Clayton C. Ruby

The appellant, a police inspector, appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding him guilty of Discreditable Conduct for using discriminatory and insulting language during a recruitment interview with a South Asian candidate.

The appellant argued the Hearing Officer applied the wrong legal test, erred in credibility assessments, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding the Hearing Officer correctly applied an objective test to determine the language was offensive to community standards, properly assessed credibility, and correctly applied the standard of clear, convincing, and weighty evidence.

The respondent police service brought an unopposed motion for a sealing order regarding certain exhibits, transcripts, and factum references from a police disciplinary hearing.

The materials contained highly sensitive intelligence information obtained from a confidential informant, as well as personal and criminal histories of non-parties.

Applying both the common law test from Donovan v. Sherman Estate and section 2(2) of the Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, 2019, the Commission found that the privacy interests of the non-parties and the need to protect confidential informants outweighed the open court principle.

The motion for a sealing order was granted.

The Applicant, Faith Bazos, sought to avoid paying costs to the Respondent, Bell Media Inc., after her application challenging Bell Media's refusal to run her political advertisements was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Bazos argued she was a public interest litigant and should be exempt from costs or pay reduced costs.

The court found that the jurisdictional issue was not novel and did not qualify her as a public interest litigant for the purpose of costs.

The court also found that it was not necessary for her to invoke the Superior Court's jurisdiction instead of the CRTC.

Consequently, the Respondent, as the successful party on the jurisdictional issue, was entitled to partial indemnity costs.

The court fixed costs at $43,117.90, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, finding the amount reasonable given the urgency and complexity of the jurisdictional hearing.

The applicant, a municipal election candidate, sought a declaration and mandatory order from the Superior Court of Justice to compel the respondent broadcaster to run her political advertisements, relying on CRTC regulations and the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the CRTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of its regulations.

While the court had concurrent jurisdiction for Charter claims, it declined to exercise it, determining that the entire application should be heard by the specialized tribunal.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Toronto Transit Commission from implementing random drug and alcohol testing for safety-sensitive employees pending the outcome of a policy grievance arbitration.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any privacy breaches or wrongful dismissals could be compensated with damages.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the significant public interest in transit safety and evidence of a workplace drug and alcohol problem.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Karina Neff.

He did not deny killing the deceased but claimed he lacked the mens rea for murder and was therefore guilty of manslaughter.

The appeal raised two issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in admitting a video-recorded statement of a witness with a disability under section 715.2 of the Criminal Code when the witness could not confirm the truth of the statement from present recollection; and (2) whether the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for mistrial after the Crown made prejudicial remarks in closing address regarding the defence's expert evidence and the issue of intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adoption test under section 715.2 is the same as under section 715.1 and does not require present recollection, and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing a mistrial and addressing any prejudice through corrective jury instructions.

The respondent was arrested during the G20 summit and filed a timely complaint against the arresting officers.

After receiving the investigative report, he discovered that higher-ranking officers may have ordered the arrests, prompting him to file a second complaint outside the six-month statutory period.

The Director of the OIPRD refused to deal with the second complaint, citing the time limit without further explanation.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the Director failed to apply discoverability principles and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Director's appeal, affirming that discoverability applies to the screening of complaints and that the Director's cursory reasons were inadequate and unreasonable.

The applicants sought to set aside a single judge's decision quashing their application for judicial review on the basis of mootness.

The applicants argued that the judge should have applied the 'plain and obvious' test and referred the matter to a full panel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the 'plain and obvious' test applies to defects on the face of a proceeding, whereas the Borowski test is the correct framework for determining mootness.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's discretionary decision to decline hearing the moot application.

The offender, a 56-year-old first-time offender, was found guilty of sexually assaulting his then-girlfriend's 13-year-old daughter in 2005.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of 3 to 4 years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the principles of denunciation and deterrence, but noted the offence was a single, transitory incident of touching by a person in a quasi-position of trust.

Applying the law as it existed at the time of the offence, the court found a conditional sentence was available and appropriate.

The offender was sentenced to a 9-month conditional sentence to be served under house arrest, along with a 20-year SOIRA order and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing her application for a declaration that she was the sole owner of a boundary tree.

