status.

The Court emphasized its unwillingness to deny potential litigants their right to seek intervener status in an important matter.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal that affirmed an order granting mandamus to compel the Minister of National Health and Welfare to issue a notice of compliance respecting a generic version of a drug.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal.

The appeal concerned a media challenge to a publication ban obtained in criminal proceedings to stop the broadcast of a fictional television mini-series said to risk prejudicing pending jury trials involving allegations of abuse in religious institutions.

The Court held that discretionary publication bans must be assessed in accordance with Charter values and reformulated the common law test to require necessity, the absence of reasonably available alternative measures, and proportional balancing between trial fairness and freedom of expression.

The Court also addressed the proper procedural routes for third-party challenges to publication bans imposed by provincial and superior court judges.

Applying the new framework, the Court concluded the ban was overbroad and unjustified because reasonable alternatives were available.

The appeal was allowed and the publication ban order was set aside.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the calculation of interest on non-mortgage loans.

The core issue was the interpretation of the loan contract and section 4 of the Interest Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing substantially with the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

The federal government introduced legislation to limit its cost-sharing obligations to certain provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan.

British Columbia referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding whether the federal government had the authority to unilaterally limit its obligations and whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations prevented the introduction of such legislation without provincial consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal government had the authority to amend the Plan, as parliamentary sovereignty allows Parliament to amend its statutes.

The Court further held that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to the legislative process and cannot create substantive rights to veto proposed legislation.

The Auditor General of Canada sought access to Cabinet documents and Crown corporation records relating to Petro-Canada's acquisition of Petrofina, relying on section 13(1) of the Auditor General Act.

The government denied access, citing Cabinet confidentiality and the limits of the Auditor General's mandate.

The Auditor General applied to the courts for a declaration of his right to access the information.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dispute was not justiciable.

The Court found that the Auditor General's exclusive remedy for a denial of access to information is the political remedy provided in section 7(1)(b) of the Act, which requires him to report the denial to the House of Commons.

The Woodstock Indian Band barricaded a railway right-of-way that crossed their reserve, claiming the railway company had no right to use the land.

The railway company sought a permanent injunction to restrain the Band from interfering with its right-of-way.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the railway company's predecessor had acquired a statutory easement in the nature of a right-of-way over the land prior to Confederation, with the permission of the Crown.

This valid right-of-way was sufficient to support the award of a permanent injunction against the Band, without needing to determine whether the Band's underlying interest in the fee held by the Crown had been extinguished.

The respondent, a Quebec Superior Court judge, challenged the constitutional validity of s. 29.1 of the Judges Act, which required judges appointed after February 16, 1975, to contribute a higher percentage of their salary toward their pensions than those appointed before that date.

The respondent argued this violated the principle of judicial independence under s. 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the right to equality before the law under s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the contributory pension scheme did not interfere with judicial independence, as it merely treated judges in accordance with standard pension schemes and did not diminish their overall financial position.

The Court also found no violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights, concluding that the legislation pursued a valid federal objective and the cut-off date chosen by Parliament was not discriminatory.

The appellants challenged the federal cabinet's decision to permit the United States to test cruise missiles in Canada, alleging it violated their right to life, liberty, and security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter by increasing the risk of nuclear war.

The respondents moved to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while cabinet decisions are reviewable under the Charter, the statement of claim must be struck out.

The Court found that the causal link between the testing of the cruise missile and an increased risk of nuclear war was entirely speculative and incapable of proof, meaning the facts alleged could not establish a violation of s. 7.

The Musqueam Indian Band surrendered valuable reserve lands to the Crown for lease to a golf club on specific terms approved by the Band.

The Crown subsequently entered into a lease on significantly less favourable terms without consulting the Band.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown's historical responsibility and the statutory scheme of the Indian Act impose a fiduciary duty on the Crown when dealing with surrendered Indian lands.

The Crown breached this fiduciary duty by ignoring the terms approved by the Band, and the Band was awarded $10 million in damages for the lost opportunity to develop the land.

The Law Society of British Columbia disciplined a lawyer, Donald Jabour, for advertising his legal services.

Jabour and the federal Director of Investigation and Research challenged the Law Society's actions, arguing they violated the Combines Investigation Act and freedom of speech.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Combines Investigation Act does not apply to regulatory schemes validly established by provincial legislation.

The Court also affirmed that provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to declare federal statutes unconstitutional, despite the Federal Court Act.

Finally, the Court held that the Law Society's advertising restrictions, authorized by valid provincial law, did not unlawfully infringe freedom of speech.

The respondent, a concerned citizen and taxpayer, sought a declaration that the therapeutic abortion provisions of the Criminal Code were invalid under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The appellants challenged the jurisdiction of the provincial superior court and the respondent's standing to bring the action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent had public interest standing to challenge the legislation, as there was a serious issue as to its validity, he had a genuine interest as a citizen, and there was no other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue could be brought before the court.