COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Sossin, Monahan and Osborne JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Natalie Travis (Senos)
Applicant (Appellant)
and
Brennan Senos
Respondent (Respondent)
Stephen Kirby, for the appellant
Brennan Senos, acting in person
Heard: July 13, 2026
On appeal from the order of Justice Erika Chozik of the Superior Court of Justice, dated December 10, 2024, with reasons reported at 2024 ONSC 6893.
I. Overview
1The appellant, Natalie Travis (Senos), and the respondent, Brennan Senos, were engaged in protracted and highly contentious family law litigation. That litigation was mostly concluded following an eight-day trial in April 2024, which finally resolved the issues of spousal support, child support, and special/extraordinary expenses (the “Final Order”).
2The central issue throughout the litigation was the appellant’s allegation that the respondent hid his income and did not disclose his ownership interests in various companies. The trial judge rejected those allegations, finding that the appellant was neither credible nor reliable. Moreover, she found that the appellant repeatedly misled the court, which resulted in the issuance of court orders against the respondent that were unjust and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
3Conversely, the trial judge accepted the respondent’s evidence regarding his income and determined retroactive and prospective support on that basis. Citing the appellant’s conduct throughout the litigation, she also “cancelled” three prior costs orders made against the respondent and imposed a common law peace bond on the appellant. Finally, although the trial judge deferred the final determination of equalization, she held that the appellant was liable for 50% of the tax debt of Seren Search Inc. (“Seren”), a corporation jointly owned by the parties. She ordered that liability be paid out of the appellant’s share of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.
4The appellant challenged four aspects of the Final Order:
(i) The quantum and methodology for calculating the respondent’s spousal support obligations;
(ii) The “cancellation” of prior costs orders made against the respondent in the course of the litigation;
(iii) The determination that the appellant is liable for 50% of the tax debts of Seren and that this liability be paid out of her share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home; and
(iv) The imposition of the peace bond.
5For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the first ground of appeal but allow the appeal on the remaining three grounds.
II. Background
6The parties were married in 1994 and separated in 2019. They share one child who at the time of trial was 23 years old.
7The respondent worked in the IT industry for many years and provided IT consulting services to several corporate clients through Seren. The appellant maintained throughout the litigation that the respondent had an ownership interest in several of Seren’s corporate clients and/or used these corporations to hide assets and income. Based on these allegations, in December 2019 the trial judge (then acting as motion judge) imputed an annual income of $280,000 to the respondent, and ordered he pay the appellant $8,000 per month in spousal support and $745 per month in child support on an interim basis (the “Interim Support Order”). These payments were subject to enforcement by the Family Responsibility Office (the “FRO”). The trial judge also ordered he pay the appellant $15,000 in costs for the motion.
8The respondent unsuccessfully sought to vary the Interim Support Order on five occasions prior to the trial which occurred four years later in April 2024. Further costs orders were made against him on September 30, 2020 ($8,500) and February 10, 2023 ($15,000). These costs orders were also enforceable by the FRO. The total amount of the costs orders against the respondent was therefore $38,500 (the “Impugned Costs Orders”).
9The FRO took several enforcement actions from 2020 to 2024. It garnished 50% of the respondent’s wages, suspended his driver’s licence and passport, and registered a lien under the Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10. By the time of the trial, the respondent had paid approximately $198,000 in spousal and child support from January 2020 to April 2024. According to an FRO account statement, he had arrears of approximately $235,000 in unpaid support, plus approximately $10,000 in interest, $18,000 in court costs, and $800 in fees.
10Both parties were self-represented at the trial. The appellant’s position was that annual income of $250,000 should be imputed to the respondent retroactive to the date of separation. She maintained that the respondent intentionally misled the court with respect to his income and assets by doctoring financial statements and lying on tax returns. She claimed, among other allegations, that the tax returns and notices of assessment the respondent provided were fabricated and should be disregarded and that, more generally, he failed to properly disclose his actual income and assets.
11The respondent’s position was that he fully complied with his disclosure obligations and that his income averaged roughly $90,000 in the three years prior to the parties’ separation. He was prepared to have his support obligations calculated based on an imputed income of $100,000. On this basis, he submitted that he had significantly overpaid spousal and child support prior to trial. He separately argued that the appellant was a joint owner and director of Seren, and thus should be held liable to pay half of the outstanding taxes owed by the corporation, which he claimed totaled approximately $152,000.
