Milton Davis

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs for the entire action after successfully moving to dismiss the proposed class action for delay.

The plaintiffs argued the costs claimed were excessive and that previous steps had already been addressed by prior costs rulings.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiffs' response to the motion did not warrant an elevated scale.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs for the delay motion and reimbursement for mediation disbursements, fixing costs at $125,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the production of financial records relating to mortgages held by the defendants in trust for the plaintiffs, alleging a fraudulent scheme to misappropriate funds.

The defendants argued that the documents should be produced in the ordinary course of litigation.

The court held that beneficiaries of a trust have a proprietary right to records relevant to an accounting for the trust property, separate from the ordinary rules of discovery, and ordered the defendants to produce the requested documents or confirm their non-existence.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $230,000, arguing that the plaintiff's unproven allegations of fraud justified an elevated award.

The plaintiff argued for partial indemnity costs of approximately $39,000.

The court agreed that unproven fraud allegations warrant higher costs, but found the defendants' claim excessive, particularly the $40,000 spent preparing brief costs submissions.

Costs were fixed at $200,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff unit owner brought a motion for a mandatory interlocutory injunction against the defendant condominium corporation, seeking orders for expert opinions, alternative accommodation, and repairs to her unit following water damage and mould contamination originating from the common elements.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the high threshold of a strong prima facie case or demonstrate irreparable harm, particularly given the condominium corporation's undertaking to pay $100 per day for alternative accommodation and to repair the unit.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer 143 questions refused during her cross-examination on an affidavit filed in response to the defendants' summary judgment motion.

The summary judgment motion was based on the expiry of the limitation period.

The plaintiff had refused questions on the basis of relevance and solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that questions seeking the legal significance of material facts were not relevant to discoverability.

The court also held that the plaintiff had not waived solicitor-client privilege, as she had not voluntarily put her state of mind or legal advice in issue.

The motion to compel answers was dismissed.

The plaintiff sued corporate and individual defendants for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale regarding a retail development.

The individual defendants moved to strike the claim against them under Rule 21.01(1)(b), arguing that as corporate officers, they could not be held personally liable for inducing the corporation to breach its contract without allegations of separate tortious conduct.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding the pleadings lacked necessary particulars of bad faith or separate interests.

However, the court also granted the plaintiff's cross-motion under Rule 26.01 to amend the statement of claim, as there was no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The defendants moved to set aside a Mareva injunction granted four years prior, citing delay and new expert evidence.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment or to strike the defendants' statement of defence in a complex fraud action involving a factoring company.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding the delay was largely attributable to their own failure to produce documents and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the injunction.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's summary judgment motion, concluding that the extensive conflicting circumstantial evidence and credibility issues required a full trial, and that partial summary judgment was inappropriate.

The motion to strike the defence was dismissed as premature.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, brought a motion for summary judgment against her former brokerage for unpaid commissions and improperly deducted fees.

The brokerage argued the commission was subject to a referral agreement with an unlicensed third party and was being held in trust.

The court found that while an agreement to split the commission existed, it was unenforceable under the Real Estate Brokers Act, 2002, which prohibits paying commissions to unlicensed persons.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for the unpaid commission and the improperly deducted fees.

Following a successful application regarding the ownership of a parkette, the successful municipality sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent developers argued that no costs should be awarded as the matter involved public interest and was litigated in good faith.

The court rejected the public interest argument, finding the developers were seeking a private windfall.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of the case and the developers' vexatious conduct during discovery, the court awarded the municipality $210,000 in costs.

The defendant in two construction lien actions sought leave to move for summary judgment dismissing the actions.

The claims arose from the remediation of environmental contamination.

The court reviewed the principles of summary procedure under the Construction Lien Act and the expanded summary judgment rules following Hryniak.

Finding the record insufficient to determine whether a summary judgment motion or a trial of an issue would be most appropriate, the court ordered the parties to exchange draft issues of law and agreed statements of fact before resuming the conference.

The non-party moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his appeal from a Master's order requiring the production of his post-marriage contract financial records.

The moving party argued the decision conflicted with established authority on assessing damages for breach of fiduciary duty and valuing a business using hindsight.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no conflict in legal principles and concluding the proposed appeal did not raise matters of such importance to warrant leave.

A request to stay the Master's order was also denied.

The plaintiffs, two physicians with prominent professional roles, brought a defamation action arising from malicious internet websites created by the defendant that falsely accused them of criminal conduct and professional misconduct.

After the defendant ceased participating in the litigation and his defence was struck, the plaintiffs sought default judgment and damages.

The court held that the publications were intentionally designed to harm the plaintiffs' professional reputations and were entirely false.

Applying principles governing defamation damages, including those articulated in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto and Barrick Gold Corp. v. Lopehandia, the court found substantial reputational harm caused through internet dissemination.

Each plaintiff was awarded $150,000 in general damages and the defendant was ordered to pay $50,000 in punitive damages, together with costs.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff bank succeeded in obtaining judgment against one defendant for fraud and under a personal guarantee, the court addressed competing claims for costs.

The bank sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $600,000, while certain defendants who successfully defended fraud allegations sought substantial indemnity costs for both trial and a prior Mareva injunction motion.

The court found that the bank had overstated and pursued broad allegations of fraud despite prior judicial warnings, unnecessarily lengthening the litigation.

Costs were therefore limited to partial indemnity and further reduced under Rule 57 for litigation conduct.

After applying equitable set‑off against costs awarded to two defendants, the court ordered one defendant to pay net costs to the bank.