She sought to cut down the tree without her neighbours' consent, arguing that under previous jurisprudence, the trunk at ground level was entirely on her property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation of section 10(2) of the Forestry Act, finding that 'trunk' should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, encompassing the part of the tree from its roots to where it branches out, not just at ground level.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, which were based on constructive possession of items found in a locked closet at a stash house.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, rejecting the defence argument that it was reasonable to infer the appellant lacked knowledge or control of the closet's contents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and directed an acquittal.

The Court found, with the Crown's concession, that it was reasonably inferable the appellant went to the house to clear it after his associates' arrests but left the closet because he lacked access or knowledge of its contents, meaning constructive possession was not the only reasonable inference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Animal Care Review Board that had found a compliance order invalid for three dogs and required the appellant to reimburse veterinary costs.

The Superior Court held that under s. 18(4) of the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act the appeal is a new hearing conducted de novo, not a review of the Board’s decision.

The court declined to determine whether the Board had jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the Charter because the constitutional issue was not properly raised and the respondent did not participate.

After hearing unopposed evidence from animal welfare officers and a veterinarian, the court found there were reasonable grounds to believe the dogs were in distress and that the compliance order was justified.

The Board’s order requiring reimbursement of veterinary expenses was rescinded.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his designation as a long-term offender.

At trial, the complainant's mother testified about a phone call during which the complainant stated the appellant was touching her.

The trial judge found it would be dangerous to convict on the complainant's evidence alone but used the mother's hearsay evidence as confirmatory.

The Court of Appeal held that while the prior consistent statement was admissible to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, the trial judge erred by using it for the truth of its contents to confirm the complainant's allegations.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of common assault and aggravated assault following a bar fight.

They appealed their aggravated assault convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the doctrine of common purpose under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, despite the Crown heavily relying on it.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's brief reference to a 'joint criminal enterprise' without a full explanation of the elements of common purpose left the jury without adequate guidance.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions for aggravated assault were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Following dismissal of an application concerning ownership and removal of a boundary tree under s. 10 of the Forestry Act, the successful respondents sought costs on a full indemnity or substantial indemnity basis, alleging abusive litigation conduct.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence governing elevated costs awards and confirmed that such awards are reserved for rare circumstances involving reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct.

The court found that the application raised a legitimate issue of statutory interpretation and that the parties conducted the litigation professionally and without abuse of process.

As none of the exceptional circumstances required for elevated costs were present, costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents were awarded $10,000 in fees plus HST and disbursements of $2,951.48 plus HST.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to not deal with his complaint regarding the conduct of the Chief of Police and other senior officers during the G20 summit.

The OIPRD dismissed the complaint under s. 60(2) of the Police Services Act because it was filed more than six months after the incident.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding that the Director breached procedural fairness and statutory requirements by failing to provide adequate reasons.

The court held that s. 60(2) is not a strict limitation period and requires consideration of discoverability and public interest.

The matter was remitted to the Director for reconsideration; mandamus was denied.

The appellant sought costs of $107,070 plus disbursements after successfully appealing a decision under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The respondent argued for no costs on the basis that he was a public interest litigant.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs to either party, noting that success on the appeal was divided, the proceeding raised novel legal issues of public importance regarding municipal codes of conduct, and it was reasonable for the respondent to have pursued the application initially.

The appellant, Mayor Robert Ford, appealed a decision declaring his seat vacant for violating the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA).

The application judge found the appellant breached the MCIA by speaking and voting on a council motion to rescind a previous council decision that required him to reimburse $3,150 in donations to his private football foundation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the original reimbursement order was ultra vires the City of Toronto Act, 2006, which only permits reprimands or suspensions of remuneration for Code of Conduct violations.

Because the financial sanction was a nullity, the appellant did not have a pecuniary interest when he voted to rescind it, and therefore did not contravene the MCIA.

The appellant, the mayor of Toronto, moved for a stay of a judgment removing him from office for violating the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, pending his appeal.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found there was a serious issue to be tried, the appellant would suffer irreparable harm if removed before the appeal, and the balance of convenience favoured a short stay.

The respondent conceded the stay was appropriate given the expedited appeal schedule.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.