III. The Trial Judgment
12The trial judge found that the appellant was not a credible or reliable witness. Not only were her claims unsupported by the evidence or positively refuted by extrinsic evidence, but she had deliberately misled the court by putting forward a narrative that was “patently false”. The trial judge’s credibility findings were expressed in unusually strong language:
[The appellant] has distorted the court process by not complying with the rules. She has misled the court. She has deliberately withheld relevant evidence in her possession. The result has been that the court made several orders against [the respondent] that were unjust. By her conduct, [the appellant] occasioned what I now consider to be a miscarriage of justice.
13In contrast, the trial judge found that the respondent made full and complete financial disclosure and complied with court orders to the best of his ability. She accepted his submission that his income should be imputed at $100,000 retroactive to the date of separation and that he ought to have paid $2,200 per month in spousal support rather than the $8,000 per month she ordered on an interim basis in December 2019. Therefore, the respondent was not in arrears on his support payments, but instead had overpaid spousal support by approximately $57,000. The trial judge ordered this amount be set off against his future spousal support obligations.1 She also ordered that there be no further enforcement action by the FRO in respect of the Interim Support Order and, because the Impugned Costs Orders would not have been made had the appellant been forthcoming with the court, those orders were “cancelled”.
14On the issue of equalization, the trial judge ordered the immediate partition and sale of the parties’ main asset, the matrimonial home. The trial judge held that until the home was sold, she was unable to make a finding in respect of equalization. She therefore directed the parties to make further submissions regarding equalization once the home was sold. However, because Seren had a significant tax debt (which the trial judge accepted was $152,349.36 as of March 23, 2024), and on the basis that the appellant was a joint owner of the corporation, the trial judge found that the appellant was liable for 50% of those outstanding taxes. The trial judge directed that this liability should be paid out of the appellant’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.
15The trial judge found that the appellant made malicious and false allegations regarding the respondent to his business associates, clients, landlord, and the Canadian Revenue Agency. Because the respondent had reasonable grounds to fear the appellant’s ongoing harassment, the trial judge invoked the court’s common law jurisdiction to prevent a breach of the peace and issued a peace bond requiring the appellant to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The peace bond ordered the appellant to refrain from all direct or indirect communication with the respondent, his past or current romantic partners, landlords, employers, and business associates, and not communicate with or about any of those individuals, including through text messages, telephone, email, mail, or posts on social media. The duration of the peace bond was ten years.
IV. Grounds of Appeal
16The appellant argues that the trial judge erred in the following respects:
(i) By making a final spousal support order before determining the equalization issues and on the basis of an erroneous and overly simplified calculation of the respondent’s income for support purposes;
(ii) By cancelling the Impugned Cost Orders;
(iii) By holding the appellant liable for 50% of the tax debts of Seren and ordering the appellant to discharge that liability through her share of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home; and
(iv) By imposing an overly broad and lengthy peace bond on the appellant without prior notice.
17The appellant argues that these were errors of law, subject to review on a standard of correctness.
V. Analysis
1. While final spousal support orders should generally only be issued after determining equalization, in the particular circumstances of this case the spousal support order should not be disturbed
18As the appellant points out, s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) requires that in making an order for spousal support, the judge must consider the total means of the parties: see also Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 920, at para. 29. Since the amount of any equalization payment will almost invariably affect each party’s means, a final support order should not be made until after equalization has been determined: Greenglass v. Greenglass, 2010 ONCA 675, 99 R.F.L. (6th) 271, at para. 44.
19Here, despite the fact that the trial judge declined to make an equalization order, she nevertheless made a final spousal support order. In addition to this alleged legal error, the appellant argues that there were inconsistencies in the respondent’s evidence regarding his income which were not addressed by the trial judge. The appellant also objects to the fact that the trial judge failed to consider whether she was entitled to share in the respondent’s higher annual income post-separation.
20I agree that the general rule is that equalization should be determined prior to making a final spousal support order. But in the particular circumstances of this case, it would be inconsistent with the primary objective of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, namely, to deal with cases justly, to revisit the spousal support order at this stage of the litigation.
