Bradley W. Miller

The appellant tenant appealed the dismissal of its application to restrain the respondent landlord from terminating its commercial lease.

The landlord relied on a 30-day termination clause from a 1998 amending agreement.

The tenant argued that subsequent amending agreements, which included a six-month termination clause conditional on redevelopment, indicated the 30-day clause was confined to the 1998 extension term.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by failing to address this key argument regarding contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 23 charges, including multiple frauds and breaches of court orders, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge committed a material error of principle by including a withdrawn charge in the sentencing analysis.

The global sentence was reduced to three and a half years.

Additionally, two restitution orders were vacated because the victims had recovered their losses, and the remaining restitution orders were varied to allow 10 years to pay.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment holding it jointly liable with a related corporation for wrongful dismissal under the common employer doctrine.

The court held that the motion judge applied the correct legal test, made findings available on the record, and committed no palpable and overriding error in concluding that both corporations jointly ran the hotel and intended to create an employment relationship with the deceased employee.

The court also upheld the conclusion that res judicata and abuse of process did not bar the estate's subsequent claim against the appellant, because the appellant was not a defendant in the initial action and the corporate relationship was not easily discernable.

The appeal was dismissed with partial indemnity costs to the respondent.

The appellant challenged an indeterminate sentence imposed after a dangerous offender designation, arguing that his risk could be managed in the community through a fixed custodial term followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The court held that the sentencing judge made no error in finding that the appellant’s violent risk was driven by multiple factors, including personality pathology not meaningfully amenable to medication.

The psychiatric evidence established high risk, chronic non-compliance with treatment and supervision, and an absence of insight or motivation to change.

The court concluded that the conditions necessary to control the risk could only be achieved in custody and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged a conditional discharge from bankruptcy requiring him to satisfy several conditions, including payment of approximately $13.6 million into the bankruptcy estate.

He argued that the monetary condition was improper because there was no evidence he could fulfill it and also challenged the remaining terms of discharge.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge made no error in principle, that the monetary condition fell within the court's discretionary authority under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and that the conditions were justified on the record.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the trustee.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge's exchanges with defence counsel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court applied the established bias test and emphasized the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the heavy burden required to rebut it.

Although the trial judge's comments to defence counsel were found to be inappropriate and short-tempered, they arose in the context of counsel's repeated improper questioning, including myth-based reasoning and impermissible use of prior sexual history evidence.

Viewed realistically and practically, the exchanges did not demonstrate that the trial judge was predisposed to one side.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence in an estate action.

The motion judge struck the pleading after finding the appellants deliberately breached a court order requiring them to produce passwords for business email accounts and prohibiting the deletion of emails.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Falcon Lumber test and concluding that striking the defence was an appropriate sanction for the appellants' repeated and continuous failure to provide transparent disclosure of estate business documents.

The Township of Clearview brought a motion for a stay pending appeal of an order requiring it to immediately issue a fill permit to the respondents.

The respondents had sought to build a noise and privacy berm on their property adjacent to an unregulated aerodrome.

The application judge had found the Township's requirement to verify obstacle limitation surfaces was ultra vires.

On the motion for a stay, the Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding that the appeal raised a serious question, the Township would suffer irreparable harm as the appeal would become moot if the permit issued, and the balance of convenience favoured the Township.

The motion for a stay was granted and the appeal expedited.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm, driving, and drug trafficking offences, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a key witness who had a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not explicitly address the witness's motive to lie, the reasons demonstrated an awareness of the evidence's frailties.

Furthermore, the witness's testimony was corroborated by significant independent evidence, including the complainant's testimony, video surveillance, and text messages.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent and in applying delayed reporting principles to physical assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent after an initial refusal, and made no error in assessing the complainant's credibility regarding her delayed reporting.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition.

The charges arose from an altercation outside a bar where a handgun fell to the ground, which the trial judge concluded had fallen from the appellant's satchel based on circumstantial and video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant possessed the firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed the restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture orders imposed following his conviction for five counts of fraud over $5,000.

