Clayton C. Ruby

The Applicant, Faith Bazos, sought to avoid paying costs to the Respondent, Bell Media Inc., after her application challenging Bell Media's refusal to run her political advertisements was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Bazos argued she was a public interest litigant and should be exempt from costs or pay reduced costs.

The court found that the jurisdictional issue was not novel and did not qualify her as a public interest litigant for the purpose of costs.

The court also found that it was not necessary for her to invoke the Superior Court's jurisdiction instead of the CRTC.

Consequently, the Respondent, as the successful party on the jurisdictional issue, was entitled to partial indemnity costs.

The court fixed costs at $43,117.90, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, finding the amount reasonable given the urgency and complexity of the jurisdictional hearing.

The applicant, a municipal election candidate, sought a declaration and mandatory order from the Superior Court of Justice to compel the respondent broadcaster to run her political advertisements, relying on CRTC regulations and the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the CRTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of its regulations.

While the court had concurrent jurisdiction for Charter claims, it declined to exercise it, determining that the entire application should be heard by the specialized tribunal.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Toronto Transit Commission from implementing random drug and alcohol testing for safety-sensitive employees pending the outcome of a policy grievance arbitration.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any privacy breaches or wrongful dismissals could be compensated with damages.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the significant public interest in transit safety and evidence of a workplace drug and alcohol problem.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Karina Neff.

He did not deny killing the deceased but claimed he lacked the mens rea for murder and was therefore guilty of manslaughter.

The appeal raised two issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in admitting a video-recorded statement of a witness with a disability under section 715.2 of the Criminal Code when the witness could not confirm the truth of the statement from present recollection; and (2) whether the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for mistrial after the Crown made prejudicial remarks in closing address regarding the defence's expert evidence and the issue of intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adoption test under section 715.2 is the same as under section 715.1 and does not require present recollection, and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing a mistrial and addressing any prejudice through corrective jury instructions.

Following dismissal of an application concerning ownership and removal of a boundary tree under s. 10 of the Forestry Act, the successful respondents sought costs on a full indemnity or substantial indemnity basis, alleging abusive litigation conduct.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence governing elevated costs awards and confirmed that such awards are reserved for rare circumstances involving reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct.

The court found that the application raised a legitimate issue of statutory interpretation and that the parties conducted the litigation professionally and without abuse of process.

As none of the exceptional circumstances required for elevated costs were present, costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents were awarded $10,000 in fees plus HST and disbursements of $2,951.48 plus HST.

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.