Peter J. Osborne

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing his guarantee of a corporate overdraft credit facility.

He argued that the bank's assurances regarding dual signing authority and online account access were conditions precedent to the guarantee, and that the bank was liable for misrepresentation and negligence for allowing withdrawals before these safeguards were in place.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the assurances were not conditions precedent, the guarantee contained an entire agreement clause, and the bank did not owe a duty to deny credit facilities until the safeguards were implemented.

The appellant appealed a final family law order that determined spousal support, cancelled prior costs orders, held her liable for corporate tax debts, and imposed a ten-year peace bond.

The Court of Appeal upheld the spousal support order, finding that although equalization should generally be determined first, reopening the issue would contradict the primary objective of the Family Law Rules given the protracted litigation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the remaining grounds.

It reinstated the costs orders because they were not properly set aside for fraud under Rule 25(19)(a), set aside the corporate tax liability because the trial judge ignored the corporate veil, and quashed the peace bond due to a lack of procedural fairness and overly broad terms.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision to rectify his mother's will by adding a remainderman clause that gifted two properties to his niece and nephew upon the termination of his father's life interest.

The drafting solicitor admitted to accidentally omitting the clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not exceed his jurisdiction as a court of construction, as the will could be interpreted to achieve the same result without adding words.

The Court also held that the application judge did not err in his application of the corroboration requirement under s. 13 of the Evidence Act or in his reliance on admissions against interest as extrinsic evidence of the testator's intentions.

The cross-appeal challenging the remedy and costs was also dismissed.

The appellants failed to complete the sale of their home in 2016.

The respondent was awarded $715,000 in damages in lieu of specific performance at trial.

On appeal, the self-represented appellant requested an adjournment, which the court denied due to the lengthy history of the litigation and lack of evidence supporting the request.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and fact-finding.

The court also rejected the argument that the appellant wife was not a proper party, noting she signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale as a consenting spouse under the Family Law Act.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash an appeal on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the motion judge's decision dismissing a motion for summary judgment and to strike pleadings was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the motion judge's decision regarding the 2020 limitation issue was a final determination under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion under Rule 51.06 for judgment on alleged admissions regarding a limitation period defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's order did not finally dispose of the rights of any parties or any issue, as the limitation defence could still be argued at trial.

Consequently, the order was interlocutory, and jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed an equalization order and sought leave to appeal an elevated costs award.

He argued a $78,000 shareholder loan should have been excluded from his net family property as it was unlikely to be repaid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the loan was outstanding at the date of separation and its inclusion was within the trial judge's discretion.

Leave to appeal costs was denied, as the trial judge's finding of bad faith justified costs on an elevated basis under the Family Law Rules.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the same reasons given by the motion judge who previously refused to stay enforcement pending appeal.

The court also rejected the appellant's submission regarding title and the respondent's standing, noting the mortgage and its transfer were clearly reflected on the parcel abstract.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her application for adverse possession of a narrow strip of land behind the respondents' garage.

The application judge found that the appellant failed to prove actual possession of the disputed strip between 1998 and 2008, noting insufficient evidence of a fence restricting access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law were entitled to deference and were open to her on the record.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action to enforce a 2008 Quebec judgment in Ontario, which was commenced over eight years later.

The trial judge found the action was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding promissory estoppel, delayed discoverability, and written acknowledgment of debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to set aside a separation agreement on the basis of duress under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant's vulnerabilities were compensated by independent legal advice.

On the respondent's cross-appeal regarding costs, the Court found the application judge erred in principle by using a 'cost equalization' methodology rather than applying the proper purposes of a costs award.

The cross-appeal was allowed, and the respondent was awarded $80,000 in costs for the proceeding below, plus $12,500 for the appeal.

The appellant sought a panel review of a motion judge's order that granted him an extension of time to perfect his appeal.

The appellant failed to perfect the appeal by the extended deadline and sought a further extension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the panel review motion, finding no error by the motion judge, and dismissed a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Registrar was directed to dismiss the appeal for failure to perfect.

The appellants, contractors who supplied services and materials to an insolvent developer, appealed a motion judge's decision determining the quantum of their priority payables claim under s. 78(2) of the Construction Act.

The motion judge held that the deficiency in the holdbacks should be calculated as ten percent of the unpaid invoices, rather than ten percent of all invoices rendered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that where there are no subcontractor lien claims at the time of the priority dispute, and a payer has fully paid invoices from a contractor, there is no deficiency in the holdbacks related to those fully paid services or materials.

Calculating the holdback based on all invoices would result in double recovery for the contractor and unfairly prejudice the building mortgagee and other creditors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for historical sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to properly address discrepancies between the complainant's evidence and that of her sister, and misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's demeanour upon disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's brief reasons were responsive to the issues and disclosed no misapprehension of evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to find that discrepancies were explained by the passage of time and to rely on the consistent evidence of the complainant's emotional upset during disclosure to support her credibility and reliability.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous operation causing death and failure to stop after an accident causing death.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver of the truck that struck and killed a pedestrian.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her treatment of video surveillance evidence under Nikolovski, failed to apply W.(D.) to exculpatory evidence, and misapprehended evidence regarding the vehicle's features.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the extensive video evidence tracing the appellant's vehicle and properly considered all potentially exculpatory evidence in the context of the record as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after border officers found nearly three kilograms of the drug hidden in the false bottom of his carry-on suitcase.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a fabrication instruction regarding his statements to border officers and by characterizing Crown witnesses as 'professionals' who took notes compared to 'civilian' witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the jury instructions were flawed in both respects, the errors did not prejudice the appellant's right to a fair trial given the overwhelming independent evidence of fabrication and trial counsel's strategic decision not to object.

The appellant appealed the refusal to terminate a SOIRA order after obtaining a pardon.

The court held that the application judge properly applied the statutory criteria in s. 490.016(1) of the Criminal Code and the mandatory factors in s. 490.016(1.1), and made no error in principle in concluding the appellant failed to prove either no connection to the registry's purpose or gross disproportionality.

The court rejected arguments that a pardon alone justified termination, that the Crown had to file the pardon materials, and that the seriousness of the predicate offences had been overstated.

The court also dismissed a fresh evidence motion because the materials were unsworn and did not satisfy the Palmer criteria.

Appeal from summary judgment in a life insurance coverage dispute arising after the insurer denied a beneficiary's claim based on an alleged change in insurability between the insured's application and delivery of the policy.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act creates a condition precedent to contract formation and is not subject to the two-year contestability limitation in s. 184(2).

The court rejected both the argument that s. 180(1)(c) operates only prospectively and the argument that the policy's incontestability clause ousted the statutory requirement.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and the parties were left to determine how to litigate the insurability issue.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment declaring the respondent the sole beneficial owner of a residential property and ordering its transfer, along with general and punitive damages.

The trial judge found the appellant held the property in trust for the respondent, her niece, who paid the deposit and carrying costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the trust documents or her rejection of the appellant's illegality defence.

The punitive damages award was upheld as the appellant's high-handed conduct, including failing to pay property taxes and maintain insurance, merited sanction.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for arson, appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention at a psychiatric hospital.

The Board found that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety due to his schizophrenia, ongoing substance abuse, and history of relapses leading to acute psychosis and violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable, internally coherent, and well-supported by the psychiatric evidence.