He argued the orders were unfair and based on a misinterpretation of the fraud amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant did not contest the restitution order at sentencing and the preconditions for the fine in lieu of forfeiture were met.

The three-year sentence in default of payment was the statutory minimum.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to four years in custody.

On sentence appeal, he argued that the sentencing judge improperly treated his lack of remorse as an aggravating factor related to his decision to appeal rather than plead guilty, incorrectly relied on a case involving a younger victim, and unfairly considered his failure to participate in programs.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error.

The sentencing judge expressly stated he did not treat the absence of a guilty plea as aggravating; lack of remorse was properly considered with respect to future rehabilitative prospects.

The four-year sentence falls squarely within the established three-to-five-year range for penetrative sexual assaults and appropriately reflects the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the serious aggravating factors, including a decades-long criminal record involving violence against women.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

He challenged the validity of the search warrant used to locate fentanyl and cocaine at a Toronto residence, arguing that the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient evidence to support its issuance and that the evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Three confidential sources had identified the appellant as a drug dealer through single photo identification, and police surveillance corroborated his connection to the searched address.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, misapprehension of evidence, or failure to consider relevant evidence in the application judge's analysis, and dismissed the appeal without calling on the respondent.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm arising from a collision with an electric scooter rider on a residential street.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence concerning his emotional state, improperly relied on demeanour evidence, and erred in rejecting his position that the incident reflected only a momentary lapse of attention.

The court held that the characterization of the appellant's emotional condition was supported by the record, that any demeanour-based inference was invited by defence counsel, and that the trial judge committed no reversible error in treating the conduct as a marked departure from the reasonable standard of care.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

A payment processing company appealed sanctions imposed after it was found in civil contempt for repeatedly obstructing a court-ordered audit obtained by mandatory injunction under a commercial services agreement.

The appellant argued the penalties were disproportionate, challenged the direction to pay audit costs into court, and sought leave to appeal the contempt-motion costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the arguments depended on unappealed factual findings that the appellant intentionally obstructed the audit and that no basis existed to interfere with the sanctions or the costs order.

The court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that r. 60.11(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not confined to cases where the officer or director has already been found personally in contempt, and remitted the issue of joint and several liability of the sole officer and director for redetermination.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his action against the respondents on the basis that he was an undischarged bankrupt at the relevant time and thus lacked capacity to commence it.

The appellant argued the trustee in bankruptcy had implicitly assigned him authority to commence the action by permitting him to manage the property under s. 30(1)(l) of the BIA.

The Court of Appeal held the motion judge committed no palpable and overriding error in finding that no express assignment had been made, as the trustee was unaware of both the fire damage and the action.

The court further held the appellant's claim for general damages for loss of enjoyment and use of the property was proprietary rather than personal in nature, and therefore vested in the trustee.

Appeal dismissed with no costs order given the respondents' non-participation.

Following a successful appeal in which the appellants were awarded a 50% interest in a residential property, the court addressed trial costs.

The appellants sought approximately $155,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the result beat their offer to settle.

The court declined, finding the result did not beat the offer because the appellants were awarded 50% ownership rather than 50% of the equity, with the equity value remaining to be determined on a subsequent accounting.

Trial costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $70,000 all inclusive.

Following the dismissal of the appeal (2026 ONCA 3), the court addressed costs.

Having considered the written submissions and costs outlines of both parties, the court fixed all-inclusive costs of the appeal payable by the appellant to the respondents in the amount of $37,000.

The moving party sought panel review under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act of two single-judge decisions: a refusal to extend time to perfect an appeal of a judgment rejecting allegations of undue influence in an estate matter, and a full indemnity costs award of $16,492.35.

The panel found no error in the refusal to extend time, noting the long unexplained delay, prejudice to the estate, and lack of merit in the proposed appeal.

However, the panel found the motion judge erred in awarding full indemnity costs, as there was no evidence of especially egregious misconduct warranting enhanced costs on appeal, and substituted partial indemnity costs of $9,400.