Stuart Svonkin

The plaintiffs brought a motion for contempt against the defendants, alleging they breached a Mareva injunction by using frozen assets to pay for living and legal expenses.

In response, the defendants brought several procedural motions.

Dr. Saad moved to strike compelled evidence from the plaintiffs' contempt motion record, arguing it violated his Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that a contempt motion is not 'other proceedings' under s. 13 and that ss. 7 and 11(c) did not apply to previously compelled evidence.

Dr. Saad also moved under Rule 21 to exclude prior judicial rulings made in the civil action from the contempt motion.

The court granted this motion, holding that findings made on a civil standard are inadmissible in a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding.

The plaintiffs moved to compel the defendants to answer undertakings and produce documents.

The court ordered Dr. Saad to answer undertakings but ruled the answers could not be used in the contempt motion, and declined to order further document production that would conscript the defendants to assist in their own prosecution.

The court also limited the plaintiffs' disclosure obligations to the alleged breach, refusing broad discovery on the underlying fraud.

Finally, the court dismissed Mohammed's motion to stay the contempt proceedings pending his appeal on jurisdiction.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer 143 questions refused during her cross-examination on an affidavit filed in response to the defendants' summary judgment motion.

The summary judgment motion was based on the expiry of the limitation period.

The plaintiff had refused questions on the basis of relevance and solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that questions seeking the legal significance of material facts were not relevant to discoverability.

The court also held that the plaintiff had not waived solicitor-client privilege, as she had not voluntarily put her state of mind or legal advice in issue.

The motion to compel answers was dismissed.

Following a 38-day trial where the plaintiff's claim was dismissed, the successful defendant sought costs of over $2.2 million on a partial indemnity basis, but argued for substantial indemnity costs from the date the plaintiff amended its pleadings to allege bias and conspiracy.

The court denied substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff's allegations were not made recklessly or without evidentiary foundation.

The court upheld the defendant's significant e-discovery disbursements as reasonable but ordered the defendant to produce redacted dockets for the plaintiff's review before finalizing the fee award.

The plaintiff, a construction company, sued the defendant municipality after being disqualified from a Request for Proposals (RFP) process for a City Hall expansion.

The plaintiff alleged that the municipality acted in bad faith and with bias when it disqualified the plaintiff for refusing to sign a confidentiality agreement and for communicating directly with City Council.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff had breached the clear terms of the RFP and that the municipality's decision to disqualify the plaintiff was fair, made in good faith, and based on the advice of an independent fairness advisor.

The court also held that even if the municipality had breached the RFP, the plaintiff would only be entitled to reliance damages, not expectation damages for lost profits.

The defendant brought a motion for the production of numerous documents following a further examination for discovery of the plaintiff's representative.

The defendant sought documents that were not considered by the plaintiff's damages expert in preparing his report, arguing they were relevant to the calculation of damages and mitigation.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that documents not forming the foundational information used by the expert cannot be ordered produced under Rule 31.06(3).

Furthermore, the court found the requested disclosure to be entirely disproportionate under Rule 29.2.03 given the late stage of the proceeding and the volume of irrelevant documentation sought.

The plaintiff successfully opposed the defendants' motion for summary judgment and sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the defendants acted unreasonably in bringing the motion, as there was no factual or legal basis for their limitation period defence regarding the nuisance and snow loading claims.

Additionally, the plaintiff had served an offer to settle the motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixing the quantum at $80,673.62 after applying a 20% reduction to the fees claimed for being moderately excessive.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the basis that the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff claimed damages for anticipated snow loading caused by the construction of an adjacent City Hall addition, as well as damages in nuisance for noise, dust, vibration, and hoarding during construction.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court held that a claim for snow loading damage does not arise until actual damage occurs, and the nuisance claim may constitute a continuing cause of action.

The plaintiffs in two related actions brought motions for the production of information by the corporate defendants under the Business Corporations Act.

The parties settled the motions 'except for costs' and filed written costs submissions.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motions were unnecessary as the defendants ultimately consented to the relief sought.

The court declined to award costs, holding that costs generally should not be awarded when parties settle 'except for costs.' The court reasoned that determining costs in such circumstances would require a hypothetical adjudication of the merits, which is an inefficient use of judicial resources and runs counter to the principle that costs are an incident of the determination of rights, not the subject matter of the dispute itself.

The plaintiff, Husky, brought an action against its founder, Robert Schad, his new company Athena, and others, alleging misuse of confidential information relating to injection molding machines.

Husky claimed that Athena accessed confidential information from Husky machines placed at a third-party facility (Niigon) and used it to develop competing machines.

The defendants argued the claims were statute-barred, that most issues were settled during prior negotiations, and that no confidential information was misused.

The court dismissed Husky's claims, finding they were statute-barred as Husky knew of the material facts more than two years before commencing the action.

The court also found that the commercially available machines were not confidential, and that Athena did not make material use of any confidential information from the prototype machines.

Athena's counterclaim for abuse of process and injurious falsehood was also dismissed for lack of evidence.

Following a motion to strike portions of a statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate costs payable to individually named defendants whose claims had been struck as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff had asserted a $10 million claim against individual employees and directors of corporate defendants without adequately pleading separate acts or interests beyond their corporate roles.

The individual defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the claims constituted tactical harassment.

The court found the claims against the individuals lacked proper particulars but concluded the circumstances did not justify elevated costs.

Partial indemnity costs were instead fixed at reduced amounts reflecting duplication of work with corporate defendants’ counsel.

The defendants moved under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging civil conspiracy, unlawful interference with economic interests, trespass, and breach of confidence arising from alleged GPS tracking of the plaintiff’s service vehicles to obtain customer information.

The court held that the pleadings for civil conspiracy lacked the required material facts and particulars but granted leave to amend.

The claim for intentional interference with economic interests was struck without leave to amend because the pleadings failed to allege unlawful means directed at a third party as required by the Supreme Court’s formulation of the tort.

Allegations against individual corporate officers were struck as an abuse of process for failing to plead independent tortious conduct.

Claims for trespass to chattels and breach of confidence were allowed to proceed, while the trespass to land claim was struck with leave to amend.

The appellant, Jetport Inc., appealed a Master's order regarding discovery refusals in three related actions arising from an aviation insurance coverage dispute.

The court allowed the appeal in part, ordering the respondent insurer to answer questions about its course of conduct with other insureds regarding policy exemptions, finding them relevant to the pleadings.

The court also relieved the appellant from answering a question about claims against other third parties, as it was not relevant to mitigation.

However, the court upheld the Master's order requiring the appellant to answer questions about whether its employee sought legal advice from in-house counsel regarding a pilot clause, finding that disclosing the fact of such discussions did not breach solicitor-client privilege.