Graeme G. Mitchell

This constitutional labour appeal addressed whether a statutory prohibition on designated essential-services employees striking substantially interfered with meaningful collective bargaining under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court held that the right to strike is an indispensable component of meaningful collective bargaining, and that the statutory scheme’s unilateral employer designations and lack of a meaningful impasse-resolution substitute rendered the infringement unjustified under s. 1.

The declaration of invalidity concerning the essential-services regime was suspended for one year.

The companion challenge to amendments governing union certification, decertification, and employer communications was dismissed.

The Governor in Council referred the proposed federal Securities Act to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its constitutional validity.

The proposed Act sought to create a single national securities regulator and a comprehensive federal regime for securities regulation.

The federal government argued the Act was a valid exercise of its general trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the General Motors test and concluded that while certain aspects of the securities market are national in scope, the main thrust of the Act was the day-to-day regulation of securities, which falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).

Consequently, the Court found the proposed Act unconstitutional, though it noted that a cooperative federal-provincial approach remains available.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after taking the life of his severely disabled daughter.

At trial, the judge removed the defence of necessity from the jury after closing addresses and instructed the jury not to concern itself with the penalty.

Following conviction, the trial judge granted a constitutional exemption from the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 10 years.

The Court of Appeal restored the mandatory minimum sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals against conviction and sentence, holding that there was no air of reality to the defence of necessity, the trial was not rendered unfair by the timing of the ruling or the judge's instructions, and the mandatory minimum sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter given the gravity of the offence.

The appellants picketed a police station carrying placards alleging a police officer allowed or participated in the sexual abuse of children.

They were convicted of defamatory libel under s. 300 of the Criminal Code.

They appealed, arguing the defamatory libel provisions infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provisions infringe s. 2(b), they are justified under s. 1, subject to the severance of a portion of s. 299(c).

The Court found the protection of reputation to be a pressing and substantial objective, and that the provisions were rationally connected and minimally impairing, given the requirement of subjective knowledge of falsity and intent to defame.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions upheld.

The appellant was subpoenaed as a Crown witness at a preliminary inquiry but refused to be sworn and was abusive toward the presiding judge.

The judge convicted him of contempt of court instanter, without notice, a show cause hearing, or an opportunity to consult counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, holding that while the judge was justified in initiating summary contempt procedures, there was no urgent and imperative need to forego the usual steps required by natural justice.

The appellant, who was charged with first degree murder, was subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiry of another individual separately charged with the same murder.

The appellant sought to quash the subpoena, arguing that compelling his testimony would violate his right to silence and protection against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, treating the appellant's application as tantamount to a certiorari application under the Dagenais framework.

On the merits, the Court held that the appellant was compellable, as the predominant purpose of the subpoena was not to incriminate him, and he would be entitled to protections against self-incrimination in his own subsequent proceedings.

The appellant media organization challenged a publication ban imposed during a young offender's trial involving sexual offence allegations by two child complainants.

The Supreme Court held that there was no direct third-party right of appeal from the interlocutory criminal order to the provincial court of appeal.

The proper route was certiorari to a superior court judge because the order was made by a provincial court judge, with any further appeal proceeding under s. 784(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and the Court declined to review the publication ban order itself.

The accused was charged with storing firearms and ammunition in a careless manner contrary to s. 86(2) of the Criminal Code.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated s. 7 of the Charter by allowing conviction based on mere negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 86(2) does not violate s. 7, as the objective standard of a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person satisfies the minimum fault requirement for this offence.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was lifted.

The appellant's first two trials on a charge of criminal negligence causing death ended with hung juries.

The trial judge stayed a third trial on the grounds that it would constitute an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while prosecutorial misconduct is not an essential element of abuse of process, a third trial in these circumstances does not violate the community's sense of fair play and decency.

The appellant, an RCMP officer, assaulted a prisoner and was convicted of a major service offence under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.

He was subsequently charged with common assault under the Criminal Code for the same incident.

The appellant argued that the criminal charge violated his right under section 11(h) of the Charter not to be tried and punished twice for the same offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while section 11 applies to proceedings involving true penal consequences, the appellant was not being tried for the same offence.

The service offence was an internal disciplinary matter, whereas the criminal charge was a public offence.

The appeal was dismissed.