21As the trial judge pointed out, this proceeding has been protracted and highly contentious, primarily due to the appellant’s unreasonable and bad faith conduct. In the trial judge’s retelling of the litigation history, the parties appeared before 9 different judges on more than 15 occasions. The appellant sought to strike the respondent’s pleadings five times. She brought 22 motions, some without notice, seeking a litany of relief, often on an urgent basis. The trial was adjourned four times at the appellant’s request. Throughout the litigation, the appellant’s primary focus was on proving that the respondent hid his true income and assets and was thus liable to pay spousal support at the elevated level mandated by the Interim Support Order. All of these claims were conclusively shown to be without merit at trial.
22The requirement to deal with cases justly includes “ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties”; “saving expense and time”; “dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity”; and “giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases”: r. 2(3) of the Family Law Rules. Reopening the issue of spousal support at this stage in the litigation in order to first address equalization would be inconsistent with these objectives, since it would result in further delay and increased costs in a proceeding that has already gone on for far too long and at undue expense to both the parties and to the court. This is particularly the case because the parties have very limited assets and any equalization payment that might be ordered is likely to be quite modest. It is very unlikely that the eventual equalization payment will materially change the total means of the parties, which is what is relevant to determining the quantum of spousal support.
23As for the appellant’s arguments relating to the alleged inconsistencies in the respondent’s evidence regarding his income, the alleged inconsistencies were relatively minor and, more importantly, none of them was raised before the trial judge. Nor was the trial judge asked to account for increases in the respondent’s income post-separation in calculating his spousal support obligations. I do not see how it would be consistent with the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to grant the appellant the opportunity to advance these new arguments at a second trial, when there was nothing that prevented her from raising them over the course of five years of protracted litigation. Nor is it appropriate or fair for this court to entertain new issues on appeal in this case: see generally Kaiman v. Graham, 2009 ONCA 77, 245 O.A.C. 130, at para. 113.
24Accordingly, notwithstanding that the trial judge made a final order regarding spousal support prior to determining equalization, in the particular circumstances of this case I would decline to revisit the spousal support order and would dismiss this ground of appeal.
2. The trial judge erred in cancelling the Impugned Costs Orders
25The trial judge “cancelled” the Impugned Costs Orders on the basis that “[h]ad [the appellant] been forthcoming with the court, those costs orders would not have been made”. No other explanation or authority is cited for setting aside the Impugned Costs Orders.
26In K.K. v. M.M., 2025 ONCA 446, 16 R.F.L. (9th) 1, at paras. 69-80, this court considered the circumstances in which a prior court order can be set aside on the basis of r. 25(19) of the Family Law Rules. One such circumstance is where an order was obtained by fraud: r. 25(19)(a).
27Here, the trial judge made factual findings that strongly suggested the appellant obtained the Impugned Costs Orders by fraud. The appellant was found to have repeatedly misled the court and these false representations were the basis upon which the Impugned Costs Orders were issued. However, there are a number of insuperable difficulties with upholding the trial judge’s “cancellation” of the Impugned Costs Orders on the basis of r. 25(19)(a).
28First, the trial judge makes no reference to r. 25(19)(a), but merely stated that the Impugned Costs Orders were “cancelled” because they would not have been made had the appellant been forthcoming with the court. While this statement explains what the trial judge did, it does not indicate her legal basis for doing so. Meaningful appellate review can only occur when the trial judge clearly articulates the logical connection between the “what” (the order made) and the “why” (the basis for the order): R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 17. Although in this case the trial judge’s reasons meet the standard of factual sufficiency, they do not meet the standard of legal sufficiency, being the “legal basis of the decision”: see R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at paras. 71-75. Here, we have no way of knowing the legal authority that the trial judge relied on to cancel the Impugned Costs Orders – whether r. 25(19) of the Family Law Rules, or some other legal basis. This impedes the appellant’s ability to meaningfully exercise her right of appeal: see R. v. Sheppard, 2025 SCC 29, 507 D.L.R. (4th) 78, at para. 47.
29Second, in order to establish fraud within the meaning of r. 25(19)(a), the party alleging fraud has the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the other party made a false representation of fact (i) with knowledge of its falsehood, (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly careless whether it is true or false, and in any event, with the intention that it should be acted upon, and inducing the person to whom it is made to act upon it: Sonia v. Ratan, 2022 ONSC 6340, at paras. 26-30, aff’d 2024 ONCA 152, 171 O.R. (3d) 677, at paras. 45-51; see also Hutter v. Hutter, 2024 ONSC 785, at para. 51, citing Howard v. Howard (14 July 2023) Kitchener 20-56237 (S.C.), at paras. 21-22.
