Kaley Pulfer

The appellant developer sued the respondent resident for defamation, economic torts, and trespass after the respondent publicly opposed a mall redevelopment and complained to the city about safety and bylaw issues.

The respondent successfully moved to dismiss the action as a SLAPP under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, and was awarded $25,000 in damages and full indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and damages award, finding the action was inextricably linked to the respondent's public expression and lacked substantial merit.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, finding the motion judge erred by pre-determining the costs scale, and reduced the costs award from $156,394.54 to $75,000.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action for delay under the Langenecker test.

The action had been outstanding for eleven years but was a relatively straightforward wrongful dismissal claim for a one-year employee.

The court found the delay was inordinate but not inexcusable, as the plaintiff had adequately explained the turnover of counsel and procedural complications.

Even assuming the delay was inexcusable, the court found no prejudice to the defendants' ability to have a fair trial, as discovery transcripts preserved evidence and previous findings on the amendment motion had already rejected prejudice claims.

The defendants' motion was dismissed and the plaintiff's cross-motion to restore the action to the trial list was granted with a peremptory timetable imposed.

This is a costs decision following the dismissal of a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff developer sought $300,000 in damages for defamation and trespass against a local resident and engineering student who raised environmental, social, and safety concerns about a mall redevelopment.

The court dismissed the claim as a SLAPP and awarded the defendant full-indemnity costs.

This decision addresses the quantum of costs, with the defendant seeking $156,394.54 and the plaintiff arguing for a cap of $100,000.

The court awarded the full amount sought, finding it fair and reasonable given the circumstances, including the defendant's reasonable settlement offers, the plaintiff's expansion of the motion scope, and consistency with other anti-SLAPP costs awards.

This decision concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by Pierre Roy, a student and local resident, against Sheridan Retail Inc., a developer redeveloping Sheridan Mall in Mississauga.

The developer sued Roy for defamation, inducing breach of contract, interference with economic relations, and trespass after he raised environmental, social, and safety concerns about the redevelopment.

The court found the lawsuit to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) aimed at silencing Roy’s public expression.

The court dismissed the developer’s claim, refused to allow the developer to “prune” its claim to trespass only, and awarded Roy $25,000 in damages and full-indemnity costs.

The applicants' motion for leave to appeal an order denying an interlocutory injunction was previously dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

The respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, arguing the applicants unnecessarily ran up costs by pursuing the motion despite being warned the appeal route was to the Court of Appeal.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the jurisdictional issue was not straightforward.

Costs were fixed at $20,000 on a partial indemnity basis, reflecting the complexity of the jurisdictional issue and the need for the respondent to address the merits of the leave motion.

The appellant, a rapper performing under the name Avalanche the Architect, appealed the dismissal of his libel action against a newspaper and its reporter.

The action was struck as statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The core issue was whether the Act's notice and limitation periods apply to online newspaper articles.

The court held that the Act applies to online versions of newspapers, that the limitation period begins when the libel comes to the plaintiff's knowledge, and that the plaintiff's initial complaint did not constitute proper notice under the Act as it merely complained of factual errors without asserting libel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an order denying their application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent from implementing random drug and alcohol testing pending a grievance arbitration.

The respondent argued the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction because the order was final, not interlocutory.

The court agreed, finding that because the injunction was sought by way of an application, the dismissal of that application finally determined the proceeding.

Consequently, the order was final and any appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Toronto Transit Commission from implementing random drug and alcohol testing for safety-sensitive employees pending the outcome of a policy grievance arbitration.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any privacy breaches or wrongful dismissals could be compensated with damages.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the significant public interest in transit safety and evidence of a workplace drug and alcohol problem.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action, primarily focusing on a defamation claim, due to the plaintiffs' failure to provide the statutory notice required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The court dismissed the libel claim of one plaintiff, Nina Willis, finding that compliance with the notice requirement is a condition precedent and its absence constitutes an absolute bar.

However, the motion to dismiss was denied for her remaining claims and all claims of the other plaintiffs, as it was not plain and obvious that these claims, including potential claims akin to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, could not succeed.

The court also declined to dismiss claims for plaintiffs who had not been properly served with the motion.

The plaintiff sued a reporter and newspaper for libel over an article published online and in print.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(1)(a) for failure to comply with the notice and limitation periods in the Libel and Slander Act.

The court held that the Act applies to electronic editions of newspapers.

The court found the plaintiff failed to provide proper notice within six weeks and failed to commence the action within the three-month limitation period.

The action was dismissed as statute-barred.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for public and private interest standing and the dismissal of the Notice of Application, the successful respondents sought costs.

The applicant, who was self-represented, opposed the costs but made no specific submissions on the costs outlines, instead repeating the merits of his dismissed claims.

The court found the applicant's conduct caused unnecessary delay and expense, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $4,000 to the Crown and $4,324.87 to Metrolinx.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion for public interest standing and to consolidate his application for judicial review with a separate Superior Court application.

The respondents opposed the motion, noting they had a pending motion to strike the application for failing to disclose a cause of action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's motion, holding that the motion to strike must proceed first as it would determine whether there was a serious justiciable issue.

The court also found it lacked jurisdiction to consolidate the matters and awarded costs of $1,000 to each respondent.

The applicant alleged discrimination with respect to services because of creed after the respondent asked him to remove a religious avatar he used to identify himself on its website.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had no reasonable prospect of success.

Accepting the applicant's allegations as true, the Tribunal found there was a reasonable prospect of success and directed the application to proceed to the next stage.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment claiming unjust enrichment and seeking to enforce a guarantee against the defendants after mistakenly depositing over $230,000 into the corporate defendant's bank account.

The individual defendant used the funds to pay personal and corporate debts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the quantification of the benefit to the individual defendant and the enforceability of the guarantee and terms of the merchant agreement.