George H. Copley

The Governor in Council referred the proposed federal Securities Act to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its constitutional validity.

The proposed Act sought to create a single national securities regulator and a comprehensive federal regime for securities regulation.

The federal government argued the Act was a valid exercise of its general trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the General Motors test and concluded that while certain aspects of the securities market are national in scope, the main thrust of the Act was the day-to-day regulation of securities, which falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).

Consequently, the Court found the proposed Act unconstitutional, though it noted that a cooperative federal-provincial approach remains available.

The respondent, a lawyer representing low-income clients, challenged the constitutionality of British Columbia's 7 percent tax on legal services, arguing it infringed a fundamental constitutional right to access to justice.

The chambers judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed, finding a general constitutional right to legal services in proceedings determining rights and obligations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the province's appeal, holding that while the rule of law is a foundational constitutional principle, it does not encompass a general constitutional right to counsel in all court and tribunal proceedings.

The Court noted that the Charter specifically provides for the right to counsel only upon arrest or detention, and the historical understanding of the rule of law does not support a broad general right to legal representation.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, was detained at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

The Review Board ordered that he continue to be held in custody but imposed conditions requiring the hospital director to review his treatment plan, provide an independent risk assessment, and explore culturally appropriate treatment.

The Court of Appeal struck the conditions, finding the Board lacked jurisdiction to impose medical treatment or bind parties other than the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while Review Boards cannot prescribe medical treatment, they have the authority under the Criminal Code to make conditions regarding or supervising medical treatment that are binding on hospital authorities.

The respondent Police Complaint Commissioner brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis of mootness.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion, finding that the appeal had become moot and there were no circumstances justifying hearing the appeal under the Borowski criteria.

The appeal was quashed with no order as to costs.

The respondent's liquor licence was suspended by the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch.

The respondent appealed to the Liquor Appeal Board, which upheld the suspension.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Board's decision, finding that its members lacked sufficient independence because they were appointed 'at pleasure'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the degree of independence required of an administrative tribunal is determined by its enabling statute.

Since the legislature unequivocally provided for 'at pleasure' appointments, there was no room to import common law doctrines of independence.

The appellant, a gay and lesbian bookstore, challenged the constitutionality of Customs legislation that authorized the interception and prohibition of obscene materials.

Customs officials had repeatedly delayed, confiscated, or prohibited materials imported by the bookstore, often misclassifying non-obscene gay and lesbian erotica as obscene.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Customs legislation infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was largely justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to prevent the importation of harmful obscene materials.

However, the Court struck down the reverse onus provision in s. 152(3) of the Customs Act as it applied to obscenity determinations, ruling that the burden of proving obscenity must rest on the Crown.

The Court also found that while the legislation itself did not violate s. 15(1) equality rights, its systemic misapplication by Customs officials had discriminated against the gay and lesbian community.