30Like in K.K. v. M.M., the party seeking to set aside the prior costs orders (in this case, the respondent), did not expressly argue that the orders should be set aside on the basis of fraud, even if the factual matrix might suggest that fraud occurred: see K.K. v. M.M., 2024 ONSC 1092, 98 R.F.L. (8th) 391, at paras. 105-6. Since the respondent was not making this argument at trial, he could not have met his burden of proving those orders were obtained by fraud, and the trial judge did not have authority to set them aside.
31Finally, the trial judge made apparently inconsistent findings as to whether the appellant deliberately misled the court. At various points in her reasons the trial judge describes the appellant as having acted in this improper manner, but the trial judge also stated that she was “unable to conclude whether [the appellant] has deliberately misled the court or whether she suffers from some cognitive impairment or mental illness”. This statement is puzzling and difficult to square with statements elsewhere in the trial judge’s reasons. Nevertheless, it may provide an explanation as to why the trial judge did not expressly rely on r. 25(19)(a) in setting aside the Impugned Costs Orders.
32The appellant does not suggest any basis, apart from r. 25(19)(a), upon which the cancellation of the Impugned Costs Orders could be justified. Since the trial judge did not rely on r. 25(19)(a), I would set aside this element of the Final Order and reinstate the $38,500 in prior costs orders.
3. The trial judge erred in holding the appellant personally liable for 50% of the tax debt of Seren
33The trial judge found the appellant personally liable for 50% of Seren’s tax liability, which the trial judge accepted was approximately $152,000 as of March 23, 2024. The trial judge ordered that the appellant’s liability be paid out of her share of the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home. The only explanation provided for this order was that the appellant was the “joint owner of the company”.
34The appellant argues that the trial judge erred by overlooking the basic principle that a corporation is its own entity, separate and distinct from its shareholders. She further submits that a shareholder can have no liability for the debts of the corporation, except where a statutory or other basis exists to pierce the corporate veil.
35I agree. A bedrock principle of corporate law is that a corporation is a separate entity from its shareholders and a shareholder is not generally liable for the debts of the corporation merely by virtue of their ownership of shares of the corporation: Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2018 ONCA 472, 141 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 57, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 255. While there are various exceptions to this general rule (see, for example, the discussion in Yaiguaje, at paras. 64-83) no exception applies in the circumstances of this case. Nor did the trial judge suggest otherwise. Instead, she appears to have simply ignored entirely the legal distinction between a corporation and its shareholders in holding the appellant personally liable for 50% of the tax debt of Seren.
36This is not to suggest that the tax liability of Seren has no possible relevance to the resolution of the issues between the parties. It may be that one or both parties are personally liable for some portion of Seren’s tax liabilities pertaining to statutory payroll source deductions and/or HST remittances, if they were directors and/or officers at the material time: see e.g., X v. Y, 2016 ONSC 545, at paras. 271-84. Any liability in this regard would obviously affect their individual net family property calculations. Moreover, the corporation’s indebtedness, even if not a personal liability of either party, may affect the value of its shares, and thus may indirectly impact the calculation of either party’s net family property. But these are entirely different matters than treating Seren’s entire tax liability as a personal liability of either party, which is how the trial judge approached the issue. In my view, she erred in doing so.
37Therefore, I would set aside the order that the appellant is responsible for 50% of Seren’s purported $152,000 tax liability. The impact of the corporation’s liabilities, if any, will need to be properly determined when equalization is finalized.2
4. The trial judge erred in imposing the peace bond
38The respondent sought a restraining order against the appellant pursuant to s. 46 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. However, rather than granting the relief sought, the trial judge proceeded on her own initiative to invoke the court’s common law jurisdiction to prevent a breach of the peace by requiring the appellant to enter into a peace bond that would remain in effect for a period of ten years.
39The peace bond stated that His Majesty the King (or the “Crown”) had requested the imposition of the order. It required the appellant to keep the peace be of good behaviour generally, and especially in relation to the respondent. The appellant was prohibited from having any direct or indirect contact with the respondent and his current or past romantic partners, landlords, employers, and business associates. The peace bond then listed 18 individuals and entities with whom the appellant could not communicate directly or indirectly, including by text, email, phone, mail, or social media. The peace bond further stated that any breach without lawful excuse of the order would constitute an offence under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, which carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment if prosecuted by indictment.
40The imposition of a peace bond, whether on the basis of s. 810 of the Criminal Code or pursuant to the court’s common law jurisdiction, can have serious implications for an individual. The entering of the bond places restrictions on the Charter-protected liberty of the individual and subjects them to criminal sanctions for breach of its terms. It is therefore imperative that procedural safeguards be observed in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, including providing sufficient notice that the court is considering making such an order, advising the individual of its possible terms, and providing the individual with a meaningful opportunity to retain counsel, adduce evidence, and make submissions: see R. v. Petre, 2013 ONSC 3048, 299 C.C.C. (3d) 246, at paras. 12-15; see generally R. v. Musoni (2009), 2009 CanLII 12118 (ON SC), 243 C.C.C. (3d) 17 (Ont. S.C.), aff’d 2009 ONCA 829, 248 C.C.C. (3d) 487, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 534.
41The procedure followed in this case fell significantly short of what was required.
42First, the appellant was not provided with proper notice prior to the issuance of the peace bond. The respondent did not seek this relief in his pleadings or in his submissions to the court. Although the peace bond states that it was issued on application by the Crown, in fact this was not the case because the Crown was not a party to the proceeding. The matter was not discussed during the course of the eight-day trial and was raised by the trial judge only after the parties had made their closing submissions. Then, instead of adjourning the proceedings, even briefly, in order to provide the appellant with a meaningful opportunity to consult counsel and consider whether she wished to adduce evidence and prepare submissions, the trial judge issued the order orally immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing.
43Even if the appellant had been afforded appropriate procedural protections, the terms of the order are extremely broad and unduly vague. For example, the categories of persons with whom the appellant is prohibited from communicating over the next ten years, such as “current or past girlfriends” or “business associates”, are not clearly defined. Nor is the scope of the prohibition on posting on social media “to or about” any of these persons. Thus the peace bond subjects the appellant to possible penal consequences for a period of ten years without her being able to know exactly what conduct could give rise to a breach of the order.
44I conclude that these were serious breaches of the principles of fundamental justice, requiring that the peace bond be set aside.
VI. DISPOSITION
45I would allow the appeal in part and set aside the following paragraphs of the Final Order:
(a) [Para. 8] The Applicant is liable for 50% of the outstanding HST and other corporate taxes of Seren Search Inc., which totaled $152,349.36 as of March 23, 2024. Her share of those taxes, plus her share of any accrued interest and penalties, shall be paid out of her share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.
(b) [Para. 11] The costs ordered against the Respondent on December 12, 2019 of $15,000.00, on September 30, 2020 of $8,500.00 and on February 10, 2023 of $15,000.00 are cancelled.
(c) [Para. 12] The peace bond against the Applicant, dated April 22, 2024, shall remain in effect until further order of this court.
46I would otherwise dismiss the appeal. For greater certainty, I would not disturb any other aspect of the Final Order.
47Given that success is divided, I would not order costs in respect of the appeal. The appellant did not seek leave to appeal the costs order from the trial below. In any event, despite the appellant’s partial success on appeal, the respondent remains the overwhelmingly successful party on the main issues litigated at trial. Therefore, I would not disturb the trial judge’s original costs award of $10,398.42 in favour of the respondent.
Released: July 29, 2026 “L.S.”
“P.J. Monahan J.A.”
“I agree. Sossin J.A.”
“I agree. Osborne J.A.”
Footnotes
- The trial judge also found that the respondent’s child support obligations should have ceased in January 2020 when the child became independent, and that the quantum of child support ($745 per month) was above the table amount after adjusting the respondent’s income down to $100,000 from the $280,000 originally imputed to him. However, the respondent did not seek a recalculation of the quantum of child support he ought to have paid. The trial judge ordered that the FRO determine any overpayment (presumably in relation to the duration of support, not the quantum) and credit it to the respondent.
- I note that the parties do not agree on whether the appellant was a shareholder and/or director at the material times when the corporation’s tax obligations arose. This is a factual issue that will need to be addressed by the trial judge in her equalization analysis, and on which I